In what year was the battle of Rzhev. Summer battle for Rzhev

Summer battle for Rzhev

Thanks to the successful conduct of Operation Seydlitz, the 9th Army eliminated a dangerous threat to its rear from the Russian armies that had broken through in the winter. But there was no time for respite. It was necessary to prepare the newly created front for defense: to replenish and put in order the subunits, to deliver weapons, food supplies and ammunition for the upcoming battles. The German command expected, and, as it turned out later, very timely, that a new major Russian offensive would soon begin.

Near Rzhev, the enemy still suffered failures, but did not surrender and continued to pursue its goal - to break through the German front and encircle the emerging protrusion of the advancing units of the 9th Army.

The capture of Rzhev was supposed to help the Russian Southern Front stop the German offensive along the Stalingrad-Caucasus line, destroying German troops that could have been transferred to the south. In the winter battles for Rzhev, the enemy brought in a large number of manpower. Now his task was to replenish his troops with people and equipment and to eliminate the central German front. At the end of July 1942, 41 rifle divisions, 15 rifle and 38 tank brigades with more than 3,000 tanks, thousands of guns and large air formations began a large offensive against Rzhev and Sychevka. It pursued the goal of breaking through the front of the 9th Army and then with a blow to Vyazma and Smolensk to crush Army Group Center.

The order for the Russian Kalinin Front read:

Order to the soldiers of the Kalinin front

The Motherland is going through difficult days now. The German army fiercely attacked the vital centers of our country. Despite the casualties suffered, Hitler's bandit hordes tried to approach the industrial centers on the Volga near Stalingrad, our Kuban wheat and oil sources.

The increased strength of resistance and the organization of the Red Army forced the enemy to throw into the fight not only the main forces, but also reserves.

Comrades soldiers, officers and political workers of the X Army! The enemy is rushing to the south of our country. It must be stopped and destroyed. Each battle with the enemy, on whatever front it takes place, brings the German occupiers closer to complete defeat.

The powerful, energetic battle that we will give to the enemy in our sector of the front will respond in the south and in Voronezh, providing direct assistance to the Red Army in containing the pressure of the German fascist gang.

I order:

1. Officers, soldiers, political workers of all kinds of troops, infantrymen, artillerymen, tankmen, pilots, mortarmen, machine gunners and tank destroyers boldly and quickly attack the enemy, break through the enemy line of defense, destroy its technical weapons and vigorously pursue the bandits before they come to myself.

2. Take the city of Rzhev.

Brave warriors! You have defeated the Germans more than once. You made them flee from Wedge. At the same time, the enemy seeded the escape routes with thousands of killed. You, together with other units of the Red Army, prevented the capture of Moscow. The Motherland believes in you and sets before you a sacred task: to defeat the enemy grouping near Rzhev and thereby help the valiant soldiers in the south to destroy the German invaders. Take revenge on the bloodthirsty beast for the suffering and tears of your relatives and loved ones, for dishonored Soviet citizens, for burnt down cities and villages, as well as for the destroyed happiness of our children. Ruthlessly destroy the soldiers and weapons of the German fascist army. Follow the example of the heroic defenders of Moscow, who destroyed the storming German army in a counterattack. Imitate their courage, courage, and ferocity in the fight against the enemy. Forward for the Motherland! Forward for Stalin! Forward, brave soldiers! Return the ancient city of Rzhev to the country!

Boldly forward to Rzhev!

3. Bring this order to every company, battery, subunit.

Commander of the Kalinin Front

Colonel General Konev

Member of the Military Council of the Kalinin Front

military commissar Leonov

Chief of staff:

Lieutenant General Zakharov

Russian offensive on Rzhev

On July 30 at 8:00, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the Russian infantry, supported by tanks and aircraft, advanced to a position north of Rzhev. A few hours later, the enemy's offensive began on the Eastern Front north of the Volga. At night, the Red Army managed to achieve a breakthrough in the northern positions of the 256th and 87th infantry divisions.

Anxiety! The 6th Infantry Division (General Grossman) was raised along it, which on July 24 was withdrawn from its positions in the northeast of Rzhev to a resting place and staffing west of Sychevka. And then - an order to march: back to Rzhev to the 6th corps (General Beeler). The first battalion of the 58th regiment left under the command of Chief Lieutenant Gollinde. He had to overcome the quagmire, which the area turned into after 48 hours of rain, without carts and with so much ammunition that the soldiers were able to carry to the Sychevka freight station. The battalion arrived there on July 31 at 6:00 am, plunged under continuous attacks by Russian pilots, which continued in the future, into carriages and at 11:30 reached Rzhev.

It was already dark (19.45) when the commander of the 58th regiment (Colonel Furbakh), making his way with his 1st battalion to Rzhev, received an order from the 6th corps: to destroy the enemy that had broken through to the east of Galakhovo in the direction of point 195.9 and re-occupy the leading edge the main line of defense. He received reinforcements - two sapper companies, a division of cyclists and two self-propelled artillery mounts of the 256th division (General Danhauser).

Colonel Furbach was accompanied only by the adjutant (Chief Lieutenant Gütmann, who later died) and several messengers.

Despite the darkness, Furbach managed to collect all the units scattered in this territory in the area of ​​deployment of both self-propelled guns, bring them to their initial positions and attack the enemy that had broken through on August 1 at 0.30. In a drizzling rain, with great enthusiasm, despite significant enemy resistance, these units recaptured three Russian trenches in close combat and closed the gap north of Polunino.

On July 31, a reconnaissance group (Major von Kalben) of the 328th division landed in Rzhev and became subordinate to the 256th division. In the area of ​​Griboedovo, as a neighbor to the right of the 580th regiment, the group entered the battle. Here Kalben fought bravely and fearlessly until he was left with only a small handful of soldiers. After that, on August 15, he received an order to cross to the right bank of the Volga.

Further to the west, on the very first day of the offensive, the battalion of Major Baron von Rekum fought, which, having arrived in Rzhev, on July 31, was attached to the 87th division (General von Studnitz). On the night of August 1, after several conflicting orders, the battalion moved to Martyukovo, joining the 187th regiment. On the march, another company was attached to it and immediately thrown into the attack. Part of Gorbov and all of Fedorkovo were taken. On August 1, the battalion of von Rekum itself, already without a company, at 3.00 began an offensive on Hanino, supported by a battalion of heavy artillery and an assault gun. The battalion occupied the village and, according to the order, handed it over to its successor.

On August 2, the situation at Gora-Kazeki became very dangerous. Six enemy tanks marched through the village where a battalion surrounded by the Russians was fighting desperately. At this time, only about 90 fighters remained in it. Von Rekum received the order: to take Gory-Kazeki with his two assault guns, release the encircled battalion, capture enemy positions at point 201.4, hand them over to suitable units, return to Martyukovo and change the unit fighting on the front line between Gorbov and Bernikov. With reckless courage, the battalion carried out all assignments. He changed the unit on the front line and became subordinate to the command of the 233rd regiment of the 102nd division. This regiment was replaced by the 187th regiment in the evening. The position entrusted to him was now held by the battalion of von Reckum in a very difficult battle, until only one officer and 22 soldiers remained in it. On August 10, he was withdrawn from battle.

The participation in the battles of the three above-mentioned military units shows how critical the situation turned out to be and how, with the scattered formations, it was possible to bring into battle the troops approaching the front line.

Meanwhile, the entire 6th division was in the center of the battle, north of Rzhev, on the strip between the 256th and 87th divisions. The Russians constantly attacked the German positions. On August 4, at 13:45, Russian bombers raided Polunino, the number of which has not yet been established. Monstrous gaps filled the entrances to the dugouts. The village was ablaze, thick clouds of smoke spreading over the positions, virtually destroyed by artillery and mortar shells. Then attacks began (up to seven per day) with ten, and then twenty or thirty tanks (T-34 and KV-1), supported by infantry. But the German soldiers buried themselves in the wet clay soil and withstood the attacks of the Russian infantrymen in their trenches, cutting them off from the tanks. They were reliably assisted by artillery, which did not spare ammunition. Often she thwarted the attacks of the Russian infantry, without waiting for her to start. Without artillery, it would have been impossible to hold positions. Anti-tank and anti-aircraft batteries were deployed behind the infantry trenches. Self-propelled guns fired at and destroyed Russian tanks. So, on August 5, 21 tanks, mainly of the T-34 type, were destroyed in the area of ​​the 58th regiment. On the front edge of the main line of defense, melee groups rushed to the tanks at every opportunity. On the same day, Lance corporal Schulte-Strathaus (58th regiment) blew up two Russian tanks with grenades, non-commissioned officer Zikman (18th regiment) knocked out three T-60 tanks, and Lieutenant Gerber (sapper battalion of the 6th division) - two T-34. On August 7, battles against tanks continued.

Heavy battles were also fought in the 6th division's zone between Polunino and Gory-Kazeki. Despite this, on August 4, she was supposed to transfer the III division of the artillery regiment of the 161st division to the troops fighting in the Zubtsov area - there the enemy also went on the offensive - and on August 6, a cavalry squadron of a reconnaissance detachment to guard the railway north of Osugi.

The 6th division north of Rzhev, the 256th to the right and the 87th to the left repelled the increasing attacks of the Russians. During the day, Rzhev was constantly fired upon by artillery. With the onset of darkness, this shelling was replaced by an ongoing bombardment. The main goal was the Volga bridges, along which the supply of ammunition and food went, reserves were delivered, and the wounded were evacuated. What feats were performed in this hell by simple messengers, scouts, sleds, and truck drivers! It was an imperceptible heroism full of self-denial. To this day, he deserves fame as a brilliant example of selfless service to military duty.

On August 10, returning from medical leave, Colonel General Model arrived in the army and found a very difficult situation. He immediately drove out to the front line. With impatient short questions, the Model revealed the very essence of the events that were taking place and made an accurate picture of the situation for itself. He understood perfectly well that the answers to his questions had to be extremely clear. Woe to the commander who did not have a clear idea of ​​his sector.

He abruptly suppressed every attempt to dissuade him. Those who wanted to speak his teeth recognized him at first sight. In crisis situations, Model demanded that the commander personally be in the most dangerous area, as he himself did. Only he could demand from the soldiers to go into battle in dangerous situations, who himself risked for them. His orders were short, clear, harsh, and sometimes even brutal. By nature, soft and warm, he hid this impressionable and delicate soul from outsiders. I was constantly looking for new means and ways out of this situation. And the 9th Army held out.

The entire Northern Front was on fire that day. At 4.30, after a systematic artillery preparation of guns of all calibers, the introduction of rocket launchers and bombers into battle, the Russian fiery shaft began to move. The explosions of the shells could be seen all the way to the horizon. Behind it ledges were tanks, covering each other from anti-tank guns. They fired at individual firing points, which tried to cut off the accompanying infantry, or leveled them to the ground.

Aviation, artillery, armored personnel carriers, anti-aircraft crews, anti-tank and field guns accompanied the attacks of infantrymen, sappers, and cavalrymen. From 5.15 to 18.30 attacks followed one another.

The battles were endless and hard. On August 10, the reconnaissance detachment of the 328th division and other formations located nearby fought on the left flank of the 256th division. German bombers dropped bombs on the enemy troops, who had taken up their initial position. And yet the Russians continued to attack. But their advance met with a counterstrike. It was carried out especially effectively by the 2nd company of the 6th engineer battalion of the 6th infantry division. The battalion commander, Captain Tummes, was killed, but 25 enemy tanks were burned on the battlefield. To the left of the 18th regiment, the battalion of von Rekum and the 3rd battalion of the 37th regiment destroyed 14 Russian tanks in the same battle. The position was held, albeit with the last bit of strength. The enemy did not pass. Once a counterattack was struck by convoy officers and logisticians, and once detained vacationers. The counterstrike was led in one case by the platoon leader with his messengers, in the other - by the company commander with a command group, in the third - by the battalion commander with his headquarters and, finally, by the regiment commander with several hastily assembled soldiers. The defense cost everyone nerves: from the commander-in-chief to the youngest commander. The Russians were overwhelmingly superior. On August 14 at 12:00 in front of the 9th Army there were 47 rifle, 5 cavalry divisions, 18 rifle and 37 tank brigades.

On August 20, the 256th division finally had to yield to the mighty Russian pressure. She retreated to the southern bank of the Volga. On August 21, this forced the 14th Motorized Division, fighting to her right, to leave the northern coast as well. She barely managed to cross with all the heavy equipment and guns at Matyukovo to the other bank along the bridge built between Rzhev and Zubtsovy.

On the north of the Rzhev bank of the Volga, the 6th division together with units of the 129th and the 87th to the left of it fought heavy battles.

While in the south the Eastern Front reached the Caucasus and a German flag was hoisted on Elbrus, a powerful battle took place on August 24 in the Rzhev region.

A fiery hurricane of artillery, mortar and rocket shots, reinforced by a real hail of bombs, hit the 6th and 87th divisions. An armored train also took part in the fight against the German troops. Clouds of smoke and burning rose from the battlefield, pierced by bright lightning from exploding mines and bombs. Exploding, the shells lifted clods of earth into the air to the height of the houses. The thunder of aircraft engines merged with the flapping shots of 88-mm guns like from a whip, with the roar of artillery fire, the crackle of machine guns and the hum of tanks. The explosions from the shells of the heavy guns were intertwined with the crackle of rifles and machine guns. The wire communications were instantly severed. Despite all the efforts of the signalmen, it was simply impossible to repair them under fire.

Tanks were advancing everywhere! The losses multiplied. One attack was replaced by another, one blow - a counterstrike. A German soldier fought in inhuman conditions and still fought off the attacks of the Russians. They only succeeded in one place. Several groups of 60 tanks marched past the weak 2nd Battalion of the 18th Regiment. The battalion commander was paddled under the collapsed embankment of the pillbox, his rifle slots were destroyed by fire or overwhelmed. Heavy and anti-tank artillery, self-propelled guns fired to the last opportunity. Some of them are out of order. German aviation helped the troops. However, the enemy still managed to attack and eventually break through to Rzhev. Captain Raine tried to fix the situation on his own. From his battalion (1st battalion of the 18th regiment) he took some of the soldiers and, together with the rest of the 2nd battalion of the aviation training regiment, launched an attack on the flank of the Russians. However, like the offensive of the 87th Division, it only brought a short respite. The Russians counterattacked on the Volga. The 6th and 87th divisions were separated. Two tank brigades of the Soviets (the 238th, reinforced by units of two tank brigades moving behind them, and the newly introduced 153rd) continued the offensive. At least 64 damaged tanks remained on the battlefield.

On August 25, the 6th division and the newly created Kolberg division formed a weak defense line that held back enemy attacks. On the night of August 26, the 6th division, with the units attached to it, took a position close to the city of Rzhev. On August 26, the Russian attacks were aimed primarily against the 87th division. Here the enemy managed to recapture a small bridgehead on the southern bank of the Volga at Znamenskoye. The enemy's attempt to advance further crashed against the staunch defenses of the 87th Division, which was preparing for the transition to the southern coast. Further west from August 27, strong Russian attacks were repelled by the 251st Division. Day after day there was a struggle for Rzhev! Aerial photography reflected the full force of mortar and bomb fire. Four weeks later, it was impossible to recognize either houses or streets in Rzhev. As in the First World War, on the Somme, a landscape of solid craters emerged on the site of the city. Thus ended August and began September. Every day, in the early morning hours, after a powerful artillery preparation and bombing, Russian infantry and tanks went to the Rzhev bridgehead. Here they fought stubbornly and fiercely: the 428th regiment (6th division) and the 1st battalion of the 430th regiment (129th division), the remnants of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 18th regiment, as well as 37- 1st regiment (6th division) and 473rd (253rd division), artillery heavy batteries (2nd battalion of the 57th regiment, 808th and 848th regiments), 189th division of self-propelled guns, 561st anti-tank division, combat crews of the 4th anti-aircraft regiment and the 2nd battalion of the 49th regiment. Sappers and aviation actively entered into a heated struggle.

Motorcycle battalion "Great Germany" under the command of Captain Vetien, who is still in reserve, on September 21, established contact with the 6th division stationed in Rzhev, receiving the necessary information from it. On the evening of September 22, he took up a position on the northern city outskirts of Rzhev. The bombing continued throughout the night.

All the days after September 21, the attacks of the Russians continued: infantry and tanks, armed with flamethrowers, were advancing. German infantry and sappers fought with fierce fury, letting the enemy pass through their line, and then counter-attacks from the rear. Chief Feldwebel Schnitger of the 18th regiment was especially brave. He often attacked the enemy with only a handful of soldiers and knocked him out of the trenches. All units fought in this death ring to their last strength. So the 1st battalion of the 18th regiment, the 1st battalion of the 37th and the sapper of the 6th division, which was sent here from the 2nd battalion of the 252nd regiment of the 110th division, quickly received reinforcements and were again thrown into battle.

The battles of September 27 were particularly intense. At 4.00 the Russians managed to break into Rzhev. After many hours of bloody battle, the reserves of the 473rd regiment and the motorcyclists of "Great Germany", supported by tanks and self-propelled guns of the 189th division, were able to push the enemy back. Many enemy positions were destroyed by German artillery. The Russian attempt to invade Rzhev in the northeastern sector, despite the energetic attacks of the enemy, was eliminated, but it was not completely eliminated. The enemy, in spite of heavy losses, threw more and more forces onto this ledge. Russian soldiers dug in with lightning speed. Enemy tanks were hiding in the craters from the shells. They were barely visible and difficult to deal with. The tanks fired as if out of the ground and produced a devastating effect, forcing the assault groups to crawl on their bellies on the ground. However, the Russians never managed to achieve decisive success. Ju-87 dive bombers dropped bombs, heavy artillery hit with pinpoint fire, anti-tank and self-propelled guns rained down on the enemy. And yet it could not be destroyed.

On October 2, at 05:05, the 14th Tank Infantry Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Tank Regiment of the 5th Division, the Great Germany tank company and part of the 189th Self-Propelled Guns Division launched an attack against the emerging breakthrough in the northeastern outskirts cities. Despite the most thorough reconnaissance and artillery preparation of the artillery of the 126th division, the 6th division and Langenbeck's group from the 256th division, it was not possible to complete the attack. The vanguard reached its goal, but the center encountered particularly strong resistance from a deeply echeloned, heavily fortified enemy position with buried tanks and a densely occupied defensive front. Another enemy counteroffensive from the north and northeast prevented the German attack. There was a ledge here that was blocked. According to prisoners of war, the Russian attack was unexpected for them and did not allow them to concentrate their forces for a new counteroffensive. The following figures indicate the strength of the enemy: 113 prisoners were captured from five different divisions (52nd, 215th, 220th, 369th, 375th) and two brigades (30th motorized rifle and 32nd anti-tank) ... The enemy also had losses in tanks and anti-tank guns (12 tanks and 9 guns). Unfortunately, the German losses were also very high, especially in the tanks, which moved too slowly along the terrain pitted with shells from the shells.

In mid-October, the Russian attacks ceased. The city of Rzhev still remained in the hands of the Germans.

Battle northeast of Sychevka

Only at the end of July 1942, on the orders of Army Group Center, the 46th Panzer Corps took over the defense of a calm 100-kilometer section that stretched east from Samoilovo to Gridino - and was occupied by the 342nd, 161st and 14th motorized divisions. There was no operational reserve. Until now, the enemy had not launched an attack, but the situation soon changed. Already on July 25, it became known about movements in the enemy's sector, which the Russians, unlike their previous tactics, did not even disguise. On July 29, twice over the loudspeaker, the Russians openly announced an offensive on July 30 against the VI Corps. On the same day, attacks began on the left wing of the tank corps north of the Volga, which led to only a slight advance of the Russian troops by 100 meters. The next day, a German counterattack returned them to their former positions. In the early morning of August 4, the Russians launched a decisive attack with forces even more significant than in the Rzhev area. Numerous tank formations took part in it, opposing the 161st and the left wing of the 36th motorized divisions on both outskirts of the Pogorely Gorodishche. Each division of the enemy had a front width of one or two kilometers and moved in waves in three regiments one after the other. In total, about two tank brigades with 80-100 tanks took part in the offensive. The rest of the divisions were behind in full combat readiness. On the German side, each sector of one or two kilometers was defended by only one company.

Heavy artillery fire, mortars, Katyusha rocket launchers, as well as bombs dropped by aircraft, fell on the German soldiers. One group of tanks rushed after another and easily overcame the weak line of German trenches, which were swept off the face of the earth by a hail of mines and shells. In the afternoon of August 4, two directions of enemy strikes were determined: one - north of Pogorely - was aimed at Zubtsov (Russian 31st Army) and the other - to the south, in the direction of Sychevka (20th Army). Despite the selfless defense of all combat arms, the enemy's attack could not be stopped. The situation has become critical. The front was broken.

On August 5, the enemy's northern group approached Zubtsov, its other units cut the important road Karmanovo - Zubtsov and thereby interrupted the communication of the tank corps with the 161st and 14th motorized divisions. The corps was no longer able to command these divisions, which came to the disposal of a neighboring unit. To defend the flank of the southern wedge, the Russians turned four or five divisions and a tank brigade south against Karmanovo, the command post of the 46th Panzer Corps, and pushed forward. The 36th Motorized Division under the command of General Golnik firmly held the position. On August 5, the 2nd Panzer Division began to approach the front line, which was supposed to engage in battle as soon as all the tanks approached. But she was never able to connect with the 36th Motorized Division. Aviation was called in to help; she destroyed the accumulation of enemy troops, but was never able to hold back the Russian advance. The bravely fighting 36th Motorized Division continued to hold an important point of defense - the village of Voskresenskoye - until the evening of August 7. On the same day, with the introduction of three infantry divisions, three infantry and about four tank brigades (consisting mainly of new American tanks) into battle, the Russian offensive began on the right flank (342nd division and a tank corps). A few days later, it became clear that the Russian 5th Army was about to launch an attack on the left wing of the 342nd Division.

The Russian breakthrough threatened to cut the supply routes along the Sychevka-Zubtsov highway and the Sychevka-Rzhev railroad. It was necessary to urgently send troops to this sector.

The 84th Infantry Regiment of the 102nd Division plunged into Olenino on 31 July and went to the aid of the 4th Army. On the way, the 5th and 8th companies were taken away from the regiment in order to bring them into battle in the area east of Rzhev. Both company commanders were killed. Their further fate is unknown. On August 2, the 84th regiment landed on the line south of Bezdon - Spas-Demensk. On August 3, after a 40-kilometer march, the regiment was ordered to return. In Spas-Demensk, the regiment was loaded onto Ju-52 aircraft and sent to Sychevka.

The first to land in Sychevka was the 1st company of the 84th regiment under the command of Chief Lieutenant Bivald. She received an order from the chief of staff of the 9th Army: to take the station in Osug and approach Markovo (12 km north of Osuga), or, if this village is already occupied by the enemy, to gain a foothold on the edge of the forest west of Chashnikovo. The fulfillment of this order was very important, because with the loss of the Osuga railway station, the supply of the units fighting in Rzhev was interrupted. Seven kilometers north of Markovo, the battle group of Bülowius was defended; further south there were no troops.

At one o'clock in the morning, the 1st company of 105 people set off from Sychevka and reached the Osuga railway station at dawn. Russian soldiers began to come across from time to time. It turned out that the station was guarded by separate groups of Cossacks. At 9.00 the company reached the edge of the forest west of Chashnikovo and took up a perimeter defense. Intelligence has established: the enemy has occupied Markovo. Already in the middle of the day, the enemy attacked the company with weak forces, but, having received a rebuff, retreated. During the night, the company dug trenches. The lack of horse-drawn transport and tools made her position much more difficult. The next day promised fierce battles. And so it happened. The enemy began shelling and mortar shelling in the morning, followed by seven attacks. Then the soldiers of the company attacked the Russians in the enemy trenches, and close combat ensued. The signalmen of the Bülowius group received a radio signal from the company, in which she asked for support with heavy weapons. At 19.00, a 20-mm quadruple anti-aircraft gun arrived at her, which successfully hit the observation post located in the Chashnikov church and other important targets, providing significant assistance to the company. Unfortunately, the anti-aircraft gun had to go back at nightfall. In battles, the company suffered such heavy losses that it could now remain as a reserve. As a result of direct hits of shells, many machine guns were out of order. The company commander considered the further intentions of the enemy and decided whether the company would be able to withstand tomorrow. The ammunition was running out. They had to be protected. Each shot had to find its target. Left only to itself, the company fought hard.

On August 7, at dusk, the Russians launched an offensive. Attacks followed one another. They could hardly be repelled by counterattacks, in which the entire company command, led by Bivald, directly participated. By the afternoon of the company, only 22 people remained. The order came from the 84th regiment: to retreat. But at this time the enemy launched a new brutal attack and forced the company to leave its trenches. She no longer had the strength to fight further. Meanwhile, on August 6, the 1st battalion reached Osugi, then the station was occupied by the entire 84th regiment and, finally, the 102nd division. The company fulfilled its task in a truly heroic struggle and thereby ensured uninterrupted supply of Rzhev.

On August 6, a cavalry squadron of a reconnaissance group of the 6th division made a march from Rzhev to Osuga in order to ensure the protection of a section of the railway north of the station with a length of 9 kilometers. But in this sector, the squadron managed to capture only individual strong points. On August 8, his reconnaissance established that the Russians had left Osugi and moved west. On August 9, already in the first morning hours, the enemy reached the forest west and north-west of Staroselya, four kilometers east of the railway. Soon a battle began on it and to the west of it, near Shalamovo.

The supply of the 9th Army by rail stopped. The cavalrymen had to endure a fierce battle against a large and well-armed enemy. The situation has become critical! A German armored train stationed in Rzhev took part in this battle with great success. On August 11, the surrendered village of Shalamovo was again taken away in fierce close combat. The enemy was destroyed.

The 195th regiment of the 78th division arrived by rail in Osugu at the disposal of the command of the 102nd division (General Friesner). On August 12, the division with the 195th regiment on its left flank attacked the enemy in the forest north of Osugi, threw him back and closed the gap that had formed. On August 14-15, the 195th regiment repulsed strong Russian attacks and destroyed seven enemy tanks.

Let us now return to the actions of the 36th Motorized and 342nd Infantry Divisions.

By August 10, the 2nd Panzer Division managed to build a cut-off position south-west of Voskresenskoye (on the Kryvtsy - Gladkoye - Lebedin line) and, on the left, make contact with the 1st Panzer Division, which had been transferred from the Spas-Demensk area to Gzhat. Here its units fought together with the 85th engineer and construction battalions against a powerful enemy. Every day, the enemy with two or three rifle divisions and the 8th tank corps (about 5 tank brigades, and they were armed with completely new Canadian tanks) attacked the German positions. The losses increased and the line of defense weakened. And this despite the fact that on August 9, only one 2nd Panzer Division destroyed 64 Russian tanks, and parts of the 10th Anti-Aircraft Regiment - even more. The enemy had literally inexhaustible sources of replenishment.

Attacking the 342nd division, the enemy tried to capture the highlands lying north and east of Karmanovo. The situation here was becoming very dangerous. On August 9, German troops were still repelling enemy attacks, but on the 10th the Russians succeeded in a wide breakthrough on the left flank of the 342nd division, which forced it to retreat beyond the Yauza.

Ahead of the 342nd, the 36th motorized division was entrenched, which, with an unprotected left flank, repelled enemy attacks from the north on the 2nd Panzer Division. Large Russian forces there were advancing south and southeast, and the tankers were threatened by the enemy from the rear. The division could be surrounded. She was ordered to withdraw. On the night of August 10-11, she fought her way to the south and left without great losses. The high skill of the tankers, their courage and discipline have been proven in practice. The divisional commander, General Golnik, deserved special praise, whose cool and prudent leadership helped to cope with the difficult task. The enemy's pressure on the 2nd Panzer Division from the north and northwest was withstood, as were the attacks on the 342nd division, which was defending on the Samoilov-Karmanovo line. To the east of Karmanovo, the reinforced II battalion of the 113th tank regiment of the 1st tank division fought. In the course of the hardest battle, he was virtually destroyed. On August 28, only one officer and 12 soldiers returned to their regiment from the entire battalion. The bulk of the 215th regiment of the 78th division and two battalions of the neighboring right corps had to be transferred to this most difficult sector.

In early August, the 78th division was transferred from the Yukhnov area (80 km southeast of Vyazma) to the Rzhev area. Its reinforced 195th regiment joined, as already mentioned, to the 102nd division, and the reinforced 215th regiment to the left wing of the 342nd division. The 2nd battalion of the 215th regiment was withdrawn from its composition and, along with the 1st tank division, entered the battle at Gzhati. In the early morning of August 11, about a third of the 78th division reached the area of ​​the 342nd division near Samoilovo. She suffered heavy losses and was forced to retreat. The Russians surrounded three German battalions west of the Yauza River in Shelomki and Krutom. To the north, the 215th regiment (without the 2nd battalion) fought against enemy tanks near the village of Bolshie Nosovye. Here the 1st battalion of the 215th regiment was surrounded. The 78th division immediately dispatched the 178th engineer battalion there. On the same day (August 11) at 16:00, both battalions of the 14th regiment, supported by the battalion of the 178th artillery regiment, set out to break through the cauldron, into which the battalions of the 342nd division fell. The forest roads turned out to be impassable, so that these troops covered three kilometers in only two hours. At about 19.00, battalions of the 14th regiment met with the enemy, attacked him and threw him back. An hour and a half later, the battalions were released. The reinforced 479th regiment (Volkovitz's battle group), allocated by the neighboring right army (3rd Panzer), was brought into battle between the 342nd and 36th motorized divisions. Here the enemy strove especially stubbornly towards Karmanovo. The Russians threw in large forces here (19th rifle and 1st guards rifle divisions, 154th and 161st tank brigades), threatening from the flanks. In this situation, the situation became more complicated for the German formations. Powerful artillery barrage - up to 9,000 rounds per day - destroyed the German fortifications. Russian aviation also operated at the same time. On August 12, 55 enemy tanks were knocked out south of Shelomka. Only one staff sergeant Barth, with his anti-tank crew, destroyed 30 of them.

In the following days, the enemy cut the Samoilovo-Karmanovo supply line. In the battle with him, the 479th regiment especially distinguished itself: it again occupied two villages. In the area of ​​operation of the 36th Motorized Division, located on the arc facing the northeast, the main attack of the Russians was expected by August 15. The 8th Infantry Corps tried to capture Karmanovo from the northeast. Here he attacked the 2nd Panzer Division. The Russians continuously stormed Karmanovo from the north and northwest. Attacks, breakthroughs and counterattacks replaced each other, and the German troops were gradually pushed back to Karmanovo. On August 21, air reconnaissance reported that the enemy was transferring powerful forces from the north (about 700 carts and 40 tanks), the 46th Panzer Corps made a difficult decision: to withdraw, with the consent of the army command, the troops and surrender Karmanovo.

On August 22 and 23, in heavy battles, during which 20 enemy tanks were knocked out, troops were withdrawn. The enemy pursued them, but in the early morning of 24 August the Panzer Corps had already taken up new positions. Thus, the retreat in this sector was completed. But the fighting continued. Subsequent Russian attacks were repelled with the support of artillery and aviation. On September 4, the last enemy attack, involving a large number of infantry and tanks, failed. In front of the 46th Panzer Corps, 460 destroyed enemy tanks remained. Of these, 131 were destroyed by the 78th division, the remaining 77 - by the 10th anti-aircraft regiment.

On August 13, the Russian offensive began south of the deployment of the 3rd Panzer Army. However, the enemy, despite his superiority in men and technology, could not break through to Vyazma. He was stopped by the city's brave defenders, despite their widely stretched positions.

In the second half of August, the "Great Germany" division (General Hoernlein) was transferred by the command of Army Group "South" to the Smolensk region, and then closer to the place of the Russian breakthrough south of Zubtsov. When on September 9, after a powerful artillery barrage, the Russians broke through the front at Cherkasovo - west of Zubtsov, “Great Germany” was immediately alerted in order to counterattack and restore the previous position. With the onset of darkness, the division's formations, despite constant bombing by the light of Russian aviation flares, reached their initial positions. Significant losses did not prevent the two regiments of "Greater Germany" from performing early in the morning of September 10: the 2nd - under the command of Colonel Garski - on the right and the 1st - under the command of Chief Lieutenant Graim - on the left. They were supported by artillery, tanks, self-propelled guns and Ju-87 aircraft. The infantry advanced slowly: the Russians rained unprecedented artillery, rocket and mortar fire on them. Bombers constantly dived from the air. Attack followed attack. Cannon fire and minefields caused losses in the "Great Germany" division, and the swampy soil forced it to operate in a narrow space under enemy fire. His defense of Cherkasovo and Kostonosovo made it impossible to take these villages. However, attacks by one Russian army and one tank corps were repulsed. The shelves began to dig in. 13 aircraft, 19 tanks, 13 anti-tank guns and 2 self-propelled guns of the enemy were destroyed. But “Greater Germany” also got a big hit.

After a relatively quiet night on September 11, the offensive resumed. Just like yesterday, the Russians opened deadly fire.

Again, one attack followed another. Only with great difficulty in a stubborn and fierce struggle did the German soldiers slowly advance. The left neighbor of the 72nd division left Mikhevo. The reserve battalion of the 1st regiment hurried to the rescue.

Beginning on September 12, the Russians, having introduced infantry and tank forces into the battle, tried to break through again into the area of ​​deployment of the "Great Germany" division. They did not succeed, but the German offensive did not take place either. It was like a boxing match with heavy losses on both sides.

Yet on September 22, the situation finally changed. After detailed preparation and support by artillery and aviation, an offensive followed at 17.00, in which the assault sapper battalion "Great Germany" was in the center of the struggle. With bundles of hand grenades and flamethrowers, riflemen and sappers rushed at the enemy and stormed the bastion located in the cemetery. It was a skyscraper adjacent to Cherkasovo in the east. The terrain on the right and left was also cleared of the enemy by an attack using hand grenades. The captured trenches were put in order. The soldiers prepared for the defense. On September 23, the enemy tried in vain to seize the division's position. On September 30, in accordance with the order of the army, "Great Germany", together with its neighbor, the 72nd division, launched an offensive. At first it was successful, but soon the Russians cut off the left wing of Grosser's battle group from the "Greater Germany" with a powerful fire strike. In the subsequent, which brought considerable casualties to the battle, it was still possible to achieve the goal of the offensive and improve the position on the front edge of the main line of defense. However, the division's losses were too great. The commander of the 2nd regiment, Colonel Garski, was mortally wounded. "Great Germany" still continued to hold the position, having the 129th divisions on the right and 72nd divisions on the left. Between 6 and 9 October, "Greater Germany" was sent to rest in the Olenino region. Its place was taken by the 95th division.

In mid-October, Russian attacks in the Zubtsovo area died down. For ten long weeks, the Russians, regardless of human losses and loss of equipment, put pressure on the weakening ranks of the German defense. Very dangerous moments arose, which were averted only thanks to the arrival of three tank divisions and a large number of infantry divisions on the battlefields, which were intended for Army Group South. Enemy planes tried to prevent the transfer of troops. They repeatedly bombed the railway line and train stations. The railroad workers showed the same courage and combat readiness as their comrades in field uniforms.

The Russians suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment, but threw more and more manpower and tanks into the German positions. Lacking ammunition, they tried to break through to Rzhev. A large role here was played by the aviation brought into battle. The battles went on with varying success. The hardest workload experienced by both the rank and file and the commanders was constantly increasing. The German front held out, although the enemy managed to break through our positions south of Zubtsovo. He was able to push back the German units to the outskirts of Rzhev, to reach the banks of the Volga on both sides of the city. However, he did not achieve his goal - to recapture two important points from the 9th Army - Sychevka and Rzhev. Rzhev remained in German hands. It was staunchly defended by the 6th division with subordinate units of the 129th, 251st and 253rd.

The summer battle in the Rzhev area finally ended with the success of the German troops. Their command was in the reliable hands of Colonel-General Model. The warrior's skill and unusual strength of character inspired all the fighters of the 9th Army. He was her driving force. And not only the commanders subordinate to him felt the power of his will, Model was adamant before Hitler, openly defending his point of view. Hitler was impressed by the fact that Model understood well the current situation on the front line, took decisive measures, if necessary, skillfully improvised and with honor came out of critical situations. He could declare his disagreement with Hitler frankly, without fear of conflict. Once Hitler decided to move a tank corps closer to Gzhatsk. The model believed that it was better to leave it next to Rzhev. Both insisted on their point of view. The argument grew more and more violent, and finally Model shouted:

"My Fuhrer, are you in command of the 9th Army or am I?" Shocked by this harsh response, Hitler decided to confirm his point of view by order. Then Model said loudly: "I have to protest." Confused and frightened, the Hitlerite retinue stood around: no one had ever admitted such a tone in relation to Hitler. To their surprise, Hitler suddenly conceded: "Okay Model, do what you want, but you will answer with your head if you are wrong." Everyone sighed with relief. Hitler respected in the Model a person of great potential. This explains the reason that Hitler did not punish him for his bold speech.

In the summer battle, all parts of the army interacted in an exemplary manner:

infantrymen, cavalrymen and sappers fought on the battlefield with the greatest courage;

gunners, tank destroyers, tankers, anti-aircraft gunners and crews of armored personnel carriers, despite heavy enemy fire, helped the infantry;

signalmen under enemy fire eliminated breaks in the wires; couriers, if communication failed, fled under the bullets, but delivered reports on time;

doctors and orderlies with improvised means rescued the wounded under fire, taking them out of the battle;

veterinarians took care of the fighter's fighting friend - the horse; under a hail of shells and bombs, the trainmen, cooks and supplies delivered everything necessary to the sectors vital for the fighting front;

repair and restoration services day and night repaired weapons and, finally, German aviation at the most decisive moments supported the soldiers during battles and destroyed Soviet aircraft in air battles.

Reliable defense was ensured by self-sacrifice, an unshakable will to victory and perseverance in battle.

Despite the seemingly insoluble tasks assigned to the German soldiers, bad weather, at times a complete lack of food, an unfavorable terrain for fighting, they performed their duty, fighting for life and death.

From the book The Great War of Russia [Why the Russian people are invincible] the author Kozhinov Vadim Valerianovich

Moscow - Rzhev - Berlin Victory on the Moscow frontiers is not without reason called a "miracle". It would seem that Moscow was doomed, and the largest enterprises and even the subway were already preparing for the explosion. The enemy's confidence in the speedy seizure of Moscow was clearly expressed in two facts:

From the book The grin of death. 1941 on the Eastern Front by Haape Heinrich

Rzhev A few days later, Volpius left us with a transfer back to Germany. The translation was arranged by Noack; Heinrich and I took the old staff to Rzhev on our horse-drawn sleigh carriage. We dropped him off at the railway station, wished the soldiers' luck,

From the book Tank Battles. Combat use of tanks in World War II. 1939-1945 the author Mellenthin Friedrich Wilhelm von

The Russian Summer Offensive Military historians, explaining the unexpected defeat of Germany in 1918, concluded that it was caused by the failure of the great Ludendorff offensive. One of them wrote about the drop in the morale of the army, which realized that “it had used up its

author Grossman Horst

Rzhev The first mention of Rzhev, located near Lake Ilmen, dates back to 1019. Then it belonged to the Novgorod principality and was founded by the Vikings.Due to its favorable position in the upper Volga, along which raftsmen drove their forest, Rzhev served as an apple for a long time

From the book Rzhevsky nightmare through the eyes of the Germans author Grossman Horst

Summer battle between Rzhev and Bely ("Seydlitz") The victorious actions of the German army in winter made it possible to completely restore the supply of the 9th Army, freeing the supply routes from enemy attacks. But in its rear there were still powerful forces of the Kalinin Front, which received

From the book Rzhevsky nightmare through the eyes of the Germans author Grossman Horst

Summer battle for Rzhev Thanks to the successful implementation of Operation Seydlitz, the 9th Army eliminated a dangerous threat to its rear from the Russian armies that had broken through in winter. But there was no time for respite. It was necessary to prepare the newly created front for defense:

author Grossman Horst

Rzhev (Map) In 1019 Rzhev was first mentioned in books. Then it belonged to the Novgorod state on Lake Ilmen, founded by the Vikings. Due to its advantageous position in the upper reaches of the Volga, along which the raftsmen drove their forest downstream, Rzhev for a long time

From the book Rzhev - the cornerstone of the Eastern Front (Rzhev nightmare through the eyes of the Germans) author Grossman Horst

The Russian offensive on the city of Rzhev on July 30 at 8.00 after an hour and a half artillery preparation, the Russian infantry, supported by tanks and aircraft, advanced north of Rzhev. A few hours later, the enemy offensive spread to the eastern front north of the Volga. Night Red

From the book Rzhev - the cornerstone of the Eastern Front (Rzhev nightmare through the eyes of the Germans) author Grossman Horst

MAP 3. Winter battle for Rzhev. January-February 1942

From the book Rzhev - the cornerstone of the Eastern Front (Rzhev nightmare through the eyes of the Germans) author Grossman Horst

MAP 6. Summer battle between Rzhev and Bely. July 1942

From the book Rzhev - the cornerstone of the Eastern Front (Rzhev nightmare through the eyes of the Germans) author Grossman Horst

MAP 7. Summer battle for Rzhev. End of July - October 1942

From the book Rzhev - the cornerstone of the Eastern Front (Rzhev nightmare through the eyes of the Germans) author Grossman Horst

MAP 10. Rzhev-Sychevka area.

From the book German Occupation of Northern Europe. Combat operations of the Third Reich. 1940-1945 by Zimke Earl

Soviet Summer Offensive The attack of June 10, 1944 was a black day for the Finnish army. After massive artillery barrage and aerial bombardment, as well as reconnaissance in force, carried out on June 9, in the morning of the 10th, the 21st Army launched a concentrated attack on the left flank division of the Finnish IV

From the book Ecumenical Councils the author Anton Kartashev

35-year division of churches (484-519) because of the Enoticon Pope Simplicius kept asking the capital to expel Peter Mong. Imagine his amazement when, in 482, he received the news of the non-recognition of John Talaya, who had been elected to the Alexandrian see, and his promotion to his

From the book German Occupation of Northern Europe. 1940-1945 by Zimke Earl

Soviet Summer Offensive The attack on June 10, 1944 was a dark day for the Finnish army. After massive artillery barrage and aerial bombardment, as well as reconnaissance in force on June 9, on the morning of the 10th, the 21st Army launched a concentrated attack on the left flank division of the Finnish IV

Rzhev, USSR

Exhausting battles from both sides. USSR victory

Opponents

Germany

Commanders

Zhukov G.K.

G. von Kluge

I. S. Konev

B. Model

Purkaev M.A.

Efremov M.G.

Sokolovsky V.D.

Forces of the parties

Unknown

Unknown

433,037 non-returnable, 891,786 sanitary

330,000 non-returnable, 450,000 sanitary

Combat actions of Soviet and German troops during the Great Patriotic War, which took place in the area of ​​the Rzhev salient from January 8, 1942 to March 31, 1943, with intervals from one and a half to three months. They include four offensive operations of the Soviet troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts against the German Army Group Center, aimed at defeating the main forces of the Center, liberating the cities of Rzhev, Sychevka, Vyazma and thereby eliminating the Rzhev salient. It ended with the liquidation of the Rzhevsky ledge.

Origin of the term

The term was introduced into modern historiography by Russian historians S.A. Gerasimova, O. Kondratyev and others. In Soviet historiography, the events of 1942-1943 on the Rzhev salient were viewed as a series of independent Soviet offensive operations. In modern Russian historiography, the hostilities on the Rzhev salient are assessed as an independent strategic operation of the Red Army.

In the memory of the Soviet soldier and Soviet citizens, the Rzhev salient, the Rzhev arch remained "the Rzhev meat grinder", "a breakthrough."

We were advancing on Rzhev along the cadaveric fields. During the battles of Rzhev, many "valleys of death" and "groves of death" appeared. It is difficult for those who have not been there to imagine what a stinking mess under the summer sun, consisting of thousands of human bodies covered with worms, is. Summer, heat, calm, and ahead - this is such a "valley of death." It is clearly visible and shot by the Germans. There is no way to pass or bypass it: a telephone cable has been laid along it - it is interrupted, and at all costs it must be quickly connected. You crawl over corpses, and they are piled in three layers, swollen, teeming with worms, emitting a sickening sweetish smell of decomposition of human bodies. This stench hangs motionless over the "valley". The explosion of the shell drives you under the corpses, the soil shudders, the corpses fall on you, showering with worms, a fountain of pernicious stench hits your face. But then the fragments flew by, you jump up, dust yourself off and again - forward.

P.A.Mikhin, We Died To Win

In the people's memory, the battles near Rzhev remained the most terrible. In the villages of many districts around Rzhev, there is an expression "drove under Rzhev." Also, German veterans recall with horror the battles in the "large space of Rzhev."

Stages of the Battle of Rzhev

Within 17 months, Soviet troops, one after another, carried out four major offensive operations with a total duration of 8 months. The German side all this time tried to keep a strategically advantageous foothold in the center of the Eastern Front.

  • Rzhev-Vyazemskaya strategic offensive operation of the Kalinin and Western fronts (January 8 - April 20, 1942).
    • At the same time, the Bolkhov operation was carried out by the troops of the Bryansk Front and the left wing of the Western Front.
    • Defensive operation of the troops of the group of General P. A. Belov of the Western Front (May - June 1942).
    • Defensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin Front in the area of ​​the city of Bely (July 2-27, 1942).
  • The first Rzhev-Sychevskaya (Gzhatskaya) offensive operation of the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts (July 30 - October 1, 1942).
  • The second Rzhev-Sychevskaya offensive operation ("Mars") of the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts (November 25 - December 20, 1942).
    • Simultaneously: the Velikie Luki operation of a part of the forces of the Kalinin Front (November 24, 1942 - January 20, 1943).
  • Rzhev-Vyazemskaya offensive operation of the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts (March 2 - March 31, 1943).
    • Simultaneously: the offensive of the troops of the Bryansk and Central fronts.

Battles of German troops

  • Capture of Rzhev (October 1941).
  • Winter battle for Rzhev (January - February 1942).
    • Operations "Hanover-I" and "Hanover-II" (May - June 1942).
  • Operation Seydlitz (July 2-12, 1942).
  • Summer battle for Rzhev (late July - mid-October 1942).
  • Winter battle around the block of the 9th Army (November 25 - December 15, 1942).
    • Operation Buffel (it. Büffel- "Buffalo") (February 1943).
  • Sixth battle for Rzhev (March 1943).

Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation of 1942

Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation (January 8 - April 20, 1942) - an offensive operation of the troops of Kalininsky (commander - Colonel General I.S.Konev) and Western (commander - Army General G.K. Zhukov) fronts, carried out with the assistance of the North Western and Bryansk fronts.

The operation was an integral part of the strategic offensive of the Soviet troops in the winter of 1941-1942 and was aimed at completing the defeat of the German Army Group Center (commanded by Field Marshal G. von Kluge). Despite its incompleteness, the operation was of great importance in the course of the general offensive of the Red Army. Soviet troops threw back the enemy in the western direction by 80-250 kilometers, completed the liberation of the Moscow and Tula regions, liberated many areas of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions.

The losses of Soviet troops in the operation, according to official data, amounted to 776,889 people, of which 272,320 people, or 25.7%, were irrecoverable, and 504,569 people were sanitary.

The first Rzhev-Sychev operation

The first Rzhev-Sychev operation, or the Second battle for Rzhev (July 30 - October 1, 1942) - military operations of the Kalininsky (commander - I.S.Konev) and Western (commander and leader of the entire operation - G.K. Zhukov) fronts with the purpose of the defeat of the German 9th Army (commander - Colonel General V. Model), defended in the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge.

The total losses of Soviet troops in the operation amounted to about 300,000 people, or 60% of the size of the Red Army grouping at the beginning of the operation. Incomplete losses in tanks amounted to about 1085 units. The immediate losses of the 30th Army amounted to 99,820 people.

The losses of the German side are unknown.

Second Rzhev-Sychev operation

The second Rzhev-Sychev operation, or Operation Mars (November 25 - December 20, 1942) - a new operation of the Kalininsky (commander - M.A. Purkaev) and Western (commander - I.S. th army. The operation was led by General of the Army G.K. Zhukov.

According to the American historian D. Glantz, during the three weeks of Operation Mars, Soviet troops lost about 100,000 soldiers killed and missing and 235,000 wounded.

AS Orlov cites other figures: irrecoverable losses amounted to 70.4 thousand people, 1,366 tanks were lost.

The losses of the German side amounted to about 40 thousand people and 400 tanks and assault guns.

Liberation of Rzhev

In the winter of 1943, V. Model's German 9th Army left the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge. The operation to withdraw troops to prepared positions was named "Buffalo" (German. Bϋffel). The tactically competent actions of the German command made it possible to preserve the German troops and withdraw them from the threat of encirclement. Going on the offensive, the troops of the Red Army found an empty city, in which only the rearguard of the 9th Army remained, creating the appearance of the presence of German troops.

Soon, the headquarters of the German 9th Army led the troops on the northern face of the Kursk salient.

The Soviet troops of the Kalininsky (commander - M.A.Purkaev) and Western (commander - V.D.Sokolovsky) fronts began to pursue the enemy. This pursuit, which lasted from March 2 to March 31, was called the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation of 1943 and pushed the front line away from Moscow by another 130-160 kilometers.

On March 4, in a personal message, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill congratulated J.V. Stalin on the capture of Rzhev:

Outcomes

The battles near Rzhev became one of the bloodiest episodes of the Great Patriotic War. According to the research of the historian A.V. Isaev, conducted on the basis of the archives of the Ministry of Defense, losses in operations on the arc encircling Rzhev, 200-250 kilometers long, from January 1942 to March 1943 were: irrecoverable - 392,554 people; sanitary - 768,233 people. Among the irrecoverable losses are prisoners, some of whom returned home after the war. 50,000 people were taken prisoner from the 39th, 22nd, 41st armies and 11th cavalry corps. 13,700 people were captured during the Rzhev-Gzhatsk offensive operation July 30 - September 30, 1942.

According to the statistical study of the historian G.F. Krivosheev "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century", irrecoverable losses (killed, died of wounds and missing, including those taken prisoner) in 1942-1943 in operations in the western direction amounted to 433,037 people, of which:

  • Rzhev-Vyazemskaya strategic offensive operation (January 8 - April 20, 1942) - 272 320 people.
  • The first Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation (July 30 - August 23, 1942) - 51 482 people.
  • The second Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation (November 25 - December 20, 1942) - 70,373 people.
  • Rzhev-Vyazemskaya offensive operation (March 2 - 31, 1943) - 38 862 people.

In 1942, the total losses on the Western and Kalinin Fronts (including the Rzhev Bulge) were:

  • Western Front - 244,574 people killed and died from wounds and 44,996 people missing.
  • Kalinin Front - 221 726 people killed and died from wounds and 55 826 people missing.

In total, the irrecoverable losses of the Soviet army, including prisoners, during the Battle of Rzhev in 1942-1943 amounted to 605,984 people.

As a result of hostilities for 17 months of occupation, Rzhev, as well as neighboring towns and villages, were almost completely destroyed, including by artillery and aviation of the Red Army during attempts to liberate them.

Of the 20 thousand people who were in the occupation, on the day of liberation, March 3, 1943, 150 people remained, together with the region - 362 people. Out of 5443 residential buildings in Rzhev, only 297 survived. The total material damage caused to the city and the region during the hostilities, according to the definition of the Extraordinary State Commission, amounted to one and a half billion rubles.

Memory

By the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 2, 1978, the city of Rzhev was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree for the courage shown by the working people of the city in the struggle against the Nazi invaders during the Great Patriotic War, the successes achieved in economic and cultural development.

“For courage, steadfastness and mass heroism shown by the defenders of the city in the struggle for freedom and independence of the Fatherland” by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1345 dated October 8, 2007 the city of Rzhev was awarded the honorary title “City of Military Glory”. The wording of the decree caused a lot of controversy among historians, since the Wehrmacht troops defended the city, and the Red Army acted as the attacking side. Nevertheless, the invaders were precisely the Wehrmacht troops.

The famous poem by AT Tvardovsky "I was killed near Rzhev" is dedicated to the "Rzhev meat grinder". A participant in the war, writer and author of the novel "Cursed and Killed" VP Astafyev gave a categorical assessment of what happened: "We poured rivers of blood on them and piled mountains of corpses."

On February 23, 2009 on the NTV channel the premiere of the documentary film by Alexei Pivovarov “Rzhev. The unknown battle of Georgy Zhukov ”. The film caused a wide response from the audience and discussion in the press.

In culture

In prose

  • Vyacheslav Kondratyev- "Sashka" and other stories.

In verse

  • Alexander Tvardovsky- "I was killed near Rzhev."

In songs

  • Mikhail Nozhkin- "Near Rzhev".

In the recently released documentary film by A. Pivovarov, it was stated: “ according to Soviet statistics, 433 thousand Red Army soldiers were killed in four operations near Rzhev". The figure is large enough, but it was considered by some to be insufficiently significant. So in the press there were statements of the form “ Pivovarov told what everyone knew without him: more than a million Russians died near Rzhev"(Elena Tokareva, Stringer, February 26, 2009). Journalist Alina Makeeva from Komsomolskaya Pravda does not stop at a round million and writes “ Official data (according to many historians, greatly underestimated) admit: more than a million Soviet soldiers and officers died on a small piece of land! Rzhev and neighboring towns were completely destroyed"(KP dated February 19, 2009). The leader's yellow jersey was confidently taken by the journalist Igor Elkov. He writes about the Battle of Rzhev: “ The exact figures of the losses of the parties are still being disputed. Recently, they talk about 1.3-1.5 million dead Soviet soldiers. Sometimes the figure sounds: more than 2 million”(“ Rossiyskaya Gazeta ”- Week No. 4857 of February 26, 2009) I would like to draw your attention to the wording in all three cases:“ perished ”, that is, it was killed. How not to remember the immortal “Write more! Why should you feel sorry for them, you bastard! " It's only a shame that the soldiers of their country are acting as a "bastard". In principle, the above estimates of losses are common illiteracy, when general losses are confused with irrecoverable ones. However, these figures become public knowledge, and as they say, "go to the people."

Against the background of the millions who died near Rzhev, the NTV film begins to seem like a bright ray of truth in the dark kingdom. The origin of the figure named in the film is obvious. This is the arithmetic sum for the column "irrecoverable losses" from the table for the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation (01/08/1942–20.04.1942) and for the three Rzhev-Sychevsk operations of 1942–1943. from Table 142 of the well-known book "The losses of the USSR and Russia in the wars of the XX century." Thus, more than 60% of this figure are irrecoverable losses in the Rzhev-Vyazemsk offensive operation. The incorrectness of this calculation is also obvious. The Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation unfolded on a front of 650 km. It is rather strange in this regard to attribute to the losses near Rzhev those who died near Yukhnov, Sukhinichi or surrounded by Vyazma. For the sake of fairness, it should be said that A. Pivovarov is not the author of all these calculations. S. Gerasimova, who took part in the filming of the film, in her dissertation on the Battle of Rzhev, confidently operates with the total losses in the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation without any attempts to isolate from them the losses actually near Rzhev.

On the other hand, a significant drawback of Krivosheev's work is "chopping off the tails" of operations. Those. the calculation of losses is limited to a time period that does not cover the entire time of active battles. This, by the way, applies not only to the operations carried out in the western direction in 1942.Accordingly, the period of intense battles for the city of Rzhev proper at the end of August and at the beginning of September 1942 is excluded from the statistics. losses. In a word, the narrow task of finding out losses in the battle for Rzhev requires referring to primary sources. The main source used is the so-called "ten days", submitted with a period of ten days (ten days) of troop casualties reports.

I would like to emphasize that the point is not that the above numbers are too large (or too small, whatever). The fact is that they were obtained by obviously incorrect calculations. We are interested in the question: how much did the Red Army actually lose in the battles for Rzhev? Does it really deserve the status of the "cornerstone" of the Eastern Front? It must be said that General Horst Grossman, the commander of the 6th Infantry Division that fought near Rzhev, called it the "cornerstone". Such a person is a person, by definition, biased and attached to the history of his connection. The silences and reservations regarding the battles for Rzhev in Soviet literature are also not proof of the exceptional nature of these battles. The battles on Mius were also hushed up, which neither in terms of the scale of losses, nor in importance do not claim to be a "cornerstone".

Considering the battles for Rzhev in chronological order, it is necessary first of all to isolate from the total losses of the Western Front in the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation the losses incurred in the Rzhev direction. I would like to emphasize that the term "Rzhev direction" is used not so much to avoid lexical repetitions as to denote the scale of the battle. In early January 1942, the right wing of the Western Front operated near Volokolamsk. It is not close from Rzhev, about 100 km, but it fits into the wording “in the Rzhev direction”. The armies of the right wing of the Western Front and the left wing of the Kalinin Front did indeed form a wide arc that skirted Rzhev. In no case should this be understood as fighting directly for the city. The Smolensk - Vyazma - Moscow highway can serve as the dividing line separating the armies of the Western Front advancing in other directions from the "Rzhev" ones. Those who fought north of the highway can be considered participants in the battles for Rzhev. At least on the grounds that their goal was Sychevka - a key communications center on the railway line feeding German troops near Rzhev. Thus, we set the calculation of losses over a sufficiently large space. Rzhev from Vyazma is located at a distance of about 120 km. That is, we do not count losses only in the immediate vicinity of the city of Rzhev. We are talking about losses for the Rzhev salient as a whole. Also, we will not be trifling: count the losses from January 8, 1942 and complete their calculation on April 20, 1942 (chronological framework of the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation). Let's calculate the losses from January 1, 1942 to May 1, 1942.

It must be said that the group advancing on Rzhev was not static during the entire described period. The 1st Shock Army took part in the battles in the Rzhev direction for a relatively short period of time. She was completely withdrawn from the Western Front in mid-January 1942 and went to the Staraya Russa area. There she took part in the battles for Demyansk. Together with her, by the way, the famous 8th Guards Division departed from near Moscow. The Panfilov division also went to Demyansk and did not participate in the battles near Rzhev. The strip of the withdrawn 1st Shock Army was filled with units of the neighboring 20th Army. Management of the 16th Army on January 21 was transferred to the Sukhinichi area. After the completion of the operation in the Gzhatsky direction, the army formations were transferred to the neighboring 5th Army, and practically only the "brain" of one of the best armies of the initial period of the war, headed by its commander K.K.Rokossovsky and chief of staff A.A. Lobachev. Command of the 16th Army arrived in the Sukhinichy area on January 27. Accordingly, from January 21, the 16th Army began to report losses in the Sukhinichi direction and it must be excluded from the calculation of losses near Rzhev. Thus, the calculations include the 1st shock, 16th, 5th and 20th armies. At the same time, the losses of the 1st Shock Army are counted until the moment it is transferred to the North-Western Front, and the 16th Army - until the movement of Rokossovsky's headquarters to the Sukhinichsky ledge. The 5th and 20th armies, or rather their losses, were taken into account throughout the entire period. Actually, the 20th Army became a real veteran of positional battles near Rzhev. One way or another, she participated in all offensive operations - winter, summer and Mars. During this period, the 20th Army was commanded by the notorious A.A.Vlasov. In March 1942 he was replaced by M. A. Reiter. The 5th Army in January-April 1942 was commanded by Lieutenant General of Artillery L.A. Govorov.

For the calculation results, see the table:

Losses of the troops of the Kalinin Front in Operation Mars from 24.11.42 to 21.12.42

Killed

missing

Total

41st Army

17063

1476

45526

22nd Army

4970

18250

39th Army

11313

2144

36947

Total

33346

3620

100723

Having survived the encirclement of the rifle and mechanized corps, the 41st Army is the undisputed leader in terms of losses in Mars. The high losses of the 39th Army on the "crown" of the Rzhev salient look somewhat strange, and the rather large losses of the missing are especially surprising. For positional battles, this was, generally speaking, uncharacteristic.

It should be noted that Mars was not the only operational area of ​​the Kalinin Front in November-December 1942. Rather heavy battles, which ended in the victory of the Soviet troops, were fought at Velikiye Luki. The 3rd shock army advancing here lost almost 45 thousand people

Losses of troops of the Western Front in the Rzhev direction from November 21 to 30, 1942 *

Killed

missing

General

20th Army

4704

1219

23212

30th Army

453

1695

31st Army

1583

6857

2 Guards cavalry corps

1153

6406

Total

7893

1288

38170

* - calculated according to TsAMO RF, f.208, op.2579, d.16, pp.190-200.


Rzhev was also not the only sector of the Western Front where hostilities were fought. However, unlike the winter battles of early 1942, most of the losses still fell on the three armies and the cavalry corps that took part in Mars. In the last decade of November, the losses of all armies of the Western Front amounted to 43,726 people, and the total losses of the front for the whole of November 1942 - 60,050 people.

Considering that the total losses of the entire Western Front in December 1942 amounted to about 90 thousand people (TsAMO RF, f.208, op.2579, d.22, l.49), the figure of losses named by Krivosheev in Operation Mars appears to be quite consistent with the available documentary sources. It is known from Soviet and German sources that by the end of December the fighting gradually subsided. An overlap like the end of August and September 1942 has nowhere to come from. The ratio of casualties to the enemy has also improved. The 9th Army lost about 53 thousand people during the Soviet offensive, which gives us a casualty ratio of about 1: 4.

According to the last, March 1943 battle for Rzhev, more precisely - the evacuation of the Rzhev salient by the Germans, "The losses of the USSR and Russia in the wars of the XX century" calls the number of losses in 138,577 people (including 38,862 people irrecoverable losses). At the same time, it is postulated that the total losses of the Kalinin and Western fronts have been calculated. However, this statement does not fit with the available documents. So the total losses of all armies of the Western Front in March 1943 amounted to 162326 people.

However, not all armies of both the Kalinin and Western fronts took part in the liquidation of the Rzhev salient in March 1943. The operation was carried out by the adjacent flanks of the two fronts. Those. The figure named by Krivosheev's team can be taken as the base for the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation of 1943 with the proviso that it refers to the troops on the perimeter of the Rzhev salient.

Irrevocable

General

Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation January-April 42nd

152942

446248

Encirclement 39 A and 11 kk in July 42nd

51458

60722

August-September 42nd

78919

299566

Operation Mars, November-December 1942

70373

215674

Liquidation of the Rzhevsky ledge, March 1943

38862

138577

Total

392554

1160787


As a result, we get the figure of irrecoverable losses, more than 40 thousand people less than the one named in the film by A. Pivovarov. The total losses are significantly lower than the 1,325,823 people declared in the thesis and book by S. Gerasimova in four battles for Rzhev. At the same time, our calculations significantly expand the data indicated in "Losses of the USSR and Russia in the wars of the 20th century" by clarifying the losses near Rzhev in August and September 1942, as well as the statistics introduced by S. Gerasimova on the July battles of 1942. upward is hardly possible. During operational pauses, losses were significantly less than during major offensives.

Just in case, I would like to emphasize once again that the losses were counted not in the battles for Rzhev as such, but on a wide arc 200-250 km long that skirted the city. It should also be noted that not all those who fall under the column "irrecoverable losses" should a priori be considered dead. Quite a few of those who were listed as missing and caught in German captivity subsequently returned to their homeland. One thing can be stated with certainty: there can be no question of a million perished near Rzhev. As well as about one and a half to two million total losses.


Despite the fact that more than seven decades have passed since the days when the Great Patriotic War ended, the Battle of Rzhev continues to attract the attention of both professional researchers and everyone who wants to preserve the memory of the past years. Many materials related to it have become available to the general public only in recent years, and made it possible to see the events in greater detail.

Enemy foothold on the outskirts of Moscow

As evidenced by materials on the history of the Great Patriotic War, the offensive of Soviet troops on the Western Front in the period 1941-1942 led to the formation of the so-called Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge. Under this term, it is customary to understand the territory occupied by the Germans, which had dimensions of 200 km along the front and went into a depth of almost 160 km. Due to its strategically advantageous position, it was considered by the German command as the most convenient foothold for a general offensive against Moscow.

To this end, the Nazis concentrated on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge 2/3 of all the forces of the army "Center". In this situation, the Battle of Rzhev in 1942-1943, which lasted for 13 months with minor interruptions, was that large-scale military operation, thanks to which the enemy's plans were not destined to come true. It was carried out by the forces of the Kalinin and Western fronts.

An important strategic operation

The term adopted today - the Battle of Rzhev, includes a number of separate offensive operations, the purpose of which was to push the Germans as far away from Moscow as possible, and, having cleared the territory of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky salient from them, thereby depriving them of a strategic advantage.

Fulfilling the task assigned to them, the Soviet troops in the first months of the operation liberated Mozhaisk, Kirov, Lyudinovo, Vereya, Medyn and Sukhinichi from the enemy, which allowed them, developing an offensive, to dismember the German forces into several separate groups and then destroy.

Tragic mistakes of the command

However, such a favorable development of events was prevented by Stalin's unexpected decision to transfer a significant part of the 1st shock army under the command of Kuznetsov and practically the entire 16th army of Rokossovsky to other directions. The remaining units, immensely weakened by such an untimely redeployment of the main forces, were unable to complete the operation begun, as a result of which the initiative passed to the enemy, and the Battle of Rzhev was choked up.

Trying to rectify the situation, in the last days of January 1942, Stalin ordered to send significant reinforcements near Rzhev, and the 33rd Army of Lieutenant General M.G. Efremova. However, instead of the intended breakthrough of the enemy's defense, this grouping of troops itself was surrounded, as a result of which it was destroyed, and its commander, a former hero of the Civil War, committed suicide.

This failed operation resulted in a real tragedy, which brought huge losses to the Soviet army. Only according to official data, there were about 273 thousand killed, missing or taken prisoner. Only a little more than eight hundred soldiers of the destroyed army of Efremov were able to escape from the enemy ring.

Liberation of Rzhev

However, despite such a tragic failure, the Battle of Rzhev continued. At the beginning of June 1942, the Headquarters of the High Command was tasked with liberating a number of key cities of the Kalinin region from the Germans, and first of all Rzhev. The forces of two fronts were involved in its implementation. As before, it was the Western, commanded by G.K. Zhukov, and Kalininsky - I.S. Konev.

The offensive on Rzhev began on July 30, and the first blow of the united fronts was so powerful that very soon the troops approached the city at a distance of 6 km. It seemed that the goal had been achieved and the Battle of Rzhev, the significance of which was so great, was close to a victorious conclusion. But in the meantime, overcoming this last line of enemy defense took almost a month, and cost several thousand soldiers' lives.

When, finally, at the end of August, the advanced units of the Soviet troops entered the city, the political department of the front decided to invite the official representatives of the American President Roosevelt who were then in the country in order to flash before them the victory that the battle of Rzhev brought. However, it soon became clear that the triumph was premature. Within a few days, pulling up reinforcements, the Germans regained their former positions.

Planning Operation Mars

Changing tactics, the Soviet command set the task for the forces of the united fronts to overcome the defense line of the "Center" group, and thereby create the preconditions for the elimination of all enemy troops assembled on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge. The area of ​​the least concentration of enemy forces was chosen as the site of the decisive strike. It was located between the Osuga and Gzhat rivers. It has not yet been attacked. The operation was codenamed "Mars".

The planned offensive also pursued another important goal - with its help, the high command intended to divert significant German forces from Stalingrad, where the battle was entering its decisive phase. For this purpose, as a misinformation, the Germans were given information in which the number of Soviet troops sent to break through the defense of the Center group was significantly overestimated.

An offensive that turned into a new tragedy

At this stage, the Battle of Rzhev, in which losses already exceeded 300 thousand people, began, as before, with temporary successes. The forces of the 39th Army with a lightning strike drove the enemy out of the village of Young Tud, and, continuing the offensive, cleared the Tula region of enemies. At the same time, the 1st Mechanized Corps struck a tangible blow to the enemy in the area of ​​the city of Bely. But very soon this attempt to make a turning point in the course of the battle turned out to be incalculable losses and blood for our soldiers.

Stopping the Soviet offensive with a powerful and unexpected counterattack, the Nazis destroyed the 20th army and surrounded two corps - the 6th tank and the 2nd guards cavalry. Their fate was just as tragic. G.K. Zhukov tried to save the situation. He insisted on continuing the offensive, but, despite all his efforts, new attempts to break through the enemy's defenses also failed.

By December, the results of the Battle of Rzhev were disastrous. Only, according to official data, the failed operation "Mars" cost the lives of 100 thousand Soviet servicemen. Many researchers believe that these data are very incomplete. The year 1942 was coming to an end and did not bring the long-awaited victory near Rzhev.

"Buffalo" is losing ground

Analyzing the current situation, the German command understood that the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge formed during the previous battles was their most vulnerable place, and sooner or later, the troops on its territory would be surrounded. In this regard, Colonel-General Kurt Zeitzler, who commanded this group of forces, turned to Hitler with a request to allow him to withdraw the formations entrusted to him to a new line of defense that passed through the city of Dorogobuzh.

After receiving the relevant order from Berlin, the Germans proceeded to carry it out. This large-scale withdrawal operation was codenamed "Wuffel", which means "Buffalo". The enemy managed to carry it out practically without losses, which, according to military historians, was the result of well-thought-out and well-planned actions.

Liberation of the city of Rzhev

By the end of March 1943, the Germans left the entire Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge, the fighting for which continued throughout the last year. After their departure, they left the cities completely burnt and destroyed: Vyazma, Gzhatsk, Olenino and Bely.

Pursuing the retreating enemy, the Soviet troops moved forward, and on March 3, 1943, the 30th Army, completely re-equipped after the losses suffered earlier, entered Rzhev. The city turned out to be practically empty, only the rearguard of the Wehrmacht's 9th Army, which had retreated by that time, remained in positions, creating the illusion of the presence of the Germans.

Leaving Rzhev behind them, the Soviet troops continued to develop the offensive, and were forced to stop only after reaching the city of Dorogobuzh, where the enemy had created a powerful line of defense. It became obvious that further advancement was impossible at this stage, and the battles took on a positional character. It was possible to knock out the enemy from the line he occupied only in the summer of 1943 after the successful completion of the operation near Kursk.

The price of victory in the Battle of Rzhev

According to historians, the events that unfolded in the period 1942-1943 on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge are one of the bloodiest episodes of the Great Patriotic War. It is not without reason that the people called them "Rzhevskaya meat grinder" and "Prorva".

The truth about the Battle of Rzhev, and about those losses that were the result of rash and hasty decisions of the command and personally of Stalin, was hidden for many years. And she was truly terrifying. Irrecoverable losses of Soviet troops, which include the killed, missing, captured and died from wounds in hospitals, amounted to the most conservative estimates of 605 thousand people. And this bloody statistics reflects only the picture of the battles of 1942-1943 on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge.

Dead city

The city of Rzhev, which was in the center of hostilities for 13 months, by the time the Germans finally left it, was completely destroyed by both German shells and the strikes of Soviet artillery and aviation inflicted during attempts to liberate it. Of the 5442 residential buildings, only 298 remained relatively intact.

The civilian casualties were also huge. It was found that out of the 20 thousand inhabitants of the city who were in the occupation, by March 1943, only 150 people remained alive. All these data allow us to imagine how dearly the Battle of Rzhev was won, the events of which will never be erased from the memory of the people.

The outcome of the battle

However, one should not lose sight of the great importance that the Battle of Rzhev had during the war. Thanks to the stubborn offensive actions of the Soviet troops, the Germans were forced to retreat, which made it possible to move the front line from Moscow by more than 160 km. In addition, the battle near Rzhev attracted significant enemy forces and contributed to the successful completion of the Battle of Stalingrad. It is also impossible not to take into account the moral factor, since the news of the release of Rzhev had a beneficial effect on the fighting spirit of the entire Soviet army.

The story of Fritz Langanke, Reich Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd SS Division

After stopping at a repair shop, we drove in our 8-wheeled armored reconnaissance vehicle from Warsaw through Minsk, Smolensk and Vyazma, heading to Moscow, until the exit from the city of Gzhatsk. We drove along country roads. It was very difficult to get the car to move on Russian roads even in the coldest winter of the century. It was in this city (Gzhatsk) that the transport of all types of the German army stood up, filling the entire road, during the long night of January 19, 1942. Whole crowds of feldzhandarms were desperately trying to organize an exit from Gzhatsk and direct traffic along bypass roads to the main one. Shouts, screams and terrible curses constantly accompanied this disorderly process. Various cars, which either got stuck in the snow, or simply did not start, mercilessly turned off the road and were thrown to the side of the road. The crossroads and the main highway were kept free of cars so that the auxiliary units of the formations located in the Mosalsk region to the east of it could easily reach the place they needed.

It was terribly cold and I, together with the machine gunner, got out of the car, trying to keep warm, moving a little. Being inside the car, when the engine was not running, was like sitting in a block of ice. We started to move, then stopped, having driven only a few meters, until, finally, we got, having spent hours on it, to the exit from Gzhatsk and already wanted to leave it. I told the driver to keep to the right, but he kept going straight until the shield of the anti-tank gun hit the snow wall that formed on both sides of the road. A group of feljandarms immediately appeared near us, who wanted to remove our car from the road, but they soon became convinced of the futility of their attempts, since our car was too heavy. Accompanied by their terrible curses, we set off back and forth several times, until finally we could not get back on the road. Subsequently, the terrain allowed us to get off the road and along a large radius we were able to reach the end of the city. A strong east wind was blowing and that night the temperature dropped to -40 Celsius. The grease in the needle bearing was too viscous, so the steering wheel could only be turned with great difficulty. The next day we tried to make it easier in some way, but did not know how to do it.

For this reason, I left the car with his crew, and I myself went to the location of our company (1st company, reconnaissance battalion, SS division "Das Reich"). On January 21, I learned that the command post of our division was located in Mozhaisk. On the highway, I managed to get on a passing car that was heading east until, after a while, all traffic came to a complete stop. As far as the eye could see, all the convoys stopped and most of the drivers and carriages got out of them, observing a stunning natural phenomenon in the northeast. Snow glittered brightly in the cold wind, the diverging rays of the sun almost blinded us, and in the sky there were two rainbows, mirrored from each other, touching each other on their peaks. Thousands of people from Landwehr must have been fascinated by this phenomenon and could not forget it throughout the war.

Only a small unit remained in Mozhaisk, left to pick up the last things. The reconnaissance battalion was moved to Sychevka, where, at a temperature of -45 C - -48 C, a counterattack of Russian divisions began, which crushed the German defenses near Rzhev. It lasted until early February. This was the beginning of the winter battle for Rzhev - one of the most important battles in Russia. An evacuation hospital was located in a large dark building near the company command post. Here the whole ruthlessness of the winter war was clearly exposed. The amputated arms, legs, feet and hands were piled up from the back of the building under the windows down to the windowsill. They were thrown here after operations (in those horrific winter conditions, frostbite losses exceeded combat ones).

The next day, through Sychevka, I reached the location of my battalion, which was located in the village of Svineroyka. The piggy was taken the day before after a very difficult fight. It was a village with 3 or 4 streets with houses located along them. For our "brotherly unit" - a motorized rifle battalion, this day was especially cruel. In the battle for the village of Pisino, they lost 250 people (out of 450), of which 4 officers and 170 soldiers were killed. After the battle, 450 dead Russian soldiers remained on the battlefield.

I, along with 3 or 4 of my comrades who arrived from Mozhaisk, were warmly greeted in the early morning by dropping to -51; With a temperature. The entrance to the village was something like an elevated crossroads, where the destroyed German cannon stood. The wind blew away all the snow from there and piled it into pits and hollows, where its depth was more than a meter, which is why this place was completely open, as a result of which this point was perfectly shot by our Russian friends. As soon as someone passed here, the Russians immediately opened fire from all kinds of tank and anti-tank guns from any distance. Breathing heavily, we finally reached the company command post located at the end of the street descending from the hillock, where we were greeted by the faces of our friends spreading into smiles. It was obvious that they were watching our "Russian roulette" with great interest. Then they told us that the chances of crossing this zone in daylight were 50-50, and they clearly felt that since I was sent to the repair shop one fine time, I had not yet had to do such a trick, while while they, dull from the cold, did this almost every day.

I reported to my commander, Hauptsturmführer Pochke, who was stationed in the corner of a hut serving the command post, which in the following days was reinforced with several rows of ceiling and wall decking so that in the end it could pass for a decent bunker. With him in the hut was Untersturmführer Prix from the first company. But my game with luck was not over that day. Untersturmführer Prix stood with me at the window and began to explain the current situation to me; at that time a mortar shell flew into the window right between the two of us and crashed into the back wall without exploding. Priksa had his face cut with small pieces of wood and glass, but no one could call these scratches excitement, it looked like he had been cut by a razor - just a minor incident.

Some time later I was outside with Sepp Rinesch from Steinmark (front driver) and Rudy Toner (radio operator and rear driver), who, together with Hermann Buhler (puller operator) and Untersturmführer Priks, made up the crew of the last 8-wheeled reconnaissance vehicle that remained in the company (4 there were no more wheeled vehicles). They were just beginning to explain what had happened in recent weeks, when a shell hit the ground a good distance from us. It was so far away that none of us tried to hide. But nevertheless, small fragments flew to our group and two of our comrades were wounded in the stomach. The wounds were shallow, so Sepp Rinesh jokingly shouted: "Hurray, first news!" Despite this, they were taken to the dressing station.

For this reason, I switched to their car as a driver, along with Hermann Burel from Balingen (Swabia) as a machine gunner. He was one of those guys who could be blindly relied on in any situation - after a similar armored vehicle of ours was knocked out in Pukhovitsa in the Pripyat swamps (then the entire crew died in a burning car), we were always glad, leaving for a reconnaissance operation, to see in his crew of Buhler and Wimmer Kreis. Despite the fact that he lost his big toe from frostbite during the retreat from the Ruza line and, despite the fact that it was very painful for him to walk, he did not stay in the hospital and came back to our company. But when, somewhere in the dugout, he took off his boot to change the rag that covered the place where the finger had previously been, the stench was so terrible that we were close to throwing it out into the snow and frost.

Our reconnaissance vehicle was limited in its capabilities. After the repair, two wheels were lowered, and the gun turret did not rotate - it was simply locked, so in terms of fire, our car looked like a self-propelled gun. But in these critical days, without a doubt, he was invaluable and powerful support for the foot soldiers lying in the snow. At that time, a week stood out when the night temperature several times dropped below -50 C. The slightest impurity in gasoline (water, for example) instantly clogged the carburetor, and then it was necessary to disconnect the carburetor from the fuel pump, which was extremely difficult to do at such terrible temperatures. This could only be done for a couple of minutes, after which it was necessary to climb into the dugout again to warm up. The cold and extraordinary rage caused streams of tears flowing down his face. These were some of the most difficult days I have experienced during the war. Every two or three hours you had to run up to the engine and start it to keep your car running.

On the very first night, an event happened to me, which then followed me in nightmares. Until then, I was not yet privy to all the details of that area and woke Hermann Buhler to go to the car with me. We climbed into the car and drove some distance, all the time turning the steering wheel back and forth, developing its system. Suddenly, the steering wheel stopped turning. I jumped out of the car to see what was going on. Looking under the car, I was shocked for the rest of my life. On the frame of the car lay a Russian and it seemed that he was holding one wheel. Several seconds passed before I regained consciousness. All over Svinoroyka were scattered dead Russians covered in snow. I ran over one of these dead soldiers and his numb limbs were completely in the bottom of the car. We tried to get him out of there, but it turned out to be impossible to do it.

Finding no other way, I grabbed the saw, crawled closer to the Russian and sawed off his hands. It was extremely creepy. The Russian was an elderly man - a typical man with a long beard. Our faces were very close to each other. Of course, the saw moved his body a little and he seemed to shake his head disapprovingly. I almost lost my mind, but there was no other choice. Only a few incidents throughout the war shocked me in the same way.

The Winter War is completely different from any other. A clear and visible front line no longer existed. Buildings, any shelter from the cold were the first targets for everyone (and of course, the basis of all tactical planning). Anyone who, after several hours on the front line, could not warm up in any structure, had a very small chance of surviving at such low temperatures.

Without the savvy skills of people of all ranks and ranks (skis, sledges, home-made devices for adapting weapons and equipment to low temperatures and previously unknown problems associated with cold, while the supply of supplies was very irregular) and without unshakable confidence in the ability to withstand everything trials and ultimately defeat the enemy ... even an outstanding command would not have been sufficient to win this winter battle for Rzhev. Fortunately, this kind of command was present with us in the person of the exceptional commander of the 3rd Army, General Model. Most of the time at night, or when the blizzard began and the snow covered the eyes, reconnaissance patrols or small units penetrated into small towns and villages or disrupted communications between them. Although everyone said that the enemy front was to the west and north of us, the Russians could appear in even greater numbers from the east and south. Being a messenger, an orderly, sending wounded soldiers to the rear (for the most part, volunteers were called up for this), going for supplies - all this was suicidal and very often ended in death. When in the night we heard the alarm signal "Russians are here!" him. Like many of my comrades, he did not trust automatic weapons - too many automatic weapons jammed at such low temperatures. He always used a Russian carbine, as for me, I always kept my submachine gun under a fur jacket and he never let me down. We could clearly distinguish the Russians against the background of white snow, since in this area they did not have winter camouflage suits and were clearly visible in their brown overcoats. Thus, we quickly spotted them, although their usual "Hurray!" was now heard only sporadically. The next morning, most of the dead were already covered in snow. Here and there hand-to-hand fighting flared up when the attackers got too close. Once in a similar situation, mostly by accident, Hermann hit a Russian with his bayonet, instantly his body cramped and at night he was already a frozen corpse. The next morning we found him in the same position - facing our car, with one leg bent at the knee, with his body standing straight, with his arms in the position in which he held his rifle when he was overtaken by death. Only the rifle fell down.

When the bullet hit the face, the ice-covered soldier could sometimes see radially directed frozen small droplets of blood radiating from the entrance hole. -50 frost can do something that you will not see under any other conditions. It was a war in its terrible and terrible guise.