Exactly 20 years ago, the First Chechen War began. On December 11, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 "On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic." Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and decisions of the government, which justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya, as consistent with the Constitution.

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (UGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia, from the northwest from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya, and from the east from the territory of Dagestan.

A well-known St. Petersburg political scientist, Doctor of Philosophy discusses the causes and consequences of the First Chechen War in an interview with Russian Narodnaya Liniya. Sergey Lebedev :

Why did the First Chechen War start? I discussed this topic in my book "Russian Ideas and Russian Business". You can't blame everything on personal hostile relations between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov, and then Dudayev. Some people suggest that they fought because of the "black gold", but this is not true, because large reserves of oil are produced in Siberia and processed in the Urals. Moreover, at that time there was a shortage of oil in the Chechen Republic, so it was brought to Grozny even during the war.

What are the true reasons for the war ?! In my opinion, everything is simple and tragic. It was 1994, Parliament was shot last fall, an American dictatorship reigns in the country - in each ministry there were dozens of omniscient and omniscient Washington advisers. What problem did they face ?! It was necessary to finally dispose of the Russian state. But how can this be achieved if Russia has powerful armed forces capable of challenging the United States ?! Let me remind you that in those days China was weak, although now it is not so strong. And Saddam Hussein was given a demonstrative flogging back in 1991. What should the American advisers do, after all, it will not be possible to simply disband the powerful armed forces. Therefore, it was decided to carry out a reform that destroys the Russian army, but to present this in the form of a necessary and urgent decision. What is needed for this ?! A dirty little war, shamefully lost! As a result of this action, demand for reforms, since everything is supposedly bad and wrong in the army. In addition, a defeat in Chechnya would herald a "parade of sovereignties" and then the collapse of Russia. For Chechnya, the rest of the republics would leave the composition of the country. These were the deep-reaching designs that the American advisers were hatching.

Until that time, Dudayev's Ichkeria had been fed for three years, starting in the fall of 1991, when the Maidan took place in Grozny and the former leader of the republic was overthrown, and Dudayev seized power. For all three years Chechnya did not recognize itself as a part of Russia, although the republic regularly received money for the social needs of the population - salaries, pensions, benefits. In turn, Russia did not receive a dime from Chechnya; oil was transported to an oil refinery in Grozny. The republic became at that time a zone where the mafia had its own territorial and political entity. The puppeteers understood that Chechens are courageous and wonderful warriors. It was in Latvia in August 1991 that 140 Riga riot policemen calmly established Soviet power on the territory of the republic. However, this scenario will not work in Chechnya. The Americans counted on the military impulse of the Chechens, stuffing them with weapons and choosing the right time - the sunset of 1994. The hostilities began in the winter, when the numerical and technical superiority of the federal forces, otherwise they were called "federals", came to naught in the highlands. Starting a war in December in the mountains is very difficult. But, nevertheless, it was for this reason that the war was started. The puppeteers counted on the shameful defeat of the Russian army, after which they would sign a peace treaty and the purge of the armed forces would begin. The Chechen war was conceived as a huge defeat for Russia, so it began in December, at the most inopportune time. For unknown reasons, not only Yeltsin, who was undergoing the operation, was not in the post of Commander-in-Chief, but also the generals. The guys who were drafted into the army in the spring and autumn of 1994 were thrown into the war! The calculation was based on the defeat of the armed forces, but as always, when the headquarters calculate how to defeat Russia, it turns out that it is not at all what was intended.

From a military point of view, there were no defeats in the First Chechen War. Of course, there were setbacks at the beginning of the storming of Grozny, but, albeit with heavy losses, the city was taken and cleared of terrorists. At that time, there were also suspicious nuances when they demanded that the military take off body armor, etc. If there were private military failures, they were all explained by treason at the headquarters, because the Chechens knew almost everything. A spetsnaz officer who participated in the First Chechen War told me a story about how the Chechens put up a poster with birthday greetings to the unit commander, his last name, first name, patronymic, the name of a military unit that had just arrived in Grozny. They knew not only classified information, but also the personal data of the commanders.

The main headquarters was the first traitor in the war, which was started with the aim of the shameful defeat of the federal forces. But it didn't work out. As General Lebed said, it was a custom-made military campaign. The Kremlin sometimes announced a truce in order not to crush the Chechens so quickly. At one time he announced the introduction of a moratorium on aviation flights, although from the point of view of common sense it was possible in the spring, when there was no dense greenery, to destroy bandit formations with the help of aerial bombardments. Human rights defenders were lowered onto the military like dogs. The entire Russian "fourth estate" fought for Dudayev, and the soldiers were called "federals." This word has an ironic connotation, while the population was not yet accustomed to this term. Also, puppeteers created legends about bandits, they were glorified as freedom fighters, constantly spitting in the back of Russian soldiers!

This is an indicator of how our society has changed because of that war. Many people began to move away from the intoxication that had been going on since the days of glasnost and perestroika. An attempt to create an anti-war movement failed. Government figures - Gaidar, Yavlinsky - suddenly began to speak at rallies against the war in Chechnya! One of two things - if you are against the war, then resign, if for it, then do not interfere. The count was on the emergence of an anti-war movement along with the dispersal of the army, which would arrange a hysterics that led to the collapse of the army. But eighteen-year-old conscripts took and broke the backs of the Chechen wolves. And what about military generals ?! Let's remember Rokhlin, Babichev, Kvashnin! All these generals of the First Chechen War showed extraordinary abilities, fighting against the Chechens.

After the start of finishing off the bandit formations, the famous strange provocation followed - the Chechens seize Grozny while our troops started maneuvers, and only the police remained in the city. Newspapers scribble at lightning speed about the imminent seizure of Grozny by the Chechens. But when General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov blocked the city, intending to destroy the militants with artillery fire, General Lebed flew in and signed a surrender in Khasavyurt. There was only one defeat in the First Chechen War - a political one. Militarily, despite a series of frequent setbacks, the war was won. The surrender in Khasavyurt was signed after the almost complete destruction of the bandit formation. The infamous role in this case was played by the media and traitors at the top.

From 1996 to 1999, Chechnya was again brewed in its own juice. By this time in Russia, after a decade of frenzied glorification of liberalism, "Russification" had taken place. The press covered the beginning of the Second Chechen War (1999-2000) in a completely different way. Is this war over, given the recent terrorist attack in Chechnya? Unfortunately, wars in the Caucasus have been going on for tens and hundreds of years.

To some extent, the view that the Kremlin is feeding the Caucasus is partly true. The masses of people with weapons were busy with something in these small conditions. No matter how we finance Chechnya, where over 90% of the revenue is the federal budget, no matter how it sounds, it is still cheaper than war.

An interesting situation has now emerged in the Caucasus. On the one hand, they were beaten well, but, on the other hand, they began to be appeased and respected. After a certain time, they will forget how they got it in the neck. Sooner or later, propitiating will lead to the fact that they will say - not enough, give more money! To avoid war, the Kremlin pursued a policy that was effective at first and yielded good results - it relied on local leaders, including Akhmat and Ramzan Kadyrov. As long as it is effective. He managed to calmly integrate many militants into normal life. In the Caucasus, as the tsarist and Soviet experience shows, the most effective was the general government headed by a Russian general. Why Russian ?! Chechens are people of a clan society, and when one of the Chechens is in power, the rest of the clans may feel offended. So far, the current policy in Chechnya is yielding good results, but it cannot be continued for long. Care must be taken to avoid a war that could break out with renewed vigor!

The siloviki drew conclusions from the two Chechen wars. Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999-2000 with considerable support, first of all, of the power structures. Among them there were many people associated with the Chechen war, so they were determined to prevent formations like Ichkeria from appearing on the territory of Russia. It must be admitted that a number of military leaders who made their careers in both Chechen wars have entered the military-political elite. Of course, there are not many of them, but they are. Let's remember that Shamanov was not very effective, but still the governor, and General Troshev was engaged in the revival of the Cossacks. They are promoted to two Chechen wars.

The Kremlin made a conclusion about the media and about public organizations such as "Soldiers' Mothers". The conclusions were correct - it is impossible to completely prohibit and close such organizations, creating an aura of martyrdom for them, otherwise the Kremlin will be suspected of hiding something. The Kremlin put them on a short leash. Now a certain citizen Vasilyeva is trying to repeat the experience of human rights defenders of the 90s. She created the society "Cargo-200", gives interviews and is trying to prove something about the huge number of soldiers who died in the Donbass. Vasilyeva's fantasies have run out, so she lists all sorts of football teams where everyone is killed, or simply takes numbers from the lantern. Such individuals must be cleverly neutralized by directing them into the marginal sphere.

If we compare the information field of 1994 and the current one, this is heaven and earth. Of course, the victory is not final, but Putin's rating is known, which is admitted with gnashing of teeth by Western leaders who speak from the position of Chechen terrorists, "white tape", liberals and other anti-Putin opposition. Who are these puski, writers who declared their desire to emigrate ?! For example, Akunin wants to be kicked out of the country in shame, as Solzhenitsyn did in his time. Akunin was told - go! Who needs him over the hill ?! It is very awkward to drain the opposition, showing what it is, without prohibiting it.

In Soviet times, everything was prohibited, many people spoke in enthusiastic tones about Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. But then they read what Sakharov wrote. Some daredevils who are trying to overcome the burden of Solzhenitsyn's novels are perplexed, but what did these authors want to say, did they really have such an influence on the minds ?! Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov would not have had that influence if they had not been gagged, but were allowed to speak, as they say, aside.

The Kremlin learned the lessons of the First Chechen War. It was with the support of the siloviki that the regime change took place with the arrival of Putin. The Kremlin has realized the role of the media, and the fight against them should not be so primitive, in the spirit of "take and close". In pathetic terms, the guys who died in Chechnya did not die in vain! In Russia, it was possible to overcome the real disintegration of the country, to preserve the armed forces, which received a certain tempering and experience. As often happens, they wanted to destroy Russia, but it turned out the opposite, the country got stronger in spite of the enemies.

The second Chechen war also had an official name - the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus, or CTO for short. But it is the common name that is more known and widespread. The war affected almost the entire territory of Chechnya and the adjacent regions of the North Caucasus. It began on September 30, 1999, with the introduction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The most active phase can be called the years of the second Chechen war from 1999 to 2000. This was the peak of the attacks. In subsequent years, the second Chechen war took on the character of local clashes between separatists and Russian soldiers. 2009 was marked by the official cancellation of the CTO regime.
The second Chechen war brought a lot of destruction. The photographs taken by journalists testify to this in the best possible way.

Background

The first and second Chechen wars have a small time gap. After the Khasavyurt agreement was signed in 1996 and the Russian troops were withdrawn from the republic, the authorities expected calm. However, peace has never been established in Chechnya.
Criminal structures have significantly stepped up their activities. They were doing impressive business on such a criminal act as kidnapping for ransom. Their victims were both Russian journalists and officials, as well as members of foreign public, political and religious organizations. The bandits did not disdain the abduction of people who came to Chechnya for the funeral of loved ones. So, in 1997, two citizens of Ukraine were captured, who arrived in the republic in connection with the death of their mother. Businessmen and workers from Turkey were regularly captured. Terrorists profited from the theft of oil, drug trafficking, the manufacture and distribution of counterfeit money. They rampaged and frightened the civilian population.

In March 1999, G. Shpigun, an authorized representative of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs for Chechnya, was captured at the Grozny airport. This egregious case showed the entire inconsistency of the CRI President Maskhadov. The federal center decided to strengthen control over the republic. Elite operational units were sent to the North Caucasus, the purpose of which was to fight against bandit formations. From the side of the Stavropol Territory, a number of rocket launchers were displayed, designed to deliver pinpoint ground strikes. An economic blockade was also introduced. The flow of cash infusions from Russia has declined sharply. In addition, it has become increasingly difficult for bandits to transport drugs abroad and take hostages. Gasoline produced in clandestine factories had nowhere to sell. In mid-1999, the border between Chechnya and Dagestan turned into a militarized zone.

The bandit formations did not abandon their attempts to seize power unofficially. Groups led by Khattab and Basayev made forays into the territory of Stavropol and Dagestan. As a result, dozens of servicemen and police officers were killed.

On September 23, 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin officially signed a decree on the creation of the United Group of Forces. Its goal was to conduct a counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus. This is how the second Chechen war began.

The nature of the conflict

The Russian Federation acted very skillfully. With the help of tactical techniques (luring the enemy into a minefield, sudden raids on small settlements), significant results were achieved. After the active phase of the war passed, the main goal of the command was to establish a truce and attract the former leaders of the gangs to their side. The militants, on the other hand, relied on giving the conflict an international character, calling on representatives of radical Islam from all over the world to participate in it.

By 2005, terrorist activity had dropped significantly. Between 2005 and 2008, there were no major attacks on civilians or clashes with official forces. However, in 2010 there were a number of tragic terrorist acts (explosions in the Moscow metro, at the Domodedovo airport).

Second Chechen War: Beginning

On June 18, from the CRI side, two attacks were made at once on the border in the direction of Dagestan, as well as on a company of Cossacks in the Stavropol Territory. After that, most of the checkpoints to Chechnya from Russia were closed.

On June 22, 1999, an attempt was made to blow up the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of our country. This fact was noted for the first time in the history of this ministry. The bomb was found and promptly defused.

On June 30, the Russian leadership gave permission to use military weapons against gangs on the border with the CRI.

Attack on the Republic of Dagestan

On August 1, 1999, the armed detachments of the Khasavyurt region, as well as the citizens of Chechnya supporting them, announced that they were introducing Sharia rule in their region.

On August 2, militants from the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria provoked a violent clash between Wahhabis and riot police. As a result, several people died on both sides.

On August 3, a shootout took place between police and Wahhabis in the Tsumadinsky district of the r. Dagestan. Not without losses. Shamil Basayev, one of the leaders of the Chechen opposition, announces the creation of an Islamic shura, which had its own troops. They established control over several areas in Dagestan. The local authorities of the republic ask the center to issue military weapons to protect the civilian population from terrorists.

The next day, the separatists were driven back from the regional center of Aghvali. More than 500 people dug in at positions that had been prepared in advance. They did not put forward any demands and did not enter into negotiations. it became known that they were holding three policemen.

At noon on August 4, on the road of the Botlikh District, a group of armed militants opened fire on along with Interior Ministry officers who were trying to stop the car for a search. As a result, two terrorists were killed, and no losses were observed among the security forces. Two powerful missile and bomb strikes by Russian attack aircraft were carried out on the settlement of Kehni. It was there, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, that a detachment of militants stopped.

On August 5, it becomes known that a major terrorist act is being prepared on the territory of Dagestan. 600 militants were going to penetrate into the center of the republic through the village of Kehni. They wanted to seize Makhachkala and sabotage power. However, representatives of the center of Dagestan denied this information.

The period from 9 to 25 August was remembered for the battle for the Donkey Ear Hill. The militants fought with paratroopers from Stavropol and Novorossiysk.

In the period from 7 to 14 September, large groups led by Basayev and Khattab invaded Chechnya. The devastating fighting continued for about a month.

Air bombing of Chechnya

On August 25, Russian military forces attacked terrorist bases in the Vedeno Gorge. More than a hundred militants were killed from the air.

In the period from 6 to 18 September, Russian aviation continues mass bombing of separatist congregations. Despite the protest of the Chechen authorities, the security forces say they will act as necessary in the fight against terrorists.

On September 23, the forces of the central aviation bombarded Grozny and its environs. As a result, power plants, oil factories, a mobile communications center, radio and television buildings were destroyed.

On September 27, V.V. Putin rejected the possibility of a meeting between the presidents of Russia and Chechnya.

Ground operation

Since September 6, martial law has been in effect in Chechnya. Maskhadov calls on his citizens to declare gazavat to Russia.

On October 8, in the village of Mekenskaya, a militant Ibragimov Akhmed shot 34 people of Russian nationality. Of these, three were children. At the gathering of the village, Ibragimov was beaten to death with sticks. Mulla forbade the burying of his body.

The next day, they occupied a third of the territory of the CRI and moved on to the second phase of hostilities. The main goal is the destruction of bandit formations.

On November 25, the President of Chechnya called on Russian soldiers to surrender and be taken prisoner.

In December 1999, the military forces of Russia liberated almost all of Chechnya from militants. About 3,000 terrorists dispersed across the mountains and also hid in Grozny.

The siege of the Chechen capital continued until February 6, 2000. After the capture of Grozny, massive battles came to naught.

Situation in 2009

Despite the fact that the counter-terrorist operation was officially terminated, the situation in Chechnya did not become calmer, but, on the contrary, worsened. Cases of explosions became more frequent, and the militants again became more active. In the fall of 2009, a number of operations were carried out aimed at destroying bandit formations. The militants are responding with major terrorist attacks, including in Moscow. By mid-2010, the conflict was escalating.

Second Chechen war: results

Any hostilities cause damage to both property and people. Despite the compelling reasons for the second Chechen war, the pain from the death of loved ones cannot be alleviated or forgotten. According to statistics, 3,684 people were lost from the Russian side. 2178 representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation were killed. The FSB lost 202 of its employees. More than 15,000 people were killed among the terrorists. The number of civilians killed during the war has not been precisely established. According to official data, it is about 1000 people.

Movies and books about the war

The fighting did not leave indifferent artists, writers and directors. Dedicated to such an event as the second Chechen war, photographs. Exhibitions are held regularly, where you can see works reflecting the destruction left after the battles.

The second Chechen war is still causing a lot of controversy. The film "Purgatory", based on real events, perfectly reflects the horror of that period. The most famous books were written by A. Karasev. These are "Chechen Stories" and "Traitor".

The combined grouping of federal forces numbered over 16.5 thousand people by the beginning of the operation. Since most of the motorized rifle units and formations had a reduced composition, consolidated detachments were created on their basis. The United Group did not have a single command body, a common system of logistic and technical support for troops. Lieutenant General Anatoly Kvashnin was appointed Commander of the United Group of Forces (UGV) in the Chechen Republic.

On December 11, 1994, the advance of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, by order of the Russian Defense Minister, troops began an assault on Grozny. About 250 units of armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian armored convoys were stopped and blocked by Chechens in different parts of the city, military units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.

After that, the Russian troops changed tactics - instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they began to use maneuverable airborne assault groups, supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.
By the beginning of February, the strength of the United Group of Forces was increased to 70 thousand people. Colonel-General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the UGV.

On February 3, 1995, the "South" grouping was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the southern side began.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the UGA Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the general staff of the armed forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov on the conclusion of a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to take out the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce was violated by both sides.

At the end of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen detachments, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

On March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last region of Grozny controlled by separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed groups in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.

On March 12-23, the UGV troops carried out a successful operation to eliminate the enemy's Argun grouping and capture the city of Argun. On March 22-31, the Gudermes group was liquidated, on March 31, after heavy fighting, Shali was occupied.

Having suffered a number of major defeats, the militants began to change the organization and tactics of their detachments, the illegal armed groups united into small, highly maneuverable units and groups focused on conducting sabotage, raids, and ambushes.

From April 28 to May 12, 1995, in accordance with the decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a moratorium on the use of armed force in Chechnya was implemented.

In June 1995, Lieutenant General Anatoly Romanov was appointed commander of the UGV.

On June 3, after heavy fighting, federal forces entered Vedeno; on June 12, the regional centers Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt were taken. By mid-June 1995, 85% of the territory of the Chechen Republic was under the control of the federal forces.

Illegal armed formations redeployed part of their forces from mountainous regions to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired at checkpoints and positions of federal forces, organized terrorist attacks on an unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaiskiy (January 1996) ...

On October 6, 1995, the commander of the UGV, Anatoly Romanov, was seriously wounded in a tunnel near Minutka Square in Grozny as a result of a well-planned terrorist act - the detonation of a radio-controlled land mine.

On August 6, 1996, after heavy defensive battles, federal troops left Grozny after suffering heavy losses. The illegal armed groups also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.

On August 31, 1996 in Khasavyurt, agreements on the cessation of hostilities were signed, which put an end to the first Chechen campaign. The signatures under the Khasavyurt Peace were put by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Alexander Lebed and the chief of staff of the armed formations of the separatists Aslan Maskhadov, the head of the OSCE assistance group in the Chechen Republic Tim Guldiman was present at the signing ceremony. The decision on the status of the Czech Republic was postponed until 2001.

After the conclusion of the agreement, the federal troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya in the shortest possible time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.

According to the data released by the UGV headquarters immediately after the end of hostilities, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4103 people killed, 1231 - missing / deserted / prisoners, 19 794 wounded.

According to the statistical study "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century" under the general editorship of G.V. Krivosheeva (2001), The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies that took part in hostilities on the territory of the Chechen Republic lost 5042 people killed and died, 510 people were missing and taken prisoner. Sanitary losses amounted to 51,387 people, including: wounded, shell-shocked, injured 16,098 people.

Irrecoverable losses of personnel of illegal armed formations of Chechnya are estimated at 2500-2700 people.

According to expert assessments of law enforcement agencies and human rights organizations, the total number of civilian casualties was 30-35 thousand people, including those killed in Budennovsk, Kizlyar, Pervomaisk, Ingushetia.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources

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25 years ago, on December 11, 1994, the First Chechen War began. With the issuance of the decree of the President of Russia "On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic," Russian regular army forces entered the territory of Chechnya. The "Caucasian Knot" reference provides a chronicle of the events that preceded the start of the war, and describes the course of hostilities up to the "New Year" storm of Grozny on December 31, 1994.

The first Chechen war lasted from December 1994 to August 1996. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, in 1994-1995, a total of about 26 thousand people died in Chechnya, including 2 thousand people - Russian servicemen, 10-15 thousand - militants, and the rest of the losses - civilians. According to General A. Lebed, the death toll among civilians alone amounted to 70-80 thousand people and federal troops - 6-7 thousand people.

Chechnya's exit from Moscow's control

The turn of the 1980-1990s. in the post-Soviet space, it was marked by a "parade of sovereignty" - Soviet republics of different levels (both the SSR and the ASSR), one after another, adopted declarations of state sovereignty. On June 12, 1990, the first republican Congress of People's Deputies adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the RSFSR. On August 6, Boris Yeltsin uttered his famous phrase in Ufa: "Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow."

On November 23-25, 1990, the Chechen National Congress was held in Grozny, which elected the Executive Committee (later transformed into the Executive Committee of the National Congress of the Chechen People (ACCN). Major General Dzhokhar Dudaev became its chairman. The Congress adopted a declaration on the formation of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho A few days later, on November 27, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the republic adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty.Later, in July 1991, the second congress of the All-Union National Committee of the Russian Federation announced the withdrawal of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho from the USSR and the RSFSR.

During the August 1991 coup, the Chechen-Ingush Republican Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet and the government of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR supported the State Emergency Committee. In turn, the OKChN, which was in opposition, opposed the GKChP and demanded the resignation of the government and secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. Ultimately, there was a political split in the republic between the supporters of the OKChN (Dzhokhar Dudayev) and the Supreme Council (Zavgaev).

On November 1, 1991, the elected President of Chechnya, D. Dudayev, issued a decree "On the Declaration of the Sovereignty of the Chechen Republic." In response to this, BN Yeltsin signed a decree on November 8, 1991 on the introduction of a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia, but practical measures for its implementation failed - two planes with special forces that landed at the airfield in Khankala were blocked by supporters of independence. On November 10, 1991, the executive committee of the OKChN called for a break with relations with Russia.

Already in November 1991, on the territory of the Chechen Republic, the seizure of military towns, weapons and property of the Armed Forces and internal troops began on the territory of the Chechen Republic. On November 27, 1991 D. Dudaev issued a decree on the nationalization of weapons and equipment of military units located on the territory of the republic. By June 8, 1992, all federal troops left the territory of Chechnya, leaving behind a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition.

In the fall of 1992, the situation in the region sharply deteriorated again, this time in connection with the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in the Prigorodny District. Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the neutrality of Chechnya, however, during the escalation of the conflict, Russian troops entered the administrative border of Chechnya. On November 10, 1992, Dudaev declared a state of emergency, the creation of a mobilization system and self-defense forces of the Chechen Republic began.

In February 1993, the disagreements between the Chechen parliament and D. Dudayev intensified. The resulting disagreements ultimately led to the dispersal of the parliament and the consolidation of opposition politicians in Chechnya around Umar Avturkhanov, who became the head of the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic. The contradictions between the structures of Dudayev and Avturkhanov grew into the storming of Grozny by the Chechen opposition.

After an unsuccessful assault, the Security Council of the Russian Federation decided to launch a military operation against Chechnya. Boris Yeltsin put forward an ultimatum: either bloodshed stops in Chechnya, or Russia will be forced to "take extreme measures."

Preparing for war

Active hostilities on the territory of Chechnya have been conducted since the end of September 1994. In particular, the opposition forces carried out pinpoint bombing of military facilities on the territory of the republic. The armed formations opposing Dudayev were armed with Mi-24 attack helicopters and Su-24 attack aircraft, which did not have identification marks. According to some reports, Mozdok became the base for the deployment of aviation. However, the press service of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the headquarters of the North Caucasian Military District, the Air Force command and the command of the Army Aviation of the Ground Forces categorically denied that the helicopters and attack aircraft bombing Chechnya belonged to the Russian army.

On November 30, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a secret decree No. 2137c "On measures to restore constitutional legality and law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic", which provided for "the disarmament and elimination of armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic."

According to the text of the decree, from December 1 it was ordered, in particular, "to carry out measures to restore constitutional legality and law and order in the Chechen Republic", to begin disarmament and liquidation of armed formations, to organize negotiations to resolve the armed conflict on the territory of the Chechen Republic by peaceful means.

On November 30, 1994, P. Grachev said that "an operation has begun to forcibly transfer to the central regions of Russia officers of the Russian army who are fighting against Dudayev on the side of the opposition." On the same day, in a telephone conversation between the Russian Defense Minister and Dudayev, an agreement was reached on "the immunity of Russian citizens captured in Chechnya."

On December 8, 1994, a closed meeting of the State Duma of the Russian Federation was held on the Chechen events. The meeting adopted a resolution "On the situation in the Chechen Republic and measures for its political settlement", according to which the activities of the executive power to resolve the conflict were recognized as unsatisfactory. A group of deputies sent a telegram to Boris Yeltsin in which they warned him about responsibility for the bloodshed in Chechnya and demanded a public explanation of their position.

On December 9, 1994, the President of the Russian Federation issued Decree No. 2166 "On Measures to Suppress the Activities of Illegal Armed Formations on the Territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Zone of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict." By this decree, the President instructed the Russian government "to use all the means available to the state to ensure state security, legality, rights and freedoms of citizens, protect public order, fight crime, and disarm all illegal armed groups." On the same day, the government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360 "On ensuring state security and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, legality, rights and freedoms of citizens, disarming illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic and adjacent regions of the North Caucasus", which entrusted a number of ministries and departments with obligations to introduce and maintain a special regime on the territory of Chechnya, similar to a state of emergency, without a formal declaration of a state of emergency or martial law.

The documents adopted on December 9 suggested the use of the troops of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the concentration of which continued on the administrative borders of Chechnya. Meanwhile, on December 12, negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides were to begin in Vladikavkaz.

The start of a full-scale military campaign

On December 11, 1994, Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 "On Measures to Ensure Legality, Law and Order and Public Activities in the Territory of the Chechen Republic", canceling decree No. 2137c. On the same day, the president made an appeal to the citizens of Russia, in which, in particular, he said: "Our goal is to find a political solution to the problems of one of the subjects of the Russian Federation - the Chechen Republic - to protect its citizens from armed extremism."

On the day of the signing of the decree, units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops advanced in three columns from three directions: Mozdok (from the north through the regions of Chechnya controlled by the anti-Dudaev opposition), Vladikavkaz (from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia) and Kizlyar (from the east, from the territory of Dagestan).

On the same day, December 11, an anti-war rally organized by the Russia's Choice party took place in Moscow. Yegor Gaidar and Grigory Yavlinsky demanded to stop the movement of troops, announced a break with the policy of Boris Yeltsin. A few days later, the communists also came out against the war.

Troops moving from the north marched unhindered through Chechnya to settlements located about 10 kilometers north of Grozny, where they first encountered armed resistance. Here, near the village of Dolinsky, on December 12, Russian troops were fired upon from the Grad installation by a detachment of field commander Vakha Arsanov. As a result of the shelling, 6 Russian servicemen were killed and 12 wounded, more than 10 armored vehicles were burned. The Grad missile launcher was destroyed by return fire.

On the line Dolinsky - the village of Pervomayskaya, Russian troops stopped and installed fortifications. Mutual shelling began. During December 1994, as a result of the shelling of settlements by Russian troops, numerous casualties appeared among civilians.

Another convoy of Russian troops, moving from Dagestan, was stopped on December 11 even before crossing the border with Chechnya, in the Khasavyurt District, where mostly Akka Chechens live. Crowds of local residents blockaded the columns of troops, while individual groups of servicemen were captured and then transported to Grozny.

A column of Russian troops moving from the west through Ingushetia was blocked by local residents and fired on near the village of Varsuki (Ingushetia). Three armored personnel carriers and four vehicles were damaged. As a result of the return fire, the first civilian casualties appeared. The Ingush village of Gazi-Yurt was shelled from helicopters. Using force, Russian troops passed through the territory of Ingushetia. On December 12, this convoy of federal troops was fired upon from the direction of the village of Assinovskaya in Chechnya. Among the Russian servicemen were killed and wounded, in response, fire was opened on the village, which led to the death of local residents. Near the village of Novy Sharoi, a crowd of residents of nearby villages blocked the road. Further advancement of the Russian troops would lead to the need to fire at unarmed people, and then to clashes with a militia detachment organized in each of the villages. These detachments were armed with machine guns, machine guns and grenade launchers. Regular armed formations of the CRI, which had heavy weapons, were based in the area located south of the village of Bamut.

As a result, in the west of Chechnya, federal forces were entrenched along the line of the conditional border of the Chechen Republic in front of the villages of Samashki - Davydenko - Novy Sharoy - Achkhoy-Martan - Bamut.

On December 15, 1994, against the background of the first setbacks in Chechnya, Russian Defense Minister P. Grachev removed from command and control a group of senior officers who refused to send troops into Chechnya and expressed a desire "before the start of a major military operation that could entail large casualties among the peaceful population ", receive a written order from the Supreme Commander. The command of the operation was entrusted to the commander of the North Caucasian Military District, Colonel-General A. Mityukhin.

On December 16, 1994, the Federation Council adopted a resolution in which it proposed to the President of the Russian Federation to immediately cease hostilities and the advance of troops and enter into negotiations. On the same day, Russian Prime Minister V.S. Chernomyrdin announced his readiness to personally meet with Dzhokhar Dudayev, subject to the disarmament of his formations.

On December 17, 1994, Yeltsin sent a telegram to D. Dudaev, in which the latter was ordered to appear in Mozdok to the plenipotentiary of the President of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, Minister of Nationalities and Regional Policy N.D. Yegorov and FSB Director S.V. Stepashin and sign the document on the surrender of weapons and a ceasefire. The text of the telegram, in particular, literally read: "I suggest you meet without delay with my plenipotentiaries Yegorov and Stepashin in Mozdok." At the same time, the President of the Russian Federation issued decree No. 2200 "On the restoration of federal territorial executive bodies on the territory of the Chechen Republic."

Siege and storming of Grozny

Since December 18, missile and bomb strikes have been repeatedly carried out on Grozny. Bombs and missiles fell mainly on the neighborhoods where residential buildings were located and obviously there were no military installations. As a result, there were large casualties among the civilian population. Despite the statement of the Russian President on December 27 to stop the bombing of the city, aviation continued to strike at Grozny.

In the second half of December, Russian federal troops attacked Grozny from the north and west, leaving the southwestern, southern and southeastern directions practically unobstructed. The corridors that remained open, linking Grozny and numerous villages of Chechnya with the outside world, allowed the civilian population to leave the zone of shelling, bombing and fighting.

On the night of December 23, federal forces attempted to cut off Grozny from Argun and established a foothold in the airport area in Khankala, southeast of Grozny.

On December 26, bombing of settlements in rural areas began: in the next three days alone, about 40 villages were attacked.

On December 26, it was announced for the second time about the creation of a government of national revival of the Chechen Republic headed by S. Khadzhiev and the readiness of the new government to discuss the issue of creating a confederation with Russia and to enter into negotiations with it, without putting forward demands for the withdrawal of troops.

On the same day, at a meeting of the Russian Security Council, it was decided to send troops to Grozny. Prior to this, no specific plans had been developed to capture the capital of Chechnya.

On December 27, Boris Yeltsin spoke on television with an appeal to the citizens of Russia, in which he explained the need for a military solution to the Chechen problem. BN Yeltsin said that ND Egorov, AV Kvashnin and SV Stepashin were entrusted with conducting negotiations with the Chechen side. On December 28, Sergei Stepashin clarified that this is not about negotiations, but about the presentation of an ultimatum.

On December 31, 1994, the storming of Grozny by units of the Russian army began. It was planned to inflict "powerful concentric strikes" by four groups and unite in the center of the city. For a variety of reasons, the troops immediately suffered heavy losses. The 131st (Maykop) separate motorized rifle brigade and the 81st (Samara) motorized rifle regiment, advancing from the north-western direction under the command of General K.B. Pulikovsky, were almost completely defeated. More than 100 servicemen were captured.

As stated by the deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation L.A. Ponomarev, G.P. Yakunin and V.L.Sheinis said that "a large-scale military action has been unleashed in Grozny and its environs. On December 31, after fierce bombing and shelling, about 250 units of armored vehicles. Dozens of them broke into the city center. Defenders of Grozny, armored columns were cut into pieces and systematically destroyed. Their crews were killed, taken prisoner or scattered around the city. The troops that entered the city suffered a crushing defeat. "

The head of the press service of the Russian government admitted that the Russian army suffered losses in manpower and equipment during the New Year offensive on Grozny.

On January 2, 1995, the press service of the Russian government announced that the center of the Chechen capital was "completely controlled by federal troops," "the presidential palace" was blocked. "

The war in Chechnya lasted until August 31, 1996. It was accompanied by terrorist acts outside Chechnya (Budennovsk, Kizlyar). The actual result of the campaign was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements on August 31, 1996. The agreement was signed by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Alexander Lebed, and the chief of staff of the Chechen militants, Aslan Maskhadov. As a result of the Khasavyurt agreements, decisions were made on the "postponed status" (the question of the status of Chechnya was to be resolved before December 31, 2001). Chechnya has de facto become an independent state.

Notes (edit)

1. Chechnya: Old Troubles // Izvestia, 27.11.1995.
2. How many died in Chechnya // Arguments and Facts, 1996.
3. The assault, which did not exist // Radio Liberty, 10/17/2014.
4. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to restore constitutional legality and law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic."
5. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
6. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict."
7. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
8. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
9. 1994: War in Chechnya // Obshchaya Gazeta, 12 / 18.04.2001.
10. 20 years of the Chechen war // Gazeta.ru, 11.12.2014.
11. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
12. Grozny: bloody snow on New Year's Eve // ​​Independent Military Review, 10.12.2004.
13. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
14. The signing of the Khasavyurt agreements in 1996 // RIA Novosti, 31.08.2011.

The reasons are, on the one hand, objective circumstances, and on the other, subjective. Various things are usually named as reasons and prerequisites: terrible threats from Chechnya, which had to be urgently prevented; an awful amount of oil, or vice versa - the need to lay an oil pipeline through which an awful amount of oil from the Caspian had to be pumped; protection of the rights of the Russian-speaking population. And a lot of other things. But upon closer inspection, it turns out that none of them worked as an incentive.

They were concerned about the rights of the Russian-speaking population only when they got involved in the whole war. Nobody thought about it before. There is practically no oil in Chechnya. It was pumped out over a century of field exploitation, now about 2 million tons per year are mined there, this is complete nonsense. Yes, there was a large oil refinery in Chechnya, powerful factories, but nothing remained of them: something was bombed, and what was left was cut and scrapped by ferrous metallurgists. The pipeline from the Caspian Sea was not particularly popular. About the Chechen crime - this is a myth built from our modern far away. The fact is that the Chechens turned out to be incapable of the mafia. Rather, they are capable of the same degree as statehood. The Chechen, anarchic structure of society (approximately from the 16th century) did not imply the building of hierarchical systems.

As of 1992-93, Chechnya suited everyone in Russia in many ways. Arranged the special services as a kind of offshore, where it was possible to ship weapons to third world countries through the Northern Airport; as an offshore company, where fighters could be recruited to perform a variety of tasks. For example, in Abkhazia they fought with Russian weapons with Russian instructors, but units of the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus under the command of Shamil Basayev.

As an offshore, Chechnya suited large oil (then state-owned) companies, because it was possible to drive oil through it and lie that all taxes were paid there, and send it further for export.

It would seem that it suits everyone, but what happened? What happened then was a completely internal Moscow event. By the end of 1992, the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the parliament, where Ruslan Khasbulatov was, had escalated. At the same time, in November 1992, Yegor Yakovlev, a man with a conscience, was removed from Ostankino. And the main propagandist, as it already happened, was Mikhail Poltoranin (an old party cadre under Yeltsin, known for his biased attitude towards Jews). But here's what to do: there is a parliament, there is a speaker, and he is a Chechen. And here the entire propaganda machine, within the framework of the confrontation with the Parliament, is being rebuilt to "hah this Chechen Khasbulatov!"

That is, if we go back to the texts of 1993, it turns out that our parliament is not bad there, but Khasbulatov is bad, and under it 70-odd objects in Moscow are controlled by the Chechen mafia. It turns out that the White House security department guarded about 70 more objects, but at the same time they had nothing to do with the Chechens. By October 1993, this had intensified to such an extent that if you listen to the radio communications on the night air on October 3-4, it turns out that the militiamen preparing for the assault were going to take either Grozny or Kabul. They were going to fight either with the Chechens (because Khasbulatov), ​​or with the Afghans (because Rutskoi had the misfortune to be in captivity in Afghanistan, and for some reason he was accused of it). Either way, the campaign was taken up. And it was then that talk about the Chechen mafia started. Then a surprise happens: we took a little bit of the White House and burned it down a little on October 4, and on October 12 - bang! - and for some reason there is no majority in the elections. Communists and Zhirinovites took many seats in parliament. And then the political strategists (who were not yet called that way) had a bright idea: in order to intercept the electorate, it is necessary to intercept the slogans of the opponents. We need to do something national and patriotic. For example, to return a fallen province to the bosom of the Empire. Nothing raises the rating like that.

In the second half of December, Shakhrai's plan for Chechnya, signed a month ago (and drafted), was suddenly pulled out of the cloth: a plan of negotiations against the backdrop of forceful pressure, which should ensure a solution to the problems of the separatist region. It turned out that the negotiations were very bad, but very good with the use of force. All sorts of political strategists and analysts from this project were cut off after six months. It was controlled by the security forces (which then included the Minnats, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB). This project was supervised in part by Sevastyanov, head of the Moscow department of the FSK (federal counterintelligence service). But something went wrong. We give the anti-Dudaev opposition money, they take money, but Dudaev is not overthrown; we give weapons - also Dudayev is not overthrown; we give weapons to the crews - on November 26, 1994, the storming of Grozny takes place (supposedly the opposition, but in fact the tanks were officers hired by the FSK in the Moscow region units). They fought in a hybrid way. Tanks enter Grozny. In Grozny they think: “Wow, there was someone who was able to build 40 tanks in a column and reach Grozny! My mother! Yes, you can give him power! ”Because there was no such person in Chechnya at that time. But suddenly non-locals crawled out from under the armor, and everything changed. They were burned and taken prisoner. Further, as always, foxes are hidden in the forest, and small blood can be washed off only with large blood. During the year, no one turned to the analysis of errors and return to the previous stage. Further - the beginning of the war. What's funny is that the war did not raise this rating. By the beginning of 1996, Yeltsin had it at the background level. And the elections were won partly because it was then that his team said: "Peace!", "Peace!" Nazran negotiations, Yandarbiev arrives in Moscow to talk, he is picked up at a special ABC facility in Tyoply Stan. At this time, Yeltsin flies to Chechnya, says: "That's it, peace has come." Yeltsin was elected in the second round, but at the same time, he took the third to his team (and the third was then Lebed), appointed him secretary of the Security Council. And Lebed decided to become the winner. His former deputy for Transnistria, Tikhomirov (who then commanded an army group in Chechnya) was given carte blanche to win. And in July 1996, the war resumed as soon as the results of the second round of elections were officially announced. I must say that the victory did not work out, because three days before Yeltsin's inauguration, the Chechens entered Grozny and occupied the city. Not that overwhelming force, there were about 800 of them. And no one dared to spoil the master's mood with bad news. Therefore, for three days paralysis reigned, during which time the Chechens were surprised to gain a foothold in the city and it was no longer possible to knock them out. After which Lebed, when the fighting resumed, arrived at the scene, realized that there was nothing to catch here and concluded the Khasavyurt agreements. That is, here we had one driving force, simple: neither oil, nor money, nor anything else. And power, which is more important than oil, money and much more.

I must say that after Khasavyurt they tried to forget about Chechnya, like about a bad dream. We did not get our prisoners out, although in the fall of 1996 it was quite possible to do so. Hostage-taking began, the situation was seams, and they tried to forget about Chechnya. And so we come to 1999. In the winter of that year, a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was kidnapped in Chechnya; a year later, his remains will be found in the mountains. And that was the last straw. Prime Minister Stepashin said that we will use force. The war machine spun. For example, the formation of the 77th Marine Brigade in Dagestan began (this is not funny, at that time the Marine Corps were the only units that had at least some mountain training). The transfer of tactical missiles to the south went. And here, even against someone else's will, we irresistibly went to war, because from the other side the car started spinning. Why? We pass to the other side and notice that in 97th year Maskhadov won the elections in Chechnya (convincingly won), and Shamil Basayev took the second place. It was terribly unstable there, because Basayev had detachments. Not that great, but he knew how to unite under himself very restless local comrades. At some point, Maskhadov let him steer, for six months (somewhere at the turn of 97-98, Basayev headed the government). It must be said that he achieved brilliant success: the budget replenishment fell 20 times. After which, it seemed, his career was over. After leaving, as promised, six months later from this post, he immediately spoke at the congress of the Congress of the peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan, declaring the powerful goals of expansion. Preparations began for what eventually resulted in the invasion of Dagestan.

Basayev, being a political marginal, found himself on the brink of death, not only political, but also physical. The only thing that saved him from such a prospect was the beginning of a war, which would inevitably lead to the rallying of all and save him from death (at least delay this death). And so it happened.

In 1999, in the summer, Basayev was already accumulating his forces in the Tsumadinsky district in Dagestan. And what went bang there at the turn of July-August 1999 could have banged a little earlier, it could have banged a little later. One way or another, the war began, which was declared a counter-terrorist operation (although there were no explosions in the cities yet). I do not want to say that these explosions were staged by the special services, except for the "Ryazan exercises" the role of the special services has not been proven anywhere. But the point is different. The fact that this war was used. If you look at Vladimir Putin's rating for August-November 1999, you will see that it suddenly began to grow from insignificant, background values. Every week, some kind of brutal statement like "soak in the toilet." And the hop rating - 7% jumped up until he went to sky-high heights. Actually, this is exactly the situation when we can say something like the following: we do not know who arranged all this, but we know exactly who used it.

Ironically, what was not possible in the first war (to use it as an electoral tool) was perfectly successful in the second. Further the war, of course, was of no use to anyone. For example, already before the election of Putin as president, they tried in every possible way to declare that “Victory, guys! That's it, already a victory! There - in the Komsomolskoye battles. " However, the terrorist attacks in every possible way reminded of the opposite. But they were again used to further strengthen the power. But attempts to assert that the subsequent large-scale terrorist attacks were organized by the special services, they are also, in my opinion, untenable. Nevertheless, we see that the reason here turns out to be a thing much more attractive than oil and than money. Power. Uncontrolled power that does not stop to play with fire in order to preserve this power.