The combined grouping of federal forces numbered over 16.5 thousand people by the beginning of the operation. Since most of the motorized rifle units and formations had a reduced composition, consolidated detachments were created on their basis. The United Group did not have a single command body, a common system of logistic and technical support for troops. Lieutenant General Anatoly Kvashnin was appointed Commander of the United Group of Forces (UGV) in the Chechen Republic.

On December 11, 1994, the advance of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, by order of the Russian Defense Minister, troops began an assault on Grozny. About 250 units of armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian armored convoys were stopped and blocked by Chechens in different parts of the city, military units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.

After that, the Russian troops changed tactics - instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they began to use maneuverable airborne assault groups, supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.
By the beginning of February, the strength of the United Group of Forces was increased to 70 thousand people. Colonel-General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the UGV.

On February 3, 1995, the "South" grouping was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the southern side began.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the UGA Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the general staff of the armed forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov on the conclusion of a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to take out the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce was violated by both sides.

At the end of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen detachments, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

On March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last region of Grozny controlled by separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed groups in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.

On March 12-23, the UGV troops carried out a successful operation to eliminate the enemy's Argun grouping and capture the city of Argun. On March 22-31, the Gudermes group was liquidated, on March 31, after heavy fighting, Shali was occupied.

Having suffered a number of major defeats, the militants began to change the organization and tactics of their detachments, the illegal armed groups united into small, highly maneuverable units and groups focused on conducting sabotage, raids, and ambushes.

From April 28 to May 12, 1995, in accordance with the decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a moratorium on the use of armed force in Chechnya was implemented.

In June 1995, Lieutenant General Anatoly Romanov was appointed commander of the UGV.

On June 3, after heavy fighting, federal forces entered Vedeno; on June 12, the regional centers Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt were taken. By mid-June 1995, 85% of the territory of the Chechen Republic was under the control of the federal forces.

Illegal armed formations redeployed part of their forces from mountainous regions to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired at checkpoints and positions of federal forces, organized terrorist attacks on an unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaiskiy (January 1996) ...

On October 6, 1995, the commander of the UGV, Anatoly Romanov, was seriously wounded in a tunnel near Minutka Square in Grozny as a result of a well-planned terrorist act - the detonation of a radio-controlled land mine.

On August 6, 1996, after heavy defensive battles, federal troops left Grozny after suffering heavy losses. The illegal armed groups also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.

On August 31, 1996 in Khasavyurt, agreements on the cessation of hostilities were signed, which put an end to the first Chechen campaign. The signatures under the Khasavyurt Peace were put by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Alexander Lebed and the chief of staff of the armed formations of the separatists Aslan Maskhadov, the head of the OSCE assistance group in the Chechen Republic Tim Guldiman was present at the signing ceremony. The decision on the status of the Czech Republic was postponed until 2001.

After the conclusion of the agreement, the federal troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya in the shortest possible time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.

According to the data released by the UGV headquarters immediately after the end of hostilities, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4103 people killed, 1231 - missing / deserted / prisoners, 19 794 wounded.

According to the statistical study "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century" under the general editorship of G.V. Krivosheeva (2001), The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies that took part in hostilities on the territory of the Chechen Republic lost 5042 people killed and died, 510 people were missing and taken prisoner. Sanitary losses amounted to 51,387 people, including: wounded, shell-shocked, injured 16,098 people.

Irrecoverable losses of personnel of illegal armed formations of Chechnya are estimated at 2500-2700 people.

According to expert assessments of law enforcement agencies and human rights organizations, the total number of civilian casualties was 30-35 thousand people, including those killed in Budennovsk, Kizlyar, Pervomaisk, Ingushetia.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources

(Additional

The war with Chechnya remains by far the biggest conflict in Russian history. This campaign brought many sad consequences for both sides: a huge number of killed and wounded, destroyed houses, crippled fate.

This confrontation showed the inability of the Russian command to act effectively in local conflicts.

History of the Chechen War

In the early 90s, the USSR was slowly but surely moving towards its disintegration. At this time, with the advent of glasnost, protest moods began to gain strength throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. In order to keep the country united, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is trying to federalize the state.

at the end of this year, the Chechen-Ingush Republic adopted its declaration of independence

A year later, when it was clear that it was impossible to save the united country, Dzhokhar Dudayev was elected president of Chechnya, who on November 1 announced the sovereignty of Ichkeria.

Special forces planes were sent there to restore order. But the special forces were surrounded. As a result of negotiations, the special forces soldiers managed to leave the territory of the republic. From that moment on, relations between Grozny and Moscow began to deteriorate more and more.

The situation escalated in 1993, when bloody clashes broke out between Dudayev's supporters and the head of the Provisional Council Avturkhanov. As a result, the storming of Grozny by Avturkhanov's allies took place, Tanks easily reached the center of Grozny, but the assault failed. They were controlled by Russian tankers.

by this year, all federal troops were withdrawn from Chechnya

To end the bloodshed, Yeltsin put forward an ultimatum: if the bloodshed in Chechnya continues, Russia will be forced to go to military intervention.

First Chechen War 1994 - 1996

On November 30, 94, B. Yeltsin signed a decree designed to establish law and order in Chechnya and restore constitutional legality.

According to this document, the disarmament and destruction of the Chechen military formations was supposed. On December 11, Yeltsin addressed the Russians, arguing that the goal of the Russian troops was to protect the Chechens from extremism. On the same day, the army entered Ichkeria. This is how the Chechen war began.

The beginning of the war in Chechnya

The army moved from three directions:

• northwest grouping;
• western grouping;
• eastern grouping.

At first, the advance of troops from the northwestern direction was easy without resistance. The first clash since the beginning of the war happened only 10 km before Grozny on December 12.

The government troops were fired upon from mortars by the detachment of Vakha Arsanov. The losses of the Russians were: 18 people, of which 6 were killed, 10 pieces of equipment were lost. The Chechen detachment was destroyed by return fire.

Russian troops took up a position on the line Dolinsky - the village of Pervomayskaya, from here they fired on all December.

As a result, many civilians were killed.

From the east, the military convoy was stopped at the border by local residents. For the troops from the western direction, things immediately went difficult. They were fired upon near the village of Varsuki. After that, unarmed people were fired on more than once so that the troops could advance.

Against the background of poor results, a number of senior officers of the Russian army were dismissed. General Mityukhin was assigned to lead the operation. On December 17, Yeltsin demanded that Dudayev surrender and disarm his troops, and ordered him to come to Mozdok to surrender.

And on the 18th, the bombing of Grozny began, which continued almost until the very storming of the city.

The storming of Grozny

4 groups of troops took part in the hostilities:

• "West", commander General Petruk;
• "Northeast", commander General Rokhlin;
• "North", commander Pulikovsky;
• "East", commander General Staskov.

The plan to storm the capital of Chechnya was adopted on December 26. He assumed the assault on the city from 4 directions. The ultimate goal of this operation was to seize the presidential palace by encircling it with government troops from all sides. On the side of the government forces, there were:

• 15 thousand people;
• 200 tanks;
• 500 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

According to various sources, the armed forces of the CRI had at their disposal:

• 12-15 thousand people;
• 42 tanks;
• 64 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.

The Eastern Group of Forces, led by General Staskov, was to enter the capital from the side of the Khankala airport, and, having seized a large territory of the city, to divert significant resistance forces onto itself.

Caught in an ambush on the approaches to the city, the Russian formations were forced to return back, failing the task at the same time.

Also, as in the eastern grouping, things did not go well in other areas. Only the troops under the command of General Rokhlin were worthy to resist. Having passed with battles to the city hospital and the canning troops, they were surrounded, but did not retreat, but took up a competent defense, which made it possible to save many lives.

Things were especially tragic in the northern direction. In the battles for the railway station, being ambushed, the 131st brigade from Maikop and the 8th motorized rifle regiment were defeated. There were the biggest casualties that day.

The western group was sent to storm the presidential palace. Initially, the advance went without resistance, but the troops were ambushed near the city market and were forced to go on the defensive.

by March of this year managed to take Grozny

As a result, the first assault on the Terrible was failed, as was the second after him. After the change of tactics from the assault to the "Stalingrad" method, Grozny was taken by March 95th, having defeated the detachment of the militant Shamil Basayev.

Battles of the First Chechen War

After the capture of Grozny, the government's armed forces were sent to establish control over the entire territory of Chechnya. The entrance was not only weapons, but also negotiations with civilians. Argun, Shali, Gudermes were taken almost without a fight.

Fierce fighting also continued, with especially strong resistance in the highlands. It took Russian troops a week to capture the village of Chiri-Yurt in May 1995. By June 12, Nozhai-Yurt and Shatoi were taken.

As a result, they managed to "negotiate" a peace agreement with Russia, which was repeatedly violated by both sides. On December 10-12, the battle for Gudermes took place, which was then cleared of bandits for another two weeks.

On April 21, 1996, something happened that the Russian command had long sought. Catching a satellite signal from Dzhokhar Dudayev's phone, an air strike was launched, as a result of which the president of the unrecognized Ichkeria was killed.

Results of the First Chechen War

The results of the first Chechen war were:

• the peace agreement between Russia and Ichkeria signed on August 31, 1996;
• Russia withdrew its troops from the territory of Chechnya;
• the status of the republic was to remain uncertain.

The losses of the Russian army were:

• more than 4 thousand killed;
• 1.2 thousand missing;
• about 20 thousand wounded.

Heroes of the First Chechen War

The title of Hero of Russia was awarded to 175 people who participated in this campaign. The first to receive this title was Viktor Ponomarev for his exploits during the storming of Grozny. General Rokhlin, who was awarded this rank, refused to accept the award.

Second Chechen War 1999-2009

The Chechen campaign continued in 1999. The main prerequisites are:

• the absence of a fight against separatists who committed terrorist acts, carried out routines and committed other crimes in the neighboring regions of the Russian Federation;
• The Russian government tried to influence the leadership of Ichkeria, however, President Aslan Maskhadov only verbally condemned the ongoing lawlessness.

In this regard, the Russian government decided to conduct a counter-terrorist operation.

The beginning of hostilities

On August 7, 1999, the troops of Khattab and Shamil Basayev invaded the mountainous regions of Dagestan. The group consisted mainly of foreign mercenaries. They planned to lure the local residents over to their side, but their plan failed.

For more than a month, federal forces fought the terrorists before they left for Chechnya. For this reason, with Yeltsin's decree, on September 23, the massive bombing of Grozny began.

In this campaign, the dramatic increase in the skill of the military was clearly noticeable.

On December 26, the assault on Grozny began, which lasted until February 6, 2000. Acting announced the liberation of the city from terrorists. President V. Putin. From that moment on, the war turned into a fight, with the partisans, which ended in 2009.

Results of the Second Chechen War

Following the results of the second Chechen campaign:

• peace was established in the country;
• people of pro-Kremlin ideology came to power;
• the region began to recover;
• Chechnya has become one of the quietest regions in Russia.

For 10 years of the war, the real losses of the Russian army amounted to 7.3 thousand people, the terrorists lost more than 16 thousand people.

Many veterans of this war recall it in a sharply negative context. After all, the organization, especially the first campaign in 1994-1996. left not the best memories. This is eloquently evidenced by various documentary videos filmed in those years. One of the best films about the first Chechen war:

The end of the civil war stabilized the situation in the country as a whole, bringing peace to families on both sides.

The Chechen War is an armed confrontation between the Armed Forces of Russia and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. These events are among the darkest in the recent history of Russia. Events unfolded in two campaigns, sometimes two Chechen wars are distinguished: the first from 1994 to 1996, the second from 1999 to 2009.

In the fall of 1991, during a coup d'état, the parliament of the Chechen-Ingush Republic was ousted from power. At the same time, the Chechen-Ingush Republic was divided into Chechen and Ingush. Elections were held in Chechnya, which were declared illegal by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, since they were more a show than an actual election. Thus, separatists led by Dzhokhar Dudayev broke through to power in Chechnya. On October 27, Dudayev was declared president, and on November the independence of Chechnya was proclaimed. Chechnya was named Ichkeria. In the spring of 1992, the constitution of the republic was adopted. This state has not been recognized by any state in the world.

Chechnya was in an economic and political crisis: during 1991-1994, the criminal economy flourished (kidnapping and human trafficking, arms trafficking, drug trafficking), there was an armed confrontation between Dudayev and the opposition, ethnic cleansing took place against the non-Chechen population, primarily against the Russians. The Russian leadership tried to impose a state of emergency, but to no avail. Several rounds of negotiations also came to nothing. Chechen leaders wanted the central authorities to recognize an independent Chechnya. In the meantime, Chechen militants were seizing weapons, military depots, and this took place with the consent of the Russian Defense Minister Grachev.

On December 11, 1994, Russian troops entered the territory of Chechnya. started. The army came from three directions and was aimed at Grozny. On New Year's Eve, the troops began to storm Grozny. On February 22, 1995, the city was taken, and the movement of Russian troops deep into Chechnya began. By the summer of 1995, Dudaev's troops were in a very difficult situation. On June 14, a hostage-taking took place in Budenovsk (Stavropol Territory), which led to the start of negotiations between the Russian authorities and the separatists and a delay in hostilities on the part of Russia. In April 1996, the leader of the Chechen fighters, Dudaev, was eliminated. In August 1996, the separatists managed to capture Grozny. On August 31, 1996, the parties signed an agreement called the Khasavyurt agreements. Under the terms of the treaty, an armistice was declared, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, and the question of independence was postponed until 2001.

After the end of the first campaign, a regime was established in Chechnya, characterized by a criminal economy, drug trafficking, arms trade), officially sanctioned by blood feud, genocide of people of non-Chechen nationality. The ideas of Islamic extremists were spreading in the republic, and outside Chechnya in Russia, Chechen fighters are carrying out terrorist acts. In August 1999, separatist troops led by Basayev and Khattab invaded Dagestan. Russian troops repel the attack and enter Chechnya.
The second Chechen war begins with the battles with Basayev and Khattab. On September 30, 1999, troops entered Chechnya. The end of this war is considered to be April 16, 2009, when the CTO regime was abolished in Chechnya. It is sometimes said that the Chechen war is still going on.

The war caused enormous damage to the Russian people. This is, first of all, expressed in human losses of Russian soldiers and officers, as well as civilians. The losses cannot be accurately calculated. The data vary from 10 to 26 thousand killed soldiers. In any case, the Russian-Chechen war has become a personal tragedy for a huge number of people.

Armed conflict in 1994-1996 (first Chechen war)

The Chechen armed conflict in 1994-1996 - military operations between the Russian federal troops (forces) and the armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, created in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation.

In the fall of 1991, under the conditions of the beginning of the collapse of the USSR, the leadership of the Chechen Republic announced the state sovereignty of the republic and its secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. The organs of Soviet power on the territory of the Chechen Republic were dissolved, the effect of the laws of the Russian Federation was canceled. The formation of the armed forces of Chechnya began, headed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Defense lines were built in Grozny, as well as bases for sabotage warfare in mountainous areas.

The Dudayev regime had, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Defense, 11-12 thousand people (according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to 15 thousand) regular troops and 30-40 thousand people of the armed militia, of which 5 thousand were mercenaries from Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, the republics of the North Caucasus and etc.

On December 9, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2166 "On Measures to Suppress the Activities of Illegal Armed Formations on the Territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Ossetian Ingush Conflict Zone". On the same day, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360, which provided for the disarming of these formations by force.

On December 11, 1994, the advance of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, by order of the Russian Defense Minister, troops began an assault on Grozny. Russian armored convoys were stopped and blocked by Chechens in different parts of the city, military units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.

(Military encyclopedia. Moscow. In 8 volumes 2004)

The further course of events was extremely negatively influenced by the failure of the eastern and western groupings of troops, and the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs did not succeed in fulfilling the assigned task.

Fighting hard, federal troops took Grozny by February 6, 1995. After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed groups in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.

From April 28 to May 12, 1995, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a moratorium was implemented on the use of armed force in Chechnya.

Illegal armed formations (IAF), using the negotiating process that had begun, carried out the redeployment of part of the forces from mountainous regions to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired on checkpoints and positions of federal forces, organized terrorist acts of an unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaisky (January 1996).

On August 6, 1996, after heavy defensive battles, federal troops left Grozny after suffering heavy losses. The illegal armed groups also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.

On August 31, 1996, agreements on the cessation of hostilities were signed in Khasavyurt, which put an end to the first Chechen war. After the conclusion of the agreement, the troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya in the shortest possible time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.

On May 12, 1997, the Treaty on Peace and Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was signed.

The Chechen side, not observing the terms of the agreement, led the line for the immediate withdrawal of the Chechen Republic from Russia. Terror against employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and representatives of local authorities intensified, and attempts to rally around Chechnya on an anti-Russian basis the population of other North Caucasian republics.

Counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya in 1999 - 2009 (second Chechen war)

In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (CTO). The reason for the start of the operation was the massive invasion of Dagestan from Chechnya on August 7, 1999 by militants under the general command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The group included foreign mercenaries and Basayev's militants.

For more than a month, federal forces fought the invading militants, which ended in the militants being forced to retreat from Dagestan back to Chechnya.

On the same days - 4 September 16 - in several cities of Russia (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk) a series of terrorist acts was carried out - explosions of residential buildings.

Considering Maskhadov's inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants on the territory of Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops. On September 23, the President of the Russian Federation issued a decree "On Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Counter-Terrorist Operations in the North Caucasian Region of the Russian Federation," providing for the creation of a Joint Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus to conduct CTO.

On September 23, Russian aircraft began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. On September 30, a ground operation began - armored units of the Russian army from the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naursky and Shelkovsky regions of the republic.

In December 1999, the entire flat part of the territory of the Chechen Republic was liberated. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 3,000 people) and settled in Grozny. On February 6, 2000, Grozny was taken under the control of federal forces. To fight in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, in addition to the eastern and western groupings operating in the mountains, a new grouping "Center" was created.

On February 25-27, 2000, Zapad units blocked Kharsena, and the Vostok grouping closed the militants in the Ulus-Kert, Dachu-Borzoi, and Yaryshmardy areas. Ulus-Kert was released on March 2.

The last large-scale operation was the elimination of Ruslan Gelayev's group in the area of ​​the village. Komsomolskoye, which ended on March 14, 2000. After that, the militants switched to sabotage and terrorist methods of warfare, and the federal forces opposed the terrorists with the actions of special forces and the operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

During the CTO in Chechnya in 2002, a hostage-taking was committed in Moscow at the Theater Center on Dubrovka. In 2004, a hostage-taking was carried out at school number 1 in the city of Beslan in North Ossetia.

By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Barayev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of the sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants significantly decreased. The only large-scale operation of the militants (the raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in failure.

From midnight on April 16, 2009, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC) of Russia, on the instructions of President Dmitry Medvedev, canceled the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources

The reasons are, on the one hand, objective circumstances, and on the other, subjective. Various things are usually named as reasons and prerequisites: terrible threats from Chechnya, which had to be urgently prevented; an awful amount of oil, or vice versa - the need to lay an oil pipeline through which an awful amount of oil from the Caspian had to be pumped; protection of the rights of the Russian-speaking population. And a lot of other things. But upon closer inspection, it turns out that none of them worked as an incentive.

They were concerned about the rights of the Russian-speaking population only when they got involved in the whole war. Nobody thought about it before. There is practically no oil in Chechnya. It was pumped out over a century of field exploitation, now about 2 million tons per year are mined there, this is complete nonsense. Yes, there was a large oil refinery in Chechnya, powerful factories, but nothing remained of them: something was bombed, and what was left was cut and scrapped by ferrous metallurgists. The pipeline from the Caspian Sea was not particularly popular. About the Chechen crime - this is a myth built from our modern far away. The fact is that the Chechens turned out to be incapable of the mafia. Rather, they are capable of the same degree as statehood. The Chechen, anarchic structure of society (approximately from the 16th century) did not imply the building of hierarchical systems.

As of 1992-93, Chechnya suited everyone in Russia in many ways. Arranged the special services as a kind of offshore, where it was possible to ship weapons to third world countries through the Northern Airport; as an offshore company, where fighters could be recruited to perform a variety of tasks. For example, in Abkhazia they fought with Russian weapons with Russian instructors, but units of the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus under the command of Shamil Basayev.

As an offshore, Chechnya suited large oil (then state-owned) companies, because it was possible to drive oil through it and lie that all taxes were paid there, and send it further for export.

It would seem that it suits everyone, but what happened? What happened then was a completely internal Moscow event. By the end of 1992, the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the parliament, where Ruslan Khasbulatov was, had escalated. At the same time, in November 1992, Yegor Yakovlev, a man with a conscience, was removed from Ostankino. And the main propagandist, as it already happened, was Mikhail Poltoranin (an old party cadre under Yeltsin, known for his biased attitude towards Jews). But here's what to do: there is a parliament, there is a speaker, and he is a Chechen. And here the entire propaganda machine, within the framework of the confrontation with the Parliament, is being rebuilt to "hah this Chechen Khasbulatov!"

That is, if we go back to the texts of 1993, it turns out that our parliament is not bad there, but Khasbulatov is bad, and under it 70-odd objects in Moscow are controlled by the Chechen mafia. It turns out that the White House security department guarded about 70 more objects, but at the same time they had nothing to do with the Chechens. By October 1993, this had intensified to such an extent that if you listen to the radio communications on the night air on October 3-4, it turns out that the militiamen preparing for the assault were going to take either Grozny or Kabul. They were going to fight either with the Chechens (because Khasbulatov), ​​or with the Afghans (because Rutskoi had the misfortune to be in captivity in Afghanistan, and for some reason he was accused of it). Either way, the campaign was taken up. And it was then that talk about the Chechen mafia started. Then a surprise happens: we took a little bit of the White House and burned it down a little on October 4, and on October 12 - bang! - and for some reason there is no majority in the elections. Communists and Zhirinovites took many seats in parliament. And then the political strategists (who were not yet called that way) had a bright idea: in order to intercept the electorate, it is necessary to intercept the slogans of the opponents. We need to do something national and patriotic. For example, to return a fallen province to the bosom of the Empire. Nothing raises the rating like that.

In the second half of December, Shakhrai's plan for Chechnya, signed a month ago (and drafted), was suddenly pulled out of the cloth: a plan of negotiations against the backdrop of forceful pressure, which should ensure a solution to the problems of the separatist region. It turned out that the negotiations were very bad, but very good with the use of force. All sorts of political strategists and analysts from this project were cut off after six months. It was controlled by the security forces (which then included the Minnats, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB). This project was supervised in part by Sevastyanov, head of the Moscow department of the FSK (federal counterintelligence service). But something went wrong. We give the anti-Dudaev opposition money, they take money, but Dudaev is not overthrown; we give weapons - also Dudayev is not overthrown; we give weapons to the crews - on November 26, 1994, the storming of Grozny takes place (supposedly the opposition, but in fact the tanks were officers hired by the FSK in the Moscow region units). They fought in a hybrid way. Tanks enter Grozny. In Grozny they think: “Wow, there was someone who was able to build 40 tanks in a column and reach Grozny! My mother! Yes, you can give him power! ”Because there was no such person in Chechnya at that time. But suddenly non-locals crawled out from under the armor, and everything changed. They were burned and taken prisoner. Further, as always, foxes are hidden in the forest, and small blood can be washed off only with large blood. During the year, no one turned to the analysis of errors and return to the previous stage. Further - the beginning of the war. What's funny is that the war did not raise this rating. By the beginning of 1996, Yeltsin had it at the background level. And the elections were won partly because it was then that his team said: "Peace!", "Peace!" Nazran negotiations, Yandarbiev arrives in Moscow to talk, he is picked up at a special ABC facility in Tyoply Stan. At this time, Yeltsin flies to Chechnya, says: "That's it, peace has come." Yeltsin was elected in the second round, but at the same time, he took the third to his team (and the third was then Lebed), appointed him secretary of the Security Council. And Lebed decided to become the winner. His former deputy for Transnistria, Tikhomirov (who then commanded an army group in Chechnya) was given carte blanche to win. And in July 1996, the war resumed as soon as the results of the second round of elections were officially announced. I must say that the victory did not work out, because three days before Yeltsin's inauguration, the Chechens entered Grozny and occupied the city. Not that overwhelming force, there were about 800 of them. And no one dared to spoil the master's mood with bad news. Therefore, for three days paralysis reigned, during which time the Chechens were surprised to gain a foothold in the city and it was no longer possible to knock them out. After which Lebed, when the fighting resumed, arrived at the scene, realized that there was nothing to catch here and concluded the Khasavyurt agreements. That is, here we had one driving force, simple: neither oil, nor money, nor anything else. And power, which is more important than oil, money and much more.

I must say that after Khasavyurt they tried to forget about Chechnya, like about a bad dream. We did not get our prisoners out, although in the fall of 1996 it was quite possible to do so. Hostage-taking began, the situation was seams, and they tried to forget about Chechnya. And so we come to 1999. In the winter of that year, a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was kidnapped in Chechnya; a year later, his remains will be found in the mountains. And that was the last straw. Prime Minister Stepashin said that we will use force. The war machine spun. For example, the formation of the 77th Marine Brigade in Dagestan began (this is not funny, at that time the Marine Corps were the only units that had at least some mountain training). The transfer of tactical missiles to the south went. And here, even against someone else's will, we irresistibly went to war, because from the other side the car started spinning. Why? We pass to the other side and notice that in 97th year Maskhadov won the elections in Chechnya (convincingly won), and Shamil Basayev took the second place. It was terribly unstable there, because Basayev had detachments. Not that great, but he knew how to unite under himself very restless local comrades. At some point, Maskhadov let him steer, for six months (somewhere at the turn of 97-98, Basayev headed the government). It must be said that he achieved brilliant success: the budget replenishment fell 20 times. After which, it seemed, his career was over. After leaving, as promised, six months later from this post, he immediately spoke at the congress of the Congress of the peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan, declaring the powerful goals of expansion. Preparations began for what eventually resulted in the invasion of Dagestan.

Basayev, being a political marginal, found himself on the brink of death, not only political, but also physical. The only thing that saved him from such a prospect was the beginning of a war, which would inevitably lead to the rallying of all and save him from death (at least delay this death). And so it happened.

In 1999, in the summer, Basayev was already accumulating his forces in the Tsumadinsky district in Dagestan. And what went bang there at the turn of July-August 1999 could have banged a little earlier, it could have banged a little later. One way or another, the war began, which was declared a counter-terrorist operation (although there were no explosions in the cities yet). I do not want to say that these explosions were staged by the special services, except for the "Ryazan exercises" the role of the special services has not been proven anywhere. But the point is different. The fact that this war was used. If you look at Vladimir Putin's rating for August-November 1999, you will see that it suddenly began to grow from insignificant, background values. Every week, some kind of brutal statement like "soak in the toilet." And the hop rating - 7% jumped up until he went to sky-high heights. Actually, this is exactly the situation when we can say something like the following: we do not know who arranged all this, but we know exactly who used it.

Ironically, what was not possible in the first war (to use it as an electoral tool) was perfectly successful in the second. Further the war, of course, was of no use to anyone. For example, already before the election of Putin as president, they tried in every possible way to declare that “Victory, guys! That's it, already a victory! There - in the Komsomolskoye battles. " However, the terrorist attacks in every possible way reminded of the opposite. But they were again used to further strengthen the power. But attempts to assert that the subsequent large-scale terrorist attacks were organized by the special services, they are also, in my opinion, untenable. Nevertheless, we see that the reason here turns out to be a thing much more attractive than oil and than money. Power. Uncontrolled power that does not stop to play with fire in order to preserve this power.