On December 11, 1994, the 1st Chechen War began. Prehistory of the conflict and the chronicle of hostilities in Chechnya in the Voenpro review dedicated to the anniversary of the outbreak of the war. This conflict can be called a sad symbol of that Russia, which has not yet found itself, which was at the crossroads, in the timelessness between the collapse of one great power and the birth of a new Russia.

Historically, the Caucasus has been and remains one of the most difficult, problematic regions of Russia. This is determined by the ethnic characteristics of the territories, where many nationalities live within a rather limited space.

Therefore, various problems of a socio-political, economic and legal nature were refracted in this space through the prism of interethnic relations.

Hence, after the collapse of the country, the contradictions in the "center-periphery" system acquired the greatest acuteness in the regions of the North Caucasus and manifested themselves most vividly in Chechnya.

The rapid deterioration of the economic situation in the country and, as a consequence, the emergence of political confrontation between the national regions and the "center" led to a natural consolidation of the population in various regions along ethnic lines.

It was in this specific unity of national communities that people saw the opportunity to exert an effective influence on the state system to ensure a fair distribution of public goods and the formation of better living conditions.

During the perestroika period, the North Caucasus turned into a region of stable interethnic clashes and conflicts, objectively caused by a high level of accumulated socio-political contradictions. The sharp competition between national and politicized groups for power and resources aggravated the situation to a significant extent.

Additional factors were the protest initiatives of the peoples of the North Caucasus aimed at the rehabilitation of the repressed, the desire to establish a higher statute of national formations and the secession of territories from the Russian Federation.

Situation on the eve of the 1st Chechen war

The perestroika declared in 1985 by M. Gorbachev significantly, especially at its initial stage, encouraged society for a possible radical improvement of the situation in the field of rights and freedoms, the restoration of deformed social and national justice.

However, the restoration of humane socialism did not take place, and waves of separatism swept the entire country, especially after the adoption of the "Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation" by the first Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR in 1990.

Similar acts were soon adopted by the parliaments of 10 union and 12 autonomous republics. The sovereignization of autonomous entities posed the greatest danger to Russia. Despite this, B. Yeltsin shortsightedly declared that the peoples of the country are free to acquire "the share of power that they themselves can swallow."

In fact, interethnic conflicts in the Caucasus opened the process of the collapse of the USSR, the leadership of which was no longer able to control the development of negative trends both directly on its territory, and even more so in adjacent regions. The Soviet people, as a "new historical community", ordered to live long.

Almost all regions of the former empire very soon felt a terrible degradation, a decline in living standards and the collapse of civil institutions. The main reason was dominated by the political factor, which led, in particular, to the activation of the national movement in Chechnya.

At the same time, at the initial stage, the Chechens did not strive to become a separate independent republic.

The forces opposing the leadership of the USSR skillfully used separatist tendencies in their own interests, naively hoping that this process was manageable.

During the first two years of perestroika, the socio-political tension in Chechnya grew and, in 1987, the Chechen-Ingush society needed only a pretext for a spontaneous explosion. This was the construction of an ecologically harmful biochemical plant for the production of lysine in Gudermes.

Very soon, the ecological theme acquired a political connotation, giving rise to a number of informal associations, independent print media and the activation of the Muslim spiritual administration - the process began.

Since 1991, the national elite has been intensively renewed, consisting of functionaries of the old party nomenklatura, former military men and national leaders. D. Dudaev, R. Aushev, S. Benpaev, M. Kakhrimanov, A. Maskhadov appeared in the forefront as national heroes, around whom the most radical ethnic formations rallied.

The capabilities of nationally oriented functionaries and strata are being strengthened and expanded.

At the suggestion of the Vainakh Democratic Party (VDP), the First Chechen Congress took place, at which Major General of the USSR Armed Forces D. Dudayev and L. Umkhaev as his deputy were elected as the head of the Executive Committee of the Congress. The congress adopted the "Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Chechen Republic", which expressed Chechnya's readiness to remain an object of the Union of Sovereign Republics.

After that, already at the state level, the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Republic (CHIR) approved the Act on the State Sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Republic (CHIR), which declared the supremacy of the CHIR Constitution over the RSFSR Constitution. Natural resources on the territory of the republic were declared the exclusive property of its people.

The Act did not contain a provision on the withdrawal of the ChIR from the RSFSR, but the leadership and supporters of the VDP and the CNS clearly interpreted the document in a separatist context. Since that time, a well-known confrontation arose between the apologists of the ChIR Armed Forces and the members of the ChNS Executive Committee. By the fall of 1991, all of Chechnya was actually in a pre-revolutionary state.

In August 1991, radical structures held a mass rally in Grozny demanding the resignation of the ChIR Armed Forces, which resigned on August 29, 1991. Already in the first ten days of September, the OKChN, headed by Dudaev, completely controlled the situation in the capital, and the National Guard formed by him seized the television center and the building of the Council of Ministers of the Republic.

During the storming of the House of Political Education, where the Supreme Council meetings were held, dozens of deputies were beaten, the chairman of the capital city council was killed. At this moment, it could still be done with little blood, but Moscow chose not to interfere in these events.

The onset of dual power led to a significant increase in illegal and openly criminal acts, the Russian population began to leave the country.

On October 27, 1991, D. Dudaev won the presidential elections. At the same time, the elections were held only in 6 out of 14 regions of the republic and, in fact, under martial law.

On November 1, 1991, Dudaev published a decree "On the declaration of the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic", which meant the state's withdrawal from the Russian Federation and the creation of an independent Republic of Ichkeria. ("Ichkeria" is a part of Chechnya, where the main structures of the Chechen tribal ethnic group, teips, are located).

In November 1991, at the V Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, elections in Chechnya were declared illegal. By the decree (remaining on paper) B. Yeltsin of 07.11.1991, a state of emergency is introduced in the CHIR. In response to this, the Chechen parliament delegates additional powers to Dudayev, activates the creation of self-defense units. The post of Minister of War is occupied by Yu. Soslambekov.

Having shown a clear incompetence in political forecasting and the ability to resolve the situation, the Russian political elite continued to hope that the Dudayev regime would ultimately discredit itself, but this did not happen. Dudayev, ignoring the federal authorities, was already in full control of the situation in the country. In the USSR, since the fall of 1991, there was virtually no real political power, the army was falling apart, the KGB was going through a period of reorganization.

The Dudayev regime in Chechnya continued to strengthen and was characterized by terror against the population and the expulsion of Russians from the country. In the period from 1991 to 1994 alone, about 200 thousand Russians left Chechnya. The Republic was becoming "the smoldering torch of an undeclared war."

Opponents of the Dudayev regime were unable to organize alternative elections and, not recognizing Dudayev's authority, began to form self-defense units - the situation was heating up.

In 1992, in Chechnya, the property of military facilities of the Russian Armed Forces was forcibly seized. However, oddly enough, soon the armament of the Dudayev regime takes on legal forms. The directive of the commander of the North Caucasian district of May 26, 1992 prescribes the division of arms between Chechnya and Russia in equal shares. The transfer of 50% of weapons was legalized by P. Grachev in May 1992. The list of weapons transferred from military depots included:

• 1. Launchers (tactical missiles) - 2 units;
• 2.Tanks T-62, T-72 - 42 units, BMP-1, BP-2-2 - 36 units, BTR and BRDM - 30 units;
• 3. anti-tank weapons: Konkurs complexes - 2 units, Fagot - 24 units, Metis - 51 units, RPGs - 113 units;
• 4. artillery and mortars - 153 units;
• 5. small arms - 41538 units. (AKM - 823 units, SVD - 533 units, Flame grenade launchers - 138 units, PM and TT pistols - 10,581 units, tank machine guns - 678 units, heavy machine guns - 319 units;
• 5. Aviation: about 300 units. different types;
• 6. Air defense systems: ZK Strela -10 - 10 units, MANPADS-Igla - 7 units, anti-aircraft installations of various types - 23 units;
• 7. ammunition: shells - 25740 units, grenades - 154500, about 15 million cartridges.

Mainly due to such a "gift", and taking into account foreign aid, Dudayev in a short time managed to create a fully capable army and, in the literal sense, challenged the Russian Federation. In July 1992, the units of the Soviet Army located in the republic withdrew from its territory, leaving, with the knowledge of B. Yeltsin, significant stocks of Soviet weapons.

In a political sense, the attempts of Boris Yeltsin's team to settle the situation in Chechnya were fruitless. The idea of ​​giving it the status of a "special autonomous republic" was not accepted by Dudayev. He believed that the status of the republic should be no lower than that of the members of the CIS. In 1993, Dudayev announced that Chechnya would not take part in the upcoming elections to the Russian parliament, and in the referendum on the new Constitution of the Russian Federation. To which Yeltsin, on 07.12.1993, announced the closure of the borders with the rebellious republic.

Reasoning realistically, Moscow was in the hands of the civil war in Chechnya, the leadership hoped that the majority of the population of the Chechen Republic would be disappointed in the Dudayev regime. Therefore, money and weapons were sent from Russia for the opposition forces.

However, the desire to pacify Ichkeria led to the opposite result. The Chechen war was a huge problem for Russia both militarily and economically, and for the population it was a real disaster.

Reasons for the start of the Chechen war

In the course of these showdowns, private "oil" issues, aspects of control over cash flows, etc. were resolved. It is for this reason that a number of experts call this conflict a "commercial war."

Chechnya produced almost 1000 items, and Grozny had the highest degree of industrial concentration (up to 50%). Chechen associated petroleum gas was of great importance (1.3 billion cubic meters were produced in 1992). Natural reserves of coal and brown coal, copper and polymetals, and various mineral springs are of particular value. But the main wealth is, of course, oil. Chechnya is a long-standing center of the Russian oil industry, organized back in 1853.

In the history of oil production, the republic has invariably occupied the third place after Azerbaijani and American (USA) developments. In the 60s, oil production reached, for example, the maximum level (21.3 million tons), which amounted to about 70% of all Russian production.

Chechnya was the main supplier of fuel and lubricants for the regions of the North Caucasus, Transcaucasia and a number of regions of Russia and Ukraine.

The possession of a developed processing industry has made the republic a leading supplier of aviation oils (90% of all production in the CIS) and a wide range of other processed products (more than 80 items).

Despite this, in 1990, the standard of living in Checheno-Ingushetia among other subjects of the USSR was the lowest (73rd place). In the late 80s. the number of unemployed in rural areas, where most of the Chechens lived, reached 75%. Therefore, a considerable part of the population, of necessity, went to work in Siberia and Central Asia.

Against this background, the complex of reasons for the Chechen conflict and its outcome are:

• oil interests of political and economic elites;
• Chechnya's striving for independence;
• low standard of living of the population;
• the collapse of the Soviet Union;
• ignorance by the leadership of the Russian Federation of the socio-cultural characteristics of the population of Chechnya when deciding on the introduction of troops.

In 1995, the Constitutional Court called the position of the Center in 1991 irresponsible, since "Dudayevism" was generated precisely by its actions, and often simply by inaction. Having destroyed the federal power structures in the republic, Dudayev and his nationalist henchmen promised the population a "new Kuwait", and from the taps instead of water - "camel milk".

The armed conflict in the Chechen Republic, in terms of the nature of the hostilities being waged there, the number of combatants on both sides and the losses that took place, was a real, bloody war.

The course of hostilities and the main stages of the 1st Chechen war

In the summer of 1994, a civil war broke out. The Dudayevites were opposed by detachments of the opposition forces of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic, which were unofficially supported by Russia. Fighting clashes, with mutual, significant losses occurred in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan districts.

Armored vehicles and heavy weapons were used. With an approximate equality of forces, the opposition was unable to achieve any significant results.

On 11/26/1994, the opposition forces again tried to seize Grozny by storm - to no avail. During the assault, the Dudayevites managed to capture several servicemen, contract soldiers of the Federal Grid Company of the Russian Federation.

It is important to note that by the time the UGV entered Chechnya, the Russian military leadership had a simplified opinion both about the military potential of Dudayev's forces and about the strategy and tactics of warfare.

This is evidenced by the fact that some generals refused offers to lead the campaign in Chechnya, due to its unpreparedness. The attitude of the indigenous population of the country to the intention of the Russian Federation to send troops was also clearly underestimated, which undoubtedly had a negative impact on the course and results of the war.

On 12/01/1994, before the announcement of the decree on the introduction of troops, an air strike was struck at the airfields in Kalinovskaya and Khankala. Thus, it was possible to disable the separatist aviation.

On December 11, 1994, B. Yeltsin's Decree No. 2169 "On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic" was adopted. The Joint Group of Forces (UGV), with units of the RF Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the Chechen Republic in three groups in 3 directions: western (through Ingushetia), northwestern (through the Mozdok region of North Ossetia), eastern (from the regions of Dagestan, Kizlyar ).

The deputy commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces E. Vorobiev was offered to lead the campaign, but he did not accept the offer, citing the unpreparedness of the operation, after which his dismissal report followed.

Already at the beginning of the commissioning, the advance of the Eastern (Kizlyar) group in the Khasavyurt area was blocked by residents of Dagestan (Chechens-Akkins). On December 15, she reached the village. Tolstoy-Yurt. Western (Vladikavkaz) group, having been shelled in the area of ​​N of the item. Badgers, entered the Czech Republic. Mozdok group, reaching N of the item. Dolinsky (10 km from Grozny) fought with the enemy, having come under fire from the RAU "Grad".

On 19-20.12.1994, the Vladikavkaz group managed to blockade the capital from the west. The Mozdok group succeeded, having mastered N of the item. Dolinsky, blockade Grozny from the north-west, Kizlyarskaya from the east. 104-wdp. blocked the capital of the Chechen Republic from the side of Argun, the southern side of the city remained unblocked. In other words, at the stage of commissioning, the UGV covered the city from the north.

On December 20, the command of the UGV was entrusted to A. Kvashnin, First Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces.

In the second decade of December, shelling of the suburban part of Grozny began. 19.12.1994 bombing strikes were carried out in the center of the capital. At the same time, civilians perished, including Russians.

The storming of the capital began on December 31, 1994. The armored vehicles that entered the city (up to 250 units) turned out to be extremely vulnerable on the streets, which could well have been foreseen (it was enough to recall the experience of 1944 street battles in Vilnius by P. Rotmistrov's armored forces).

The low level of training of Russian troops, unsatisfactory interaction and coordination between the forces of the OGV and the lack of combat experience among the fighters also affected. There was a lack of accurate city plans and aerial photographs. The lack of a closed communications equipment made it possible for the enemy to intercept communications.

The divisions were ordered to occupy exclusively industrial facilities, without invading residential buildings.

During the assault, the western and eastern groups of forces were stopped. In the north, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 131st Omsb Brigade. (300 fighters), battalion and tank company of the 81st mechanized infantry regiment. (commander General Pulikovsky), reached the railway station and the President's palace. After being surrounded, divisions of the 131st Omsb Brigade. suffered losses: 85 soldiers were killed, about 100 were taken prisoner, 20 tanks were lost.

The eastern group, led by General Rokhlin, also fought in an encirclement. Later, on 07.01.1995, the groups "North-East" and "North" went under the leadership of Rokhlin. Group "West" was headed by I. Babichev.

Taking into account the considerable losses, the UGV command changed the tactics of hostilities, replacing the massive use of armored vehicles with maneuverable airborne assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce fighting in the streets of the capital continued.

By 01/09/1995, the OGV took possession of the Oil Institute and the airport. A little later, the President's palace was captured. The seperatists were forced to retreat beyond the river. Sunzha, defending the periphery of the Minutka square. On 01/19/1995, only a third of the capital was under the control of the UGA.

By February, the number of UGV, now under the leadership of General A. Kulikov, reached 70,000 people.

Only 03.02.1995, with the formation of the "South" group, began full-fledged planned measures to ensure the blockade of Grozny from the south. On February 9, the UGV forces occupied the line along the Rostov-Baku highway.

In mid-February, A. Kulikov and A. Maskhadov met in Ingushetia to discuss a temporary truce. Lists of prisoners were exchanged, the procedure for the removal of the dead and wounded was discussed. This relative truce took place with mutual violations of previously reached conditions.

In the third decade of February, the fighting continued and on 03/06/1995, the subdivisions of Sh.Basaev left Chernorechye - Grozny completely came under the control of the OGV. The city was almost completely destroyed. The new administration of the republic was headed by S. Khadzhiev and U. Avturkhanov.

March-April 1995 - the period of the second stage of the war with the task of taking control of the plain part of the Chechen Republic. This stage of the war is characterized by active explanatory work with the population on the issue of the criminal activities of militants. Using the pause, the UGV units were positioned in advance at the dominant, tactically advantageous heights.

By March 23, they seized Argun, a little later - Shali and Gudermes. However, enemy units were not eliminated and skillfully took cover, often enjoying the support of the population. Local battles continued in the west of the Chechen Republic.

In April, a detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, reinforced by SOBR and OMON units, fought for N of the item. Samashki, where the "Abkhaz battalion" of Sh.Basaev was supported by local residents.

On April 15-16, 1995, the next assault on Bamut began, which took place with varying success until the beginning of summer.

In April 1995, the units of the UGV managed to seize the flat part of the country for the most part. After that, the militants began to focus on sabotage and partisan tactics of combat.

May-June 1995 - the third stage of the war, for the mountainous territories. On 28.04-11.05.1995, combat activity was suspended. Offensive operations were resumed on 12.05.1995 in the Shali region near the villages of Chiri-Yurt and Serzhen-Yurt, which cover the entrances to the Argun and Vedeno gorges.

Here, the superior forces of the UGV faced stubborn resistance from the militants and were able to complete the combat mission only after prolonged shelling and bombing.

Some change in the direction of the attacks made it possible to pin down the enemy forces in the Argun Gorge, by June N of the item was taken. Vedeno, and somewhat later Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt.

And at this stage, the separatists did not suffer any significant defeat, the enemy was able to leave a number of villages and, using the "truce", managed to transfer most of his forces to the north.

On June 14-19, 1995, a terrorist attack took place in Budyonnovsk (up to 2000 hostages). Losses on our side - 143 people (46 - security forces fighters), 415 wounded. Losses of terrorists - 19 killed, 20 wounded.

On June 19-22, 1995, the first round of negotiations with the militants took place, a moratorium was concluded with an indefinite period for the conduct of hostilities.

In the second round (June 27-30, 1995), the parties reached an agreement on the procedure for the exchange of prisoners, disarming the militants, the withdrawal of the UGA and the implementation of elections. The truce again proved unreliable and was not respected by the parties. The militants who returned to their villages formed “self-defense units”. Local battles and clashes were occasionally interrupted by formal negotiations.

Thus, in August, the separatists led by A. Khamzatov captured Argun, but the subsequent intensive shelling forced them to leave the city. Similar events took place in Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk, where the militants called themselves "self-defense units."

On 10/06/1995, there was an attempt on the life of General Romanov, after which he fell into a deep coma. 10/08/1995 with the aim of eliminating Dudaev, an air strike was inflicted on the settlement. Roshni-Chu - dozens of houses were destroyed, 6 residents were killed and 15 injured. Dudaev survived.

Before the elections in the Russian Federation, the leadership decided the issue of replacing the heads of the ChIR administration, D. Zavgaev became a candidate.

10-12.12.1995 Gudermes, where the UGV units were located, was captured by the detachments of S. Raduev and S. Geliskhanov. Within a week, they managed to re-capture the city.

On December 14-17, 1995, D. Zavgaev won the elections in Chechnya, receiving more than 90% of the votes. Elective events were held with violations, and servicemen of the UGA took part in them.

01/09/18/1996, a major terrorist attack took place in Kizlyar, with the seizure of the "Avrasia" ferry. 256 militants took part in it. Losses on our side - 78 killed and several hundred wounded. On the night of January 18, the terrorists emerged from the encirclement.

On 03/06/1996, the militants managed to seize the Staropromyslovsky district of the capital, several detachments blocked and fired on the checkpoint and checkpoints. While retreating, the militants replenished their stocks with food, medicine and ammunition. Our losses - 70 killed, 259 wounded.

On 04/16/1996, the column of the 245th mechanized infantry division, following in Shatoi, was ambushed not far from the settlement. Yaryshmards. Having blocked the convoy, the militants destroyed armored vehicles and a significant part of the personnel.

Since the beginning of the campaign, the special services of the Russian Federation have repeatedly made attempts to destroy Dzhokhar Dudayev. It was possible to obtain information that Dudayev often uses the Inmarsat satellite phone for communication.

And, finally, on 21.04.1996, Dudayev was eliminated by a missile strike using the direction finding of a telephone signal. By a special decree of B. Yeltsin, the pilots - participants of the action, were awarded the title of Heroes of the Russian Federation.

The relative successes of the UGV did not bring a significant change in the situation - the war was becoming protracted. Taking into account the upcoming presidential elections, the leadership of the Russian Federation decided to re-enter negotiations. At the end of May, in Moscow, the parties reached an armistice and determined the procedure for the exchange of prisoners of war. After that, having specially arrived in Grozny, B. Yeltsin congratulated the UGA on the "victory".

On June 10, in Ingushetia (Nazran), in the course of negotiations, the parties reached an agreement on the withdrawal of the UGA from the Chechen Republic (excluding two brigades), disarming the separatists and holding free elections. The topic of the status of the Chechen Republic remained postponed. However, these conditions were not mutually observed. Russia was in no hurry with the withdrawal of troops, and the militants carried out a terrorist attack in Nalchik.

06/03/1996 B. Yeltsin was re-elected as president, and the new secretary of the Security Council A. Lebed announced the continuation of hostilities. Already on July 9, airstrikes were launched against militants in a number of mountainous regions of the Chechen Republic.

On 06/08/1996, the enemy, numbering up to 2000 militants, attacked Grozny. Not pursuing the goal of seizing Grozny, the separatists blocked a number of central administrative buildings, fired on checkpoints and checkpoints. The Grozny garrison could not withstand the onslaught of the enemy. The militants managed to capture Gudermes and Argun.

According to experts, it was precisely this outcome of the hostilities in Grozny that was the prologue to the Khasavyurt agreements.

On August 31, 1996, in Dagestan (Khasavyurt), representatives of the belligerent parties signed an armistice agreement. On the part of the Russian Federation, the chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation A. Lebed took part, on the part of Ichkeria A. Maskhadov. Under the agreement, the UGA was withdrawn from Chechnya in full force. The decision on the status of the Czech Republic was postponed until 31.12. 2001 year

The beginning of the Chechen war in 1994 was accompanied not only by military operations in the North Caucasus, but also by terrorist attacks in Russian cities. In this way, the militants tried to intimidate the civilian population and force people to influence the government in order to achieve the withdrawal of troops. They did not succeed in sowing panic, but many still hardly remember those times.

The disastrous start of the First Chechen War in 1994 forced the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to urgently introduce additional forces and establish interaction between all branches of the military. After that, the first victories began, and the federal forces began to rapidly advance deep into the separatist possessions.

The result was access to the suburbs of Grozny and the beginning of the assault on the capital on December 31, 1994. In the bloody and fierce battles that lasted until March 6, 1995, Russia lost about one and a half thousand soldiers killed and up to 15 thousand wounded.

But the fall of the capital did not break the resistance of the separatists, so the main tasks were not completed. Before the start of the war in Chechnya, the main goal was to eliminate Dzhokhar Dudayev, since the resistance of the militants largely depended on his authority and charisma.

Chronology of the first Chechen war

• December 11, 1994 - the troops of the United Group of Forces of Russia enter Chechnya from three directions;
• December 12 - The Mozdok group of the UGV occupies positions 10 km from Grozny;
• December 15 - The Kizlyar group occupies Tolstoy-Yurt;
• December 19 - The Western group bypasses the Sunzha ridge and ylocks Grozny from the west;
• December 20 - The Mozdok group blocks the capital of Chechnya from the northwest;
• December 20 - Kizlyar grouping blocks the city from the east, 104th Guards. PDP blocks the Argun gorge. Lieutenant General Kvashnin becomes the commander of the UGV;
• December 24 - 28 - battle for Khankala;
• December 31, 1994 - the beginning of the storming of Grozny;
• January 7, 1995 - change of tactics of the federal forces. Air assault maneuver groups supported by aviation and artillery replaced armored groups that were ineffective in urban combat;
• January 9 - the airport is busy;
• January 19 - the Presidential Palace was taken;
• February 1 - Colonel-General Kulikov becomes the commander of the UGV;
• February 3 - the creation of the southern grouping of the UGV, the beginning of attempts to blockade Grozny from the south;
• February 9 - exit to the federal highway Rostov-Baku;
• March 6, 1995 - Grozny came under full control of the Federal Forces;
• March 10 - the beginning of the battles for Bamut;
• March 23 - Argun was taken;
• March 30 - Shali is taken;
• March 31 - Gudermes was taken;
• April 7 - 8 - operation in the village of Samashki;
• April 28 - May 11 - suspension of hostilities;
• May 12 - the beginning of the battles for Chiri-Yurt and Serzhen-Yurt;
• June 3 - the capture of Vedeno;
• June 12 - Nozhai-Yurt and Shatoi captured;
• June 14-19, 1995 - a terrorist attack in Budennovsk;
• June 19-30 - 2 stages of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides, a moratorium on the conduct of hostilities, the beginning of a guerrilla and sabotage war throughout Chechnya, local battles;
• July 19 - Lieutenant General Romanov becomes the commander of the UGV;
• October 6 - an attempt on the life of Lieutenant General Romanov;
• December 10 - 20 - active battles for Gudermes;
• January 9 - 18, 1996 - a terrorist attack in Kizlyar;
• 6 - 8 March - battles in the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny;
• April 16 - an ambush on a convoy of the Russian army in the Argun gorge (the village of Yaryshmardy);
• April 21, 1996 - the liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev;
• May 24 - the final capture of Bamut;
• May - July 1996 - negotiation process;
• July 9 - resumption of hostilities;
• 6 - 22 August - Operation Jihad;
• 6 - 13 August - militants invaded Grozny, blocking federal forces in the city;
• from August 13 - the unblocking of the UGV checkpoints, the encirclement of Maskhadov's forces;
• August 17 - General Pulikovsky's ultimatum;
• August 20 - the commander of the UGV, Lieutenant General Tikhomirov, returned from vacation. Condemnation in Moscow of Pulikovsky's ultimatum;
• August 31 - signing of the Khasavyurt agreements. End of the First Chechen War.

1996 Khasavyurt agreements

After the events of August and their ambiguous coverage in the media, society once again spoke in favor of ending the war. On August 31, 1996, the Khasavyurt peace agreement was signed, according to which the issue of the status of Chechnya was postponed for 5 years, and all federal forces were to immediately leave the territory of the republic.

The outbreak of the First War in Chechnya was supposed to bring a quick victory, but instead the Russian army lost more than 5 thousand people killed, about 16 thousand wounded and 510 missing. There are also other figures in which irrecoverable losses range from 4 to 14 thousand servicemen.

The number of killed militants is from 3 to 8 thousand, and the loss of the civilian population is estimated at 19-25 thousand people. The maximum losses, therefore, can be estimated at 47 thousand people, and of the tasks set, only the elimination of Dudayev was successful.

The 1st Chechen War still serves as a symbol of "Yeltsin's Russia" - a troubled period in our modern history. We do not undertake to unambiguously judge whether the signing of the Khasavyurt agreement (and the events preceding this in August 1996) was a betrayal, but it is obvious that it did not solve the problems in Chechnya.

Lessons and Consequences of the 1st Chechen War

In fact, after Khasavyurt, Chechnya became independent, legally unrecognized by the world community and by Russia as a state.

The first Chechen war was not supported by Russian society, which for the most part considered it unnecessary. The negative attitude of Russians towards this war has grown extremely after a series of unsuccessful hostilities, which led to large casualties.

Many social movements, party associations, and representatives of scientific circles have come out with harsh, condemning positions. In the regions and districts of the country, numerous signatures of people calling for an immediate end to the war were collected.

In some regions, it was prohibited to send conscripts to the Chechen Republic. Many generals and officers openly and categorically opposed the war, preferring the tribunal to participate in this particular war.

The results, the course of the war and its consequences were evidence of the extreme shortsightedness of the policy of the country's leadership and the army, since not all possible and effective economic, technological, scientific and political peaceful instruments for resolving the conflict were fully used.

The leadership of the Russian Federation has crossed the line of permissible measures to localize separatist tendencies. By its decisions and actions, it has largely contributed to the emergence and development of such trends, while revealing a lightweight, bordering on irresponsible approach to resolving the issue.

The main losses in the war were incurred by civilians - more than 40,000 dead, including about 5,000 children, a lot of disabled people, both physically and psychologically. Of the 428 villages in the Chechen Republic, 380 were subjected to air strikes, more than 70% of housing was destroyed, almost all industry and agriculture. There is simply no need to talk about the unjustified losses among the military.

After the war, houses and villages were not restored, the collapsed economy was completely criminalized. Due to ethnic cleansing and war, more than 90% of the non-Chechen population left the republic (and was destroyed).

The severe crisis and the boom of Wahhabism led further reactionary forces to the invasion of Dagestan and, further, to the beginning of the 2nd Chechen war. The Khasavyurt agreement tightened the knot of the Caucasian problem to the limit.

Today, December 11 in Russia is the Day of Remembrance for those killed in Chechnya. On this day, civilians and servicemen who died during the hostilities in the Chechen Republic are remembered. In many cities and towns of the country, commemorative events and funeral meetings are held with the laying of wreaths and flowers at monuments and memorials.

2019 marks the 25th anniversary of the beginning of the 1st Chechen War, and many local regional administrations are presenting commemorative awards to veterans of military operations in the Caucasus.

The first Chechen war lasted exactly one year and nine months. The war began on December 1, 1994, with the bombing of all three Chechen air bases - Kalinovskaya, Khankala and Grozny-Severny, which destroyed all Chechen aviation, including several "corn planes" and a couple of antediluvian Czechoslovak fighters. The war ended on August 31, 1996 with the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements, after which the feds left Chechnya.

The military losses are depressing: 4,100 Russian servicemen were killed and 1,200 were missing. Fifteen thousand militants were killed, although Aslan Maskhadov, who was in charge of the hostilities, claimed that the militants had lost 2,700 people. According to Memorial's human rights activists, 30,000 civilians in Chechnya were killed.

There were no winners in this war. The feds were unable to take control of the territory of the republic, and the separatists did not get a real independent state. Both sides lost.

Unrecognized state and preconditions for war

The only Chechen whom the whole country knew before the start of the war is Dzhokhar Dudayev. The commander of a bomber division, a combat pilot, at the age of 45 he became a major general of aviation, at 47 he left the army and took up politics. He moved to Grozny, quickly rose to leadership positions, and in 1991 became president. True, the president of only the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. But the President! It was known that he was distinguished by a tough disposition and decisiveness. During the riots in Grozny, Dudayev and his supporters threw out the window of the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko. He crashed, he was taken to the hospital, where the Dudayevites finished him off. Kutsenko died, and Dudayev became the national leader.

Now it is somehow forgotten, but Dudaev's criminal reputation was known back in that period in 1993. Let me remind you how much noise the "Chechen advice notes" made at the federal level. After all, it was a real disaster for the national payment system. Fraudsters, through one-day companies and Grozny banks, stole 4 trillion rubles from the Central Bank of Russia. It is a trillion! For comparison, I will say that the budget of Russia in that very 93rd year was 10 trillion rubles. That is, almost half of the national budget was stolen under the Chechen advice notes. Half of the annual salary of doctors, teachers, military personnel, officials, miners, half of all government revenues. Huge damage! Subsequently, Dudayev recalled how the money was brought to Grozny by trucks.

It was with such free-market people, democrats and supporters of national self-determination that Russia had to fight in 1994.

The beginning of the conflict

When did the first Chechen war start? December 11, 1994. Many historians and publicists think so out of habit. They think that the first Chechen war of 1994-1996 began on the day when Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on the need to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. They forget that ten days earlier there was an aerial bomb attack on airfields in Chechnya. They forget about the burnt corn workers, after which no one, either in Chechnya or in the Russian armed forces, doubted that a war was going on.

But the ground operation really began on December 11. On this day, the so-called "United Group of Forces" (UGV), which then consisted of three parts, began to move:

• western;
• northwest;
• eastern.

The Western group entered Chechnya from North Ossetia and Ingushetia. Northwest - from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia. Eastern - from Dagestan.

All three groups moved straight to Grozny.

The UGV was supposed to cleanse the city of separatists, and then destroy the militant bases: first in the northern, flat part of the republic; then in the southern, mountainous part of it.

In a short time, the UGV was supposed to clear the entire territory of the republic from Dudayev's formations.

The North-Western group reached the outskirts of Grozny first, on December 12, and got involved in the battle near the village of Dolinsky. In this battle, the militants used the Grad multiple launch rocket system, and on that day they did not allow Russian troops to reach Grozny.

Two other groups gradually pulled up. By the end of December, the army approached the capital from three sides:

• from the west;
• from the north;
• from the east.

The assault was scheduled for December 31st. On New Year's Eve. And the eve of the birthday of Pavel Grachev, the then Minister of Defense. I will not say that they wanted to guess the victory for the holiday, but this opinion is widespread.

The storming of Grozny

The assault began. The assault teams immediately ran into difficulties. The fact is that the commanders made two serious mistakes:

• At first. We didn’t finish the encirclement of Grozny. The problem was that Dudayev's formations actively used the break in the open encirclement ring. In the south, in the mountains, the militant bases were located. From the south, militants brought ammunition and weapons. The wounded were evacuated to the south. Reinforcements were coming from the south;
• Secondly. We decided to massively use tanks. 250 combat vehicles entered Grozny. And without proper intelligence support and without the support of the infantry. Tanks were helpless in the narrow streets of urban development. The tanks were on fire. The 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade was surrounded, and 85 people were killed.

Parts of the Western and Eastern factions were unable to penetrate deep into the city and retreated. Only part of the North-Eastern grouping under the command of General Lev Rokhlin was entrenched in the city and took up defensive positions. Some units were surrounded and suffered losses. Street fighting broke out in various districts of Grozny.

The command quickly learned from what happened. The commanders changed their tactics. Refused the massive use of armored vehicles. The battles were fought by small, mobile units of assault groups. Soldiers and officers quickly gained experience and improved their combat skills. On January 9, the feds took the building of the oil institute, and the airport came under the control of the OGV. By January 19, the militants had left the presidential palace and organized a defense on Minutka Square. At the end of January, the federals controlled 30% of the territory of Grozny. At that moment, the federal group was increased to 70 thousand people, it was headed by Anatoly Kulikov.

The next major change happened on February 3rd. To blockade the city from the south, the command formed the "South" grouping. On February 9, it blocked the "Rostov-Baku" highway. The blockade was closed.

Half of the city fell into ruins, but the victory was won. On March 6, the last militant left Grozny under the pressure of the UGV. It was Shamil Basayev.

Major fighting in 1995

By April 1995, federal forces had established control over almost the entire flat part of the republic. Argun, Shali and Gudermes were relatively easily taken under control. The settlement of Bamut remained outside the control zone. Fights there continued intermittently until the end of the year, and even in the next 96th year.

The operation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Samashki received a fairly large public response. The propaganda campaign against Russia, professionally carried out by the Dudayev agency "Chechen-Press", seriously influenced the world public opinion about Russia and its actions in Chechnya. Many people still believe that the casualties among the civilian population in Samashki were exorbitant. There are unverified rumors about thousands of people killed, while the human rights society Memorial, for example, believes that the number of civilians killed during the sweep of Samashki is measured in the tens.

What is true here and what is exaggeration is now impossible to make out. One thing is certain: war is a cruel and unjust business. Especially when peaceful people are dying.

Advancement in mountainous areas was more difficult for federal forces than a campaign across the plain. The reason was that the troops often got bogged down in the defense of the militants, there were even such unpleasant incidents as, for example, the capture of 40 paratroopers of the Aksai special forces. In June, the federal forces took control of the regional centers of Vedeno, Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt.

The most socially significant and resonant episode of the first Chechen war in 1995 was the episode associated with the outflow of events outside Chechnya. The main negative character of the episode was Shamil Basayev. At the head of a gang of 195 people, he made a truck raid into the Stavropol Territory. The militants entered the Russian city of Budennovsk, opened fire in the city center, broke into the building of the city department of internal affairs, and shot several police officers and civilians.

The terrorists took about two thousand hostages and herded them into the complex of buildings of the city hospital. Basayev demanded to withdraw troops from Chechnya and start negotiations with Dudayev with the participation of the UN. The Russian authorities decided to storm the hospital. Unfortunately, there was a leak of information, and the bandits had time to prepare. The assault was not unexpected and failed. Spetsnaz captured a number of auxiliary buildings, but did not make it into the main building. On the same day, a second assault attempt was made, and it also failed.

In short, the situation began to become critical, and the Russian authorities were forced to enter into negotiations. The then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was on the telephone line. The whole country was watching the television report with tenseness, when Chernomyrdin spoke into the receiver: "Shamil Basayev, Shamil Basayev, I am listening to your demands." As a result of the negotiations, Basayev received a vehicle and left for Chechnya. There he released 120 of the remaining hostages. In total, 143 people were killed during the events, of which 46 were security officials.

Fighting clashes of varying intensity took place in the republic until the end of the year. On October 6, militants made an attempt on the life of General Anatoly Romanov, commander of the UGV. In Grozny, on Minutka Square, in a tunnel under the railway, the Dudayevites detonated a bomb. A helmet and a bulletproof vest saved the life of General Romanov, who was passing through the tunnel at that moment. From the received wound, the general fell into a coma, and subsequently became deeply disabled. After this incident, “retaliation strikes” were inflicted on the militant bases, which, however, did not lead to a serious change in the alignment of forces in the confrontation.

Fighting in 1996

The New Year began with another hostage-taking episode. And again outside Chechnya. The story is like this. On January 9, 250 militants carried out a bandit raid into the Dagestan city of Kizlyar. First, they attacked a Russian helicopter base, where they destroyed 2 non-combatant MI-8 helicopters. Then they seized the Kizlyar hospital and the maternity hospital. The militants drove up to three thousand townspeople from neighboring buildings.

The bandits locked people on the second floor, mined it, and barricaded themselves on the first floor, and put forward demands: the withdrawal of troops from the Caucasus, the provision of buses and a corridor to Grozny. The Dagestan authorities were negotiating with the militants. Representatives of the command of the federal forces did not participate in these negotiations. On January 10, the Chechens were provided with buses, and the militants with a group of hostages began to move towards Chechnya. They were going to cross the border near the village of Pervomayskoye, but did not reach it. Federal security officials, who were not going to put up with the fact that the hostages would be taken to Chechnya, opened warning fire, and the convoy had to stop. Unfortunately, as a result of insufficiently organized actions, confusion ensued. This allowed the militants to disarm a checkpoint of 40 Novosibirsk policemen and capture the village of Pervomayskoye.

The militants fortified themselves in Pervomayskoye. The confrontation continued for several days. On the 15th, after the Chechens had shot six captured militiamen and two negotiators - Dagestani elders, the security forces went to storm.

The assault failed. The confrontation continued. On the night of January 19, the Chechens broke through the encirclement and fled to Chechnya. They took the captured policemen with them, who were later released.

During the raid, 78 people were killed.

Fighting clashes in Chechnya continued throughout the winter. In March, the militants tried to regain Grozny, but the attempt ended in failure. In April, a bloody clash took place near the village of Yaryshmardy.

The liquidation of Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev by the federal forces brought about a new turn in the development of events. Dudayev often used the Inmarsat satellite phone. On April 21, the Russian military tracked Dudayev from an aircraft equipped with a radar station. Two SU-25 attack aircraft were lifted into the sky. They fired two air-to-ground missiles at bearing. One of them hit the target accurately. Dudaev was killed.

Contrary to the expectations of the federals, the elimination of Dudayev did not lead to drastic changes in the course of hostilities. But the situation in Russia has changed. The presidential election campaign was approaching. Boris Yeltsin was keenly interested in freezing the conflict. Until July, negotiations were going on, the activity of both the Chechens and the federals dropped noticeably.

After Yeltsin was elected president, hostilities again intensified.

The final combat chord of the first Chechen war sounded in August 1996. The separatists attacked Grozny again. The divisions of General Pulikovsky had a numerical superiority, but they could not hold Grozny. At the same time, the militants captured Gudermes and Argun.

Russia was forced to enter into negotiations.

First Chechen war (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoring constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - hostilities between the government forces of Russia (the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya and some settlements of the neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, where the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991. Often referred to as "the first Chechen war," although the conflict was officially called "measures to maintain constitutional order." The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, facts of genocide of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.

Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the defeat and withdrawal of federal troops, massive destruction and casualties, the de facto independence of Chechnya before the second Chechen conflict and a wave of terror that swept across Russia.

Background to the conflict

With the beginning of "perestroika" in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements became more active. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People, created in 1990, which aimed at the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by the former general of the Soviet Air Force Dzhokhar Dudayev.

"Chechen revolution" 1991

On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKChN, Dudaev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic Nokhchi-cho; thus, a dual power developed in the republic.

During the "August putsch" in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the GKChP. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of the republican state structures, accusing Russia of "colonial" policy. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Soviet, the television center and the House of Radio.

More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny city council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of the window, as a result of which he died. After that, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, sent them a telegram: "I was pleased to hear about the resignation of the Republic's Armed Forces." After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final withdrawal of Chechnya from the Russian Federation.

On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of the separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the president of the republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation.

On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on the introduction of a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. After these actions by the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply aggravated - supporters of the separatists surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of the state of emergency was thwarted and the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began from the republic, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began to seize and loot military depots. Dudayev's forces got a lot of weapons: 2 rocket launchers of the ground forces, 4 tanks, 3 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 armored personnel carrier, 14 lightly armored tractors, 6 aircraft, 60 thousand small arms and a lot of ammunition. In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered to transfer to the Dudayevites half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the "transferred" weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to take out the rest due to the lack of soldiers and echelons.

Disintegration of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1991-1992)

The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobeksky, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky region of the former Chechen-Ingush ASSR formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.

The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia has not been demarcated and to date (2010) has not been defined. During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops were brought into the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have sharply deteriorated. The Russian high command suggested at the same time solving the "Chechen problem" by force, but then the entry of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.

The period of de facto independence (1991-1994)

As a result, Chechnya became de facto independent, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia, as a state. The republic had state symbols - a flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahara. In the constitution, adopted on March 12, 1992, CRI was described as an "independent secular state", its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.

In fact, the state system of the CRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and in the period 1991-1994 it was rapidly criminalized.

In 1992-1993, over 600 premeditated murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. For the period of 1993, 559 trains were attacked at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasian Railway, with full or partial looting of about 4 thousand wagons and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. For 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were committed, as a result of which 1156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to over 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to make a decision to stop traffic on the territory of Chechnya from October 1994.

A special trade was the production of false advice notes, for which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and the slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, since 1992, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya.

Even after that, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned the employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated to Chechnya. Until 1994, Russian oil continued to flow to Chechnya, while it was not paid for and was resold abroad.

The period of Dudayev's rule is characterized by ethnic cleansing against the entire non-Chechen population. In 1991-1994, the non-Chechen (primarily Russian) population of Chechnya was subjected to murder, attacks and threats from the Chechens. Many were forced to leave Chechnya, being expelled from their homes, abandoning or selling apartments to Chechens at low prices. In 1992 alone, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 250 Russians were killed in Grozny, 300 were missing. The morgues were filled with unidentified corpses. Widespread anti-Russian propaganda was fueled by relevant literature, direct insults and calls from the government tribunes, and desecrations of Russian cemeteries.

1993 political crisis

In the spring of 1993, in the CRI, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply escalated. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of the parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, which hosted parliamentary and constitutional court sessions; thus, a coup d'etat took place in CRI. Amendments were made to the constitution adopted last year, and Dudaev's personal power regime was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament.

Formation of the anti-Dudaev opposition (1993-1994)

After the coup d'état on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the Committee for National Salvation (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VSChR), which proclaimed itself the only legal authority on the territory of Chechnya. The HSCR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided him with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).

The beginning of the civil war (1994)

Since the summer of 1994, hostilities have unfolded in Chechnya between government troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev conducted offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan districts controlled by the opposition forces. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides, tanks, artillery and mortars were used.

The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and neither of them was able to gain the upper hand in the struggle.

In Urus-Martan alone, in October 1994, the Dudayevites lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria A. Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan B. Gantamirov lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, a detachment of the opposition field commander R. Labazanov lost 27 people. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but each time it retreated without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses.

On November 26, oppositionists unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian servicemen who "fought on the side of the opposition" under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudaev's supporters.

The course of the war

Entry of troops (December 1994)

Even before the announcement of any decision by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation struck the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all the planes at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, 1994, the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 "On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic."

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (UGV), which consisted of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), northwest (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya) and the east (from the territory of Dagestan).

The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan by local residents - Chechens-Akkins. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, however, using force, it nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The most successful was the Mozdok group, which already on December 12 approached the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.

Near Dolinsky, Russian troops came under fire from the Chechen rocket artillery "Grad" and then fought for this settlement.

A new offensive by the UGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) grouping blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) grouping took Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) grouping blocked Grozny from the east, and the paratroopers of the 104th airborne division blocked the city from the side of the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.

Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.

The storming of Grozny (December 1994 - March 1995)

Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked from the southern side, the storming of the city began on December 31, 1994. About 250 units of armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. The Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between the various units, and many of the soldiers had no combat experience. The troops did not even have maps of the city and normal communications.

The western group of forces was stopped, the eastern one also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade and the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment, under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. There they were surrounded and defeated - the losses of the Maikop brigade amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 servicemen were captured.

The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but, nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.

On January 7, 1995, the "North-East" and "North" groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became the commander of the "West" grouping.

Russian troops changed their tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable airborne assault groups, supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.

Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and seized the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists withdrew across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.

By the beginning of February, the number of UGVs was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the UGV.

Only on February 3, 1995 was the "South" grouping formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the southern side began. By February 9, Russian units reached the border of the federal highway "Rostov-Baku".

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the UGV Anatoly Kulikov and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov on the conclusion of a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to take out the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.

In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen detachments, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last region of Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

In Grozny, a pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.

As a result of the storming of Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.

Establishment of control over the plains of Chechnya (March - April 1995)

After the storming of Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the flat regions of the rebellious republic.

The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied dominant heights over villages and cities. Thanks to this, on March 15-23, Argun was taken, on March 30 and 31, the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight, respectively. However, the militant detachments were not destroyed and left the settlements without hindrance.

Despite this, local battles took place in the western regions of Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinskaya brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martanovsky district of Chechnya) and entered into battle with the militants. It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called "Abkhaz battalion" of Shamil Basayev). The losses of the militants amounted to more than 100 people, Russian - 13-16 people were killed, 50-52 wounded. During the battle for Samashki, many civilians died and this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.

On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, the Russian troops were forced to leave the village, since now the militants occupied the commanding heights over the village, using the old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for conducting a nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aviation. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the fighting was suspended after the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk and resumed in February 1996.

By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and partisan operations.

Establishment of control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)

From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced the suspension of hostilities on its part.

The offensive was resumed only on May 12. The attacks of the Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun gorge and Serzhen-Yurt, which was located at the entrance to the Vedeno gorge. Despite the significant superiority in manpower and equipment, the Russian troops got bogged down in the enemy's defense - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.

Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the strike - instead of Shatoi to Vedeno. Militant units were pinned down in the Argun gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.

Also, as in the lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and were able to withdraw from the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the "truce", the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was fired upon by them more than 14 times.

Terrorist act in Budyonnovsk (June 14 - 19, 1995)

On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen fighters of 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory (Russian Federation) in trucks and stopped in the city of Budennovsk.

The first object of the attack was the GOVD building, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and drove the captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of the terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of the hostages.

Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to information leakage, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all the corps (except for the main one), freeing 95 hostages. The losses of the special forces amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.

After the failure of forceful actions to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, together with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.

The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were members of the security forces) and 415 wounded, the loss of terrorists - 19 killed and 20 wounded.

Situation in the republic in June - December 1995

After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from 19 to 22 June in Grozny, the first round of negotiations was held between the Russian and Chechen sides, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.

From June 27 to June 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners "all for all", the disarmament of the CRI units, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.

Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire was violated by both sides. Chechen units returned to their villages, but not as members of illegal armed groups, but as “self-defense units”. Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the emerging tensions were resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at the talks in Grozny.

On August 21, a detachment of fighters of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after a heavy shelling undertaken by Russian troops, left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.

In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since there were militant detachments in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave the occupied positions, since, according to them, these were "self-defense detachments" that had the right to be in accordance with the agreements reached earlier.

On October 6, 1995, an attempt was made against the commander of the United Group of Forces (UGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were inflicted on Chechen villages.

On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudaev - an air strike was delivered to the village of Roshni-Chu.

Before the elections, the Russian leadership decided to replace the heads of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR Dokka Zavgaev.

On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Geliskhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city, and about a week of “clean-up operations” it took for the Russian troops to finally take Gudermes under their control.

On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but nevertheless, they were recognized as valid. Supporters of the separatists announced in advance about boycotting and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; at the same time, all the servicemen of the UGA took part in the elections.

Terrorist attack in Kizlyar (January 9-18, 1996)

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of 256 militants under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov raided the city of Kizlyar (Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation). The initial target of the militants was a Russian helicopter base and an armory. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. The Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to move to the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and the maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to increase anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on the provision of buses to the militants to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved to the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would leave for Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped by warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants seized the village of Pervomayskoye, disarming the police checkpoint there. From 11 to 14 January, negotiations were held, on January 15-18, an unsuccessful assault on the village took place. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaiskoye, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the Avrasia passenger ship with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.

The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.

Militants attack on Grozny (March 6-8, 1996)

On March 6, 1996, several detachments of militants attacked Grozny, which was controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants seized the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blockaded and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists, when retreating, took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition. According to official figures, the losses of the Russian side amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded.

Fight near the village of Yaryshmardy (April 16, 1996)

On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoi, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by the field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the head and trailing convoy of the vehicle, thus the convoy was blocked and suffered significant losses.

Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev (April 21, 1996)

From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, the Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to dispatch killers ended in failure. We managed to find out that Dudayev often speaks on the satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.

On April 21, 1996, the Russian AWACS A-50 aircraft, on which equipment for bearing the satellite phone signal was installed, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudaev's cortege left for the area of ​​the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudaev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.

By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.

Negotiations with separatists (May-July 1996)

Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudaev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoe, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take on a protracted nature. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to once again negotiate with the separatists.

On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations took place in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on an armistice from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on the victory over the "rebellious Dudayev regime" and announced the cancellation of military duty.

On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.

The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.

On July 3, 1996, the current president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected as president. The new secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against the militants.

On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aviation struck the militant bases in the mountainous Shatoisky, Vedensky and Nozhai-Yurtovsky regions.

Operation Jihad (6-22 August 1996)

On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists, numbering from 850 to 2000, again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim at capturing the city; they blocked administrative buildings in the city center and fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite the significant superiority in manpower and equipment, could not hold the city.

Simultaneously with the storming of Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (taken by them without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops held only the commandant's office building).

According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of the Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.

Khasavyurt agreements (August 31, 1996)

On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) in the city of Khasavyurt (Republic of Dagestan) signed an armistice agreement. Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.

Peacekeeping initiatives and activities of humanitarian organizations

On December 15, 1994, the Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of Memorial (later called the Mission of Public Organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev) ... The Kovalev Mission did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations, and the Memorial Human Rights Center coordinated the work of the Mission.

On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the storming of Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen militants and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, and soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being at the headquarters of Dzhokhar Dudayev among the militants, "was almost all the time in a basement room equipped with army radio stations", offering Russian tankers "a way out of the city without firing if they indicated a route." According to Galina Kovalskaya, a journalist who was there, after being shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,

According to the Institute for Human Rights headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as the entire human rights and anti-war position of Kovalev, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, representatives of state authorities, as well as numerous supporters of the "state" approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution, in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, "because of his 'one-sided position' aimed at justifying illegal armed groups."

In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, "for his statements against the war in Chechnya."

Representatives of various non-governmental organizations, deputies and journalists traveled to the conflict zone as part of the Kovalev mission. The mission was engaged in collecting information about what is happening in the Chechen war, was engaged in the search for the missing and prisoners, helped to release the Russian servicemen who were captured by the Chechen militants. For example, the Kommersant newspaper reported that during the siege by Russian troops of the village of Bamut, Khaikharoev, who commanded the militant detachments, promised to execute five prisoners after each shelling of the village by Russian troops, but under the influence of Sergei Kovalev, who participated in negotiations with field commanders Khaikharoev abandoned these intentions.

Since the beginning of the conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has launched an extensive victim assistance program, providing over 250,000 internally displaced persons with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothes and plastic covers in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 residents remaining in Grozny, 70,000 were completely dependent on ICRC assistance.

In Grozny, the water supply and sewerage system were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily set about organizing the supply of drinking water to the city. In the summer of 1995, about 750,000 liters of chlorinated water every day, calculated to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents, was transported in tank trucks to 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters of drinking water were produced for the inhabitants of the North Caucasus.

In Grozny and other cities in Chechnya, free canteens were opened for the most vulnerable segments of the population, providing 7,000 people with hot food every day. More than 70,000 schoolchildren in Chechnya received books and school supplies from the ICRC.

During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of programs to help victims of the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen militants in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered to addressees more than 50,000 letters on Red Cross letterheads, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contacts with each other, so how all communications were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the rehabilitation and provision of medical supplies to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoi, provided regular assistance to homes for the disabled and children's homes. shelters.

In the fall of 1996, in the village of Novye Atagi, the ICRC equipped and opened a hospital for war victims. For three months of operation, the hospital received more than 320 people, 1,700 people received outpatient care, and almost six hundred surgical operations were performed. On December 17, 1996, an armed attack was carried out on the hospital in Novye Atagi, as a result of which six of its foreign employees were killed. After that, the ICRC was forced to withdraw foreign staff from Chechnya.

In April 1995, Frederick Cuney, an American specialist in humanitarian operations, together with two Russian doctors from the Russian Red Cross Society and an interpreter, organized humanitarian aid in Chechnya. Kewney was trying to negotiate a truce when he went missing. There is reason to believe that Kewney and his Russian associates were captured by Chechen militants and executed by order of Rezvan Elbiyev, one of the counterintelligence chiefs of Dzhokhar Dudayev, since they were mistaken for Russian agents. There is a version that this was the result of a provocation by the Russian special services, which thus dealt with Kewney by the hands of the Chechens.

Various women's movements ("Soldier's Mothers", "White Headscarf", "Women of the Don" and others) worked with servicemen - participants in military operations, released prisoners of war, wounded, and other categories of victims of hostilities.

Outcomes

The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya has again become de facto independent, but de jure unrecognized by any country in the world (including Russia) as a state.

The destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to the former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under the contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% from the amount of the contract. Due to ethnic cleansing and hostilities, almost all of the non-Chechen population left (or were killed) in Chechnya. An interwar crisis and the growth of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War.

Losses

According to the data released by the UGV headquarters, the losses of the Russian troops amounted to 4103 people killed, 1231 - missing / deserted / prisoners, 19 794 wounded. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of soldiers killed). However, it should be borne in mind that the data of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers include only the losses of conscripts, excluding the losses of contract servicemen, soldiers of special units, etc. The losses of militants, according to the data of the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen units (later President of the CRI) A. Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 killed. According to Memorial Human Rights Center, the losses of the militants did not exceed 2,700 killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to 50 thousand people killed. The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 people perished.

Commanders

Commanders of the United Group of Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic

1. Mityukhin, Alexey Nikolaevich (December 1994)
2. Kvashnin, Anatoly Vasilievich (December 1994 - February 1995)
3. Kulikov, Anatoly Sergeevich (February - July 1995)
4. Romanov, Anatoly Alexandrovich (July - October 1995)
5. Shkirko, Anatoly Afanasevich (October - December 1995)
6. Tikhomirov, Vyacheslav Valentinovich (January - October 1996)
7. Pulikovsky, Konstantin Borisovich (acting July - August 1996)

In art

Films

• "Cursed and Forgotten" (1997) is a feature film by Sergei Govorukhin.
• "60 hours of the Maikop brigade" (1995) - a documentary film by Mikhail Polunin about the "New Year" storm of Grozny.
• "Checkpoint" (1998) - a feature film by Alexander Rogozhkin.
• Purgatory (1997) is a naturalistic feature film by Alexander Nevzorov.
• Prisoner of the Caucasus (1996) is a feature film by Sergei Bodrov.
• DDT in Chechnya (1996): part 1, part 2

Music

• "Dead city. Christmas "- a song about the" New Year "assault on Grozny by Yuri Shevchuk.
• The song of Yuri Shevchuk is dedicated to the first Chechen war. Boys were dying.
• The songs "Lube" are dedicated to the first Chechen war: "Batyanya Kombat" (1995), "Demobilization Soon" (1996), "Step March" (1996), "Ment" (1997).
• Timur Mutsurayev - Almost all of his work is dedicated to the First Chechen War.
• Songs about the First Chechen War occupy a significant part of the work of the Chechen bard Imam Alimsultanov.
• The song of the Dead Dolphins group - Dead City is dedicated to the first Chechen war.
• Blue berets - "New Year", "Reflections of an officer at the telephone hotline", "Two turntables on Mozdok".

Books

• "Prisoner of the Caucasus" (1994) - story (novella) by Vladimir Makanin
• Chechen Blues (1998) is a novel by Alexander Prokhanov.
• Pervomaika (2000) - a story by Albert Zaripov. The story of the storming of the village of Pervomayskoye in the Republic of Dagestan in January 1996.
• Pathologies (novel) (2004) is a novel by Zakhar Prilepin.
• I Was in This War (2001) - a novel by Vyacheslav Mironov. The plot of the novel is built around the storming of Grozny by federal troops in the winter of 1994/95.

Armed conflict in 1994-1996 (first Chechen war)

The Chechen armed conflict in 1994-1996 - military operations between the Russian federal troops (forces) and the armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, created in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation.

In the fall of 1991, under the conditions of the beginning of the collapse of the USSR, the leadership of the Chechen Republic announced the state sovereignty of the republic and its secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. The organs of Soviet power on the territory of the Chechen Republic were dissolved, the effect of the laws of the Russian Federation was canceled. The formation of the armed forces of Chechnya began, headed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Defense lines were built in Grozny, as well as bases for sabotage warfare in mountainous areas.

The Dudayev regime had, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Defense, 11-12 thousand people (according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to 15 thousand) regular troops and 30-40 thousand people of the armed militia, of which 5 thousand were mercenaries from Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, the republics of the North Caucasus and etc.

On December 9, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2166 "On Measures to Suppress the Activities of Illegal Armed Formations on the Territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Ossetian Ingush Conflict Zone". On the same day, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360, which provided for the disarming of these formations by force.

On December 11, 1994, the advance of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, by order of the Russian Defense Minister, troops began an assault on Grozny. Russian armored convoys were stopped and blocked by Chechens in different parts of the city, military units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.

(Military encyclopedia. Moscow. In 8 volumes 2004)

The further course of events was extremely negatively influenced by the failure of the eastern and western groupings of troops, and the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs did not succeed in fulfilling the assigned task.

Fighting hard, federal troops took Grozny by February 6, 1995. After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed groups in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.

From April 28 to May 12, 1995, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a moratorium was implemented on the use of armed force in Chechnya.

Illegal armed formations (IAF), using the negotiating process that had begun, carried out the redeployment of part of the forces from mountainous regions to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired on checkpoints and positions of federal forces, organized terrorist acts of an unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaisky (January 1996).

On August 6, 1996, after heavy defensive battles, federal troops left Grozny after suffering heavy losses. The illegal armed groups also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.

On August 31, 1996, agreements on the cessation of hostilities were signed in Khasavyurt, which put an end to the first Chechen war. After the conclusion of the agreement, the troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya in the shortest possible time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.

On May 12, 1997, the Treaty on Peace and Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was signed.

The Chechen side, not observing the terms of the agreement, led the line for the immediate withdrawal of the Chechen Republic from Russia. Terror against employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and representatives of local authorities intensified, and attempts to rally around Chechnya on an anti-Russian basis the population of other North Caucasian republics.

Counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya in 1999 - 2009 (second Chechen war)

In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (CTO). The reason for the start of the operation was the massive invasion of Dagestan from Chechnya on August 7, 1999 by militants under the general command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The group included foreign mercenaries and Basayev's militants.

For more than a month, federal forces fought the invading militants, which ended in the militants being forced to retreat from Dagestan back to Chechnya.

On the same days - 4 September 16 - in several cities of Russia (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk) a series of terrorist acts was carried out - explosions of residential buildings.

Considering Maskhadov's inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants on the territory of Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops. On September 23, the President of the Russian Federation issued a decree "On Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Counter-Terrorist Operations in the North Caucasian Region of the Russian Federation," providing for the creation of a Joint Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus to conduct CTO.

On September 23, Russian aircraft began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. On September 30, a ground operation began - armored units of the Russian army from the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naursky and Shelkovsky regions of the republic.

In December 1999, the entire flat part of the territory of the Chechen Republic was liberated. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 3,000 people) and settled in Grozny. On February 6, 2000, Grozny was taken under the control of federal forces. To fight in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, in addition to the eastern and western groupings operating in the mountains, a new grouping "Center" was created.

On February 25-27, 2000, Zapad units blocked Kharsena, and the Vostok grouping closed the militants in the Ulus-Kert, Dachu-Borzoi, and Yaryshmardy areas. Ulus-Kert was released on March 2.

The last large-scale operation was the elimination of Ruslan Gelayev's group in the area of ​​the village. Komsomolskoye, which ended on March 14, 2000. After that, the militants switched to sabotage and terrorist methods of warfare, and the federal forces opposed the terrorists with the actions of special forces and the operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

During the CTO in Chechnya in 2002, a hostage-taking was committed in Moscow at the Theater Center on Dubrovka. In 2004, a hostage-taking was carried out at school number 1 in the city of Beslan in North Ossetia.

By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Barayev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of the sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants significantly decreased. The only large-scale operation of the militants (the raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in failure.

From midnight on April 16, 2009, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC) of Russia, on the instructions of President Dmitry Medvedev, canceled the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources

The first Chechen war 1994-1996: briefly about the reasons, events and results. The Chechen wars claimed many lives.

But what initially caused the conflict? What happened in those years in the troubled southern regions?

Causes of the Chechen conflict

After the collapse of the USSR, General Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. In his hands were large stocks of weapons and property of the Soviet state.

The general's main goal was to create an independent republic of Ichkeria. The funds that were used to achieve this goal were not entirely loyal.

The regime established by Dudayev was declared illegal by the federal authorities. Therefore, they considered it their duty to intervene. The struggle for spheres of influence has become the main cause of the conflict.

Other reasons coming from the main one:

• Chechnya's desire to secede from Russia;
• Dudayev's desire to create a separate Islamic state;
• dissatisfaction of the Chechens with the invasion of Russian troops;
• the source of income for the new government was the slave trade, drug and oil trade from the Russian pipeline passing through Chechnya.

The government sought to regain power over the Caucasus and regain lost control.

Chronicle of the first Chechen war

The first Chechen campaign began on December 11, 1994. It lasted almost 2 years.

It was a confrontation between the federal troops and the forces of the unrecognized state.

1. December 11, 1994 - the entry of Russian troops. The Russian army advanced from 3 sides. One of the groups the very next day approached the settlements located not far from Grozny.
2. December 31, 1994 - the storming of Grozny. The fighting began a few hours before the New Year. But at first, luck was not on the side of the Russians. The first assault failed. There were many reasons: poor preparedness of the Russian army, lack of coordination, lack of coordination, the presence of old maps and photographs of the city. But attempts to take the city continued. Grozny came under full control of the Russians only on March 6.
3. Events from April 1995 to 1996 After the capture of Grozny, it was gradually possible to establish control over most of the flat territories. In mid-June 1995, a decision was made to postpone the hostilities. However, it was violated many times. At the end of 1995, elections were held in Chechnya, which was won by a protege from Moscow. In 1996, the Chechens made attempts to attack Grozny. All attacks were repelled.
4. April 21, 1996 - death of the separatist leader Dudayev.
5. On June 1, 1996, an armistice was declared. According to the terms, prisoner exchanges, the disarmament of the militants and the withdrawal of Russian troops were to take place. But no one wanted to give in, and the fighting began again.
6. August 1996 - the Chechen operation "Jihad", during which the Chechens took Grozny and other significant cities. The Russian authorities decide to conclude an armistice and withdraw troops. The first Chechen war ended on August 31, 1996.

Consequences of the first Chechen campaign

Brief results of the war:

1. As a result of the first Chechen war, Chechnya remained independent, but as before no one recognized it as a separate state.
2. Many cities and settlements were destroyed.
3. Earning income by criminal means began to occupy a significant place.
4. Almost the entire civilian population fled their homes.

There was also an increase in Wahhabism.

Table "Losses in the Chechen War"

The exact number of casualties in the first Chechen war cannot be named. Opinions, assumptions and calculations are different.

The approximate losses of the parties look like this:

In the column "Federal forces" the first figure is the calculations immediately after the war, the second is the data contained in the book on the wars of the 20th century, published in 2001.

Heroes of Russia in the Chechen War

According to official data, 175 soldiers who fought in Chechnya received the title of Hero of Russia.

Most of the servicemen, participants in hostilities, received the title posthumously.

The most famous heroes of the first Russian-Chechen war and their exploits:

1. Victor Ponomarev. During the fighting in Grozny, he covered the sergeant with himself, which saved his life.
2. Igor Akhpashev. In Grozny, he neutralized the main firing points of the Chechen thugs on a tank. Then he was surrounded. The militants blew up the tank, but Akhpashev fought in the burning car to the last. Then there was a detonation and the hero died.
3. Andrey Dneprovsky. In the spring of 1995, the Dneprovsky unit defeated the Chechen militants who were at the height of the fortification. Andrey Dneprovsky was the only one killed in the ensuing battle. All other soldiers of this unit survived all the horrors of the war and returned home.

Federal troops did not achieve the goals set in the first war. This became one of the reasons for the second Chechen war.

War veterans believe that the first war could have been avoided. Opinions differ as to which side unleashed the war. Is it true that there was a possibility of a peaceful settlement of the situation? Here, too, the assumptions are different.