Stalin's monetary reform of 1947.

The Soviet monetary system withstood the test of war. Thus, the money supply in Germany increased 6 times during the war years (although the Germans brought goods from all over Europe and a significant part of the USSR); in Italy - 10 times; in Japan – 11 times. In the USSR, the money supply during the war years increased only 3.8 times.

Stalin's monetary reform of 1947. Pegging the USSR ruble to gold and creating a non-dollar economic space:

However, the Great Patriotic War gave rise to a number of negative phenomena that needed to be eliminated.

Firstly, a discrepancy appeared between the amount of money and the needs of trade turnover. There was a surplus of money.

Secondly, several types of prices appeared - ration, commercial and market. This undermined the importance of cash wages and cash income of collective farmers based on workdays.

Third, large sums of money ended up with speculators. Moreover, the difference in prices still gave them the opportunity to enrich themselves at the expense of the population. This undermined social justice in the country.

Immediately after the end of the war, the state carried out a number of measures aimed at strengthening the monetary system and increasing the well-being of the population. The purchasing demand of the population increased through an increase in wage funds and a decrease in payments to the financial system. Thus, in August 1945, the war tax on workers and employees began to be abolished.

The tax was finally abolished at the beginning of 1946. They no longer held monetary lotteries and reduced the size of the subscription for the new government loan. In the spring of 1946, savings banks began paying workers and employees compensation for unused vacations during the war. Post-war industrial restructuring began.

There was some growth in the stock of goods due to the restructuring of industry and due to a reduction in the consumption of the armed forces and the sale of trophies. To remove money from circulation, commercial trade continued to expand.

In 1946, commercial trade acquired a fairly wide scope: a wide network of shops and restaurants was created, the range of goods was expanded and their prices were reduced. The end of the war led to a drop in prices on collective farm markets (by more than a third).

However, by the end of 1946, the negative phenomena had not been completely eliminated. Therefore, the course towards monetary reform was maintained. In addition, the release of new money and the exchange of old money for new ones was necessary in order to eliminate money that went abroad and improve the quality of banknotes.

According to the testimony of the People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR Arseny Zverev (who managed the finances of the USSR since 1938), Stalin first inquired about the possibility of monetary reform at the end of December 1942 and demanded to submit the first calculations at the beginning of 1943.

At first, the monetary reform was planned to be carried out in 1946. However, due to famine, which was caused by drought and crop failure in a number of Soviet regions, the start of the reform had to be postponed.

Only on December 3, 1947, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to abolish the card system and begin monetary reform.

The conditions for the monetary reform were determined in the Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated December 14, 1947. The exchange of money was carried out throughout the Soviet Union from December 16 to 22, 1947, and in remote areas ended on December 29.

When recalculating wages, money was exchanged in such a way that wages remained unchanged. The coin was not subject to change and remained in circulation at face value. For cash deposits in Sberbank, amounts up to 3 thousand rubles were also subject to exchange one to one; for deposits from 3 to 10 thousand rubles, savings were reduced by one third of the amount; for deposits over 10 thousand rubles, two-thirds of the amount was subject to withdrawal.

Those citizens who kept large sums of money at home could exchange at the rate of 1 new ruble to 10 old ones.

Relatively preferential conditions for the exchange of cash savings were established for holders of government loan bonds: the 1947 loan bonds were not subject to revaluation; bonds of mass loans were exchanged for bonds of a new loan in a ratio of 3:1, bonds of a freely marketable loan of 1938 were exchanged in a ratio of 5:1. The funds that were in the settlement and current accounts of cooperative organizations and collective farms were revalued at the rate of 5 old rubles for 4 new ones.

At the same time, the government abolished the card system (before other victorious states), high prices in commercial trade and introduced uniform, reduced state retail prices for food and industrial goods. Thus, prices for bread and flour were reduced by an average of 12% compared to current ration prices; for cereals and pasta - by 10%, etc.

Thus, the negative consequences of the war in the field of the monetary system were eliminated in the USSR. This made it possible to switch to trading at uniform prices and reduce the money supply by more than three times (from 43.6 to 14 billion rubles). Overall, the reform was successful.

In addition, the reform had a social aspect. The speculators were pinned down. This restored social justice that had been violated during the war. At first glance, it seemed that everyone suffered, because everyone had some money in their hands on December 15th. But the ordinary worker and employee living on his salary, who by the middle of the month no longer had much money left, suffered only nominally. He was not even left without money, since already on December 16 they began to issue wages in new money for the first half of the month, which they usually did not do.

Salaries were usually paid monthly after the end of the month. Thanks to this issue, workers and employees were provided with new money at the beginning of the reform. The exchange of 3 thousand rubles of deposit 1:1 satisfied the overwhelming majority of the population, since people did not have significant funds. Based on the entire adult population, the average deposit in a savings book could not be more than 200 rubles. It is clear that the Stakhanovites, inventors and other small groups of the population who had super-profits lost part of their money to the speculators. But taking into account the general decline in prices, although they did not win, they still did not suffer much.

True, those who kept large sums of money at home could be dissatisfied. This concerned speculative groups of the population and part of the population of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, who did not know war and for this reason had the opportunity to trade.

It should be noted that the Stalinist system was unique, which was able to remove most of the money from monetary circulation and at the same time the majority of ordinary people were not harmed. At the same time, the whole world was amazed that just two years after the end of the war and after the crop failure of 1946, basic food prices were maintained at the level of rations or even reduced. That is, almost all food was available to everyone in the USSR.

This was a surprise and an offensive surprise for the Western world. The capitalist system has literally been driven into the mud up to its ears. Thus, Great Britain, on whose territory there was no war for four years and which suffered immeasurably less in the war than the USSR, could not abolish the card system even in the early 1950s. At this time, in the former “workshop of the world,” there were strikes by miners who demanded that they be provided with a standard of living similar to that of the miners of the USSR.

The Soviet ruble has been pegged to the US dollar since 1937. The ruble exchange rate was calculated against foreign currencies based on the US dollar.

In February 1950, the Central Statistical Office of the USSR, on the urgent instructions of I. Stalin, recalculated the exchange rate of the new ruble.

Soviet specialists, focusing on the purchasing power of the ruble and the dollar (compared prices of goods), came up with the figure of 14 rubles per 1 dollar. Previously (before 1947) the dollar was worth 53 rubles. However, according to the head of the Ministry of Finance Zverev and the head of the State Planning Committee Saburov, as well as those present at this event, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and the head of Albania Enver Hoxha, Stalin crossed out this figure on February 27 and wrote: “At most, 4 rubles.”

The resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of February 28, 1950 transferred the ruble to a permanent gold basis, and the peg to the dollar was abolished. The gold content of the ruble was set at 0.222168 grams of pure gold. On March 1, 1950, the purchase price of the USSR State Bank for gold was set at 4 rubles. 45 kopecks for 1 gram of pure gold.

As Stalin noted, the USSR was thus protected from the dollar. After the war, the United States had dollar surpluses that it wanted to dump on other countries, shifting its financial problems onto others. As an example of indefinite financial, and therefore political dependence on the Western world, Joseph Stalin cited Yugoslavia, where Josip Broz Tito ruled. The Yugoslav currency was pegged to a “basket” of the US dollar and the British pound sterling. Stalin actually predicted the future of Yugoslavia:

“...sooner or later the West will “collapse” Yugoslavia economically and dismember it politically...” His prophetic words have come true since the 1990s.

For the first time, national money was freed from the American dollar. According to the UN Economic and Social Council, the UN European and Far Eastern Commissions (1952-1954), Stalin's decision almost doubled the efficiency of Soviet exports. Moreover, at that time it was industrial and knowledge-intensive. This happened due to the exemption from dollar prices of importing countries that had lowered prices for Soviet exports. In turn, this led to increased production in most Soviet industries. The Soviet Union also had the opportunity to get rid of imports of technology from the United States and other countries that relied on the dollar and speed up its own technological renewal.

The transfer to the “Stalinist gold ruble” of most of the USSR’s trade with the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), created in 1949, as well as with China, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam and a number of developing countries led to the formation of a financial and economic bloc. A common market emerged, which was free from the dollar and, therefore, the political influence of the United States.

In the first half of April 1952, an international economic meeting was held in Moscow. At it, the Soviet delegation led by Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Shepilov proposed establishing a common market for goods, services and investments. It was free of the US dollar and was created as a counterweight to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and US expansion. At this time, the Marshall Plan was already in full force. The economies of most European countries became dependent on the United States.

Back in 1951, CMEA members and China declared the inevitability of close cooperation among all countries that do not want to submit to the US dollar and the dictates of Western financial and trade structures. The idea was supported by countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, India, Indonesia, Yemen, Syria, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and Uruguay. These countries became co-organizers of the Moscow Forum. Interestingly, the proposal was also supported by some Western countries - Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Iceland and Austria. A total of 49 countries took part in the Moscow meeting.

During his work, more than 60 trade, investment and scientific and technical agreements were signed. Among the main principles of these agreements were: the exclusion of dollar payments; the possibility of barter, including to pay off debts; policy coordination in international economic organizations and in the global market; mutual treatment of maximum favored nation in loans, investments, credits and scientific and technical cooperation; customs and price benefits for developing countries (or their individual goods), etc.

The Soviet delegation proposed at the first stage to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements on customs, price, credit and commodity issues. Then they planned to gradually unify the principles of foreign economic policy and create a “all-bloc” trade zone. At the final stage, they planned to create an interstate settlement currency with a mandatory gold content (the ruble was already prepared for this), which led to the completion of the creation of a common market.

It is clear that financial and economic integration led to political integration. Not only socialist, but also people's democracies and former colonies, that is, developing states, would unite around the USSR.

Unfortunately, after the death of Stalin, the authorities of the USSR and most other CMEA countries moved away from the proposals of the great leader, gradually falling under the power of the dollar (and their elite under the power of the “golden calf”). They tried to “forget” about the great Stalinist project. Moreover, due to Khrushchev’s socio-economic and political adventures, it was necessary to greatly devalue the “Stalinist gold ruble” (10 times) and reduce its gold content.

At the end of the 1970s, the gold content of the Soviet ruble was de facto completely eliminated. Since the time of Khrushchev, Soviet foreign trade with most countries began to be carried out in US dollars. In addition, the Soviet Union became a “donor” to developing countries and began to supply the Western world with cheap energy and industrial raw materials. And the gold reserves that were created under Stalin began to be rapidly lost.

The idea of ​​“Soviet globalization” at the financial and economic level and freedom from the US dollar, dependence on the US Federal Reserve System, is now more relevant than ever. Actually, there is no need to invent anything. Joseph Stalin has already given everything to Russia. We just need to show political will and bring his plans to their logical conclusion. Then Russia will be completely independent on financial and economic priority, will undermine the power of the Federal Reserve, Western TNBs and TNCs and will receive a powerful tool for “Russian globalization.” Russia will receive a powerful tool for the development of the national economy and the well-being of the people.

On the path to financial independence. Stalin's gold ruble.

A brief history of the monetary system during the reign of Nicholas II.

The monetary system that existed in the Russian Empire before the First World War was formed thanks to the reform of 1897 (Witte reform). The introduction of the gold ruble was in the interests of big capital, as well as foreign banks and monopolies that exported their capital to Russia. In general, Witte fulfilled the wishes of the so-called. “financial international”, with whom he had a number of contacts. The reform was preceded by measures to strengthen the budget and the accumulation of gold reserves. The accumulation of gold proceeded by increasing its production and speeding up export by reducing domestic consumption of the population (“we are undernourished, but we will export it”).

As a result of the monetary reform, a classical form of monetary system with gold currency was established in Russia. However, despite the large gold reserves, the financial situation of the Russian Empire was not stable. Russia had a large external debt.

Believing in the need for Western investment and the free circulation of the ruble, Nicholas II removed the protective barriers. Foreign capital did flow into Russia, but it (as in modern Russia) was of a speculative nature. Foreigners built enterprises in Russia for the extraction and processing of raw materials, and the manufacturing sector grew rapidly in the empire. But most of the profits were immediately exported abroad in the form of interest on loans and dividends from Western capital. For this, a freely convertible gold ruble was required. Gold flowed from the Russian Empire to Western banks. Western capital, with the help of Witte, built such a system that most of the profits ended up in the hands of the “financial international,” as well as Russian bankers and large industrialists. At the same time, Russian rich people preferred to burn their money abroad and use it to buy Western luxury goods.

Having entered the First World War, Russia quickly exhausted its budget reserves. The government was forced to prohibit the exchange of banknotes for gold and began to resort to issuing paper notes in large quantities to cover military expenses. In 1914-1915 The money supply more than doubled. However, the financial situation remained quite stable. In some other warring powers the situation was worse. Military orders and food purchases for the army even somewhat stimulated the national economy, and the Russian economy continued to grow. This delayed the fall in the value of the ruble. Confidence in the ruble has not yet been undermined. In 1916, the situation worsened somewhat, and money began to depreciate. The money supply continued to grow: from 2.4 billion rubles at the beginning of the war and 5.7 billion rubles at the beginning of 1916 to 10.8 billion rubles by March 1, 1917.

It should be noted that the depreciation of the ruble in 1914-1917. was no longer due to increased consumer demand for a decreasing number of goods, but due to the speculative component. In fact, a significant part of Russia’s industrial and financial circles during the war years tried to profit from wartime and the country’s difficulties. Theft component was increasingly included in the price of goods. There was a terrible war going on, hundreds of thousands of sons of the Fatherland died, were wounded, became crippled, were freezing and hungry, fed lice, and at the same time in the rear they were stealing everything they could.

Thus, at state-owned factories, products cost 2-3 times less than at private ones. At a state-owned plant, 122-mm shrapnel cost 15 rubles, and at a private plant - 35 rubles. When the head of the Main Artillery Directorate, General Alexei Manikovsky, tried to pin down the thieves, they complained to the tsar. Nicholas II summoned the general to his place and reported that he was hindering “the initiative of society in supplying the army.” To this Manikovsky replied that private owners already receive 300% of the profit, and in some cases up to 1000%. Nikolai said to this:

“Well, let them make money, as long as they don’t steal.” Manikovsky noted that “this is worse than theft, this is open robbery.”

However, the emperor insisted on his own under the pretext that “there is no need to irritate the public.”

This conversation is very indicative; it characterizes the degree of decomposition of the Russian Empire and the weakness of imperial power. Even during the war, Nikolai does not want to tighten the rules and restore order in the rear, for fear of “irritating the public.” As is well known, the public during this period, like most of the press, was formed by liberal, Masonic and Zionist circles. The “fifth column”, which ultimately destroyed the autocracy and the Russian Empire by organizing the February Revolution.

It should be noted that the activities of Manikovsky, who became the head of the GAU in a crisis situation - during the period of the so-called “shell famine”, encountered serious resistance. The general showed himself to be an energetic leader who was able to organize the production of ammunition and by 1917 completely satisfy the needs of the front. Under Manikovsky, existing production facilities were expanded - weapons, artillery, shells, gunpowder - and new ones were created. Manikovsky was an excellent manager. He had colossal energy and exceptional abilities. His favorite saying was:

“Delay is like death!”

The general was not afraid to take responsibility and resolved matters with lightning speed. He attracted people to himself with his warmth and directness. Manikovsky harshly criticized private manufacturers focused on super-profits; they inflated prices and produced defective products. Private industrialists hated him and almost achieved Manikovsky’s resignation from the post of head of the GAU. In March 1916, the Minister of War agreed to transfer the general back to the post of commandant of the Kronstadt Fortress. However, the possibility of a disruption in the supply of ammunition to the army in the event of Manikovsky's departure forced the military leadership to leave a skillful manager in his post.

Manikovsky was able to bring private factories producing military products under his control. Manikovsky himself believed that in peacetime state enterprises should serve as price regulators and the vanguard of technical progress, and during war they should have a dominant position. After the revolution, Manikovsky joined the Red Army and headed the Artillery Directorate and the Red Army Supply Directorate. Thanks to Manikovsky, powerful artillery appeared in the Red Army and a system for supplying the army with ammunition was organized. Unfortunately, he died in 1920.

The picture of general theft in bourgeois circles is clearly illustrated by the situation in the Urals, which was one of the oldest industrial centers of the empire. For comparison, during the Great Patriotic War, the Urals became the most powerful center of the USSR, which made a huge contribution to the overall victory. So, if the output per worker in the Urals in the first (peaceful) half of 1941 is taken as 100%, then in the second half of 1941 output increased to 217.3%, and in the first half of 1942 - to 329%.

We see a completely different picture in the Urals during the First World War. Until the spring-summer of 1915, when the Great Retreat of the Russian Army began and an acute shortage of weapons (especially shells and barbed wire) was discovered, no one thought much about the Urals and its industry. Only in 1915 did the need to urgently transfer factories to the production of military products and increase steel production become acute. In the summer of 1915, a commission from General Mikhailovsky came to the Urals, toured factories and held meetings with factory owners. The breeders began to stir and began to actively express their “patriotism.”

Entrepreneurs have developed active efforts to modernize and expand production. Purchases of new machines began, and new factories were built. The number of workers has increased significantly. It would seem that the Urals should have experienced an increase in production. However, the opposite happened. Ore mining, iron and steel smelting fell. At the same time, the entrepreneurs felt great and rode like cheese in butter. Profits of joint stock companies rose sharply. Thus, the Theological Society, which had about 4 million gross profits in 1913, received more than 10.5 million rubles in 1916; the profit of the Beloretsk company increased from 860 thousand rubles to 2 million 170 thousand rubles, etc. In general, the profit of the Ural factory owners tripled in two years.

Provisional government.

It is clear that with such a system the government had no choice but to print more and more money. When the liberals seized power in February 1917, the collapse of the economy and the financial crisis intensified even more. From March to October 1917, the money supply doubled and reached 20.4 billion rubles by November 1, 1917. This, due to a sharp decrease in production volume, a reduction in marketable products and the throwing away of money and peasant money boxes, led to a strong depreciation of the ruble. The depreciation of money has outpaced the issue. Russia entered a period of severe financial crisis and collapse of the monetary system. By the time of the October Revolution, the paper ruble had depreciated to 10 pre-revolutionary kopecks. The Bolsheviks inherited a completely disordered financial system.

The period of "war communism".

The Soviet government implemented a number of anti-crisis measures. Lenin put forward the idea of ​​abandoning the issue of money as one of the most important tasks of economic policy. The Council of People's Commissars (SNK) took measures to reduce costs. A “Special Committee to Reduce Government Expenditures” was established under the Council of People’s Commissars.

However, during the civil war and other difficulties of this period, it was not possible to eliminate the budget deficit. From November 1917 to April 1918, 18.7 billion rubles were put into circulation. In the spring of 1918, active work was carried out to prepare for monetary reform. Lenin paid great attention to this issue and emphasized that all other reforms are doomed to failure if there is no success in financial policy.

However, due to the intensification of the civil war and intervention, the financial reform, which involved a reduction in the money supply, could not be implemented. Expenditures on military needs increased sharply, but budget revenues could not be increased due to increasing economic devastation and the inability to collect taxes. The budget deficit, despite the introduction of an emergency revolutionary tax, increased sharply and continued to grow. In 1920, the budget deficit amounted to more than one trillion rubles (87% of budget expenditures). The only source of covering the budget deficit was the issue of money. The amount of money from mid-1918 to the beginning of 1921 increased almost 30 times - from 43.7 billion rubles on July 1, 1918 to 1.2 trillion rubles on January 1, 1921.

Money quickly depreciated. Thus, in January 1920, the money supply increased by 15.7%, and prices increased by 27%; in February, the money supply was increased by 12.6%, and prices by 23%; in March, the money supply increased by 16.2%, and prices by 25%. The rapid depreciation of money was associated not only with emission, but also with a significant reduction in production volume and commodity mass. War, chaos and general devastation caused a reduction in production. The naturalization of the economy and exchange (surplus appropriation system, ration supply, introduction of free services and goods, etc.), as well as the acceleration of the circulation of money, also had an effect. There was a “flight of money”, characteristic of a period of strong inflation. Individual goods became means of exchange, displacing money. In addition, the Soviet government did not even have a symbolic provision of money.

The gold reserves of the Russian Empire were lost and taken abroad. The Soviet ruble did not inspire confidence due to the lack of gold reserves. Psychology is of great importance in financial policy. The financial experiments of the Bolsheviks also played a negative role. The Bolsheviks made attempts to abandon money altogether and distribute goods for free.

NEP period.

It was impossible to stop inflation during the civil war and intervention. It was necessary to maintain and feed the state apparatus, the army, support cities and workers, but there was almost no income from taxes. But as soon as the war ended, the Soviet government was able to change the situation.

One of the most important measures to improve monetary circulation was the organization of the State Bank in October 1921. The State Bank became not only the main credit institution, but also the center for organizing money circulation and regulating money circulation. With the transition to the New Economic Policy, the importance of money increased. Payment for goods and services has been restored everywhere. Most of the state-owned enterprises were transferred to self-financing, that is, the free supply of raw materials and supplies was stopped and budget support was reduced. The card system for distributing products among employees and workers was limited and then eliminated; Cash wages gradually replaced wages in kind.

The XI Congress of the RCP(b) adopted an extensive program of financial policy. The transfer to self-financing of most enterprises and organizations contributed to the growth of production and trade turnover, reduced government spending and expanded sources of income for the budget. In 1922-1923 Local budgets were organized and administrative costs were reduced. In 1922, the first short-term grain loan was issued. Loan bonds were sold for money, and they could be repaid with money or bread. Bonds were also accepted as payment in kind tax, which replaced the surplus appropriation system. These and other measures somewhat stabilized the financial situation of Soviet Russia.

To reorganize monetary circulation in 1921-1922. carried out two denominations of banknotes. During the first denomination, one ruble of new money (banknotes of the 1922 model) was equal to 10 thousand rubles of banknotes of previous issues. For the second denomination (banknotes of the 1923 model) to 1 million rubles of banknotes of all issues before 1922 or 100 thousand rubles of the 1922 model.

However, it was not possible to radically change the situation. The money supply continued to grow at a rapid pace. In the period from July 1, 1921 to January 1, 1923, it increased 850 times. The crop failure and famine of 1921 also played a negative role. True, the growth of economic turnover contributed to the fact that the depreciation of money proceeded more slowly than the growth of emissions. To create a stable currency, a radical monetary reform and a serious expansion of production and trade turnover were required.

Monetary reform in the USSR 1922-1924.

By the spring of 1922, the problem of stabilizing the ruble became especially acute, since the depreciation of the ruble interfered with economic recovery. It should be noted that the Soviet government knew why it needed a hard ruble. And this differed from modern economists who like to talk about the benefits of a “weak ruble” for Russia. In reality, the depreciation of the ruble is beneficial to the West, which, with its hard currency, can more easily buy Russian raw materials. The depreciation of the ruble is also beneficial for modern large Russian capital. All this reinforces the raw material nature of the Russian economy. A solid ruble is beneficial for the development of national production and domestic trade. The Bolsheviks understood this well.

Foreign currency and gold, which penetrated into the economic circulation of the USSR, reduced the sphere of circulation of the Soviet ruble. It was necessary to create a stable currency. Two denominations became the first stage of reform. The denomination unified monetary circulation, but did not strengthen the sovznak. Since the summer of 1922, the State Bank carried out preparatory work in preparation for the issue of new banknotes. By decrees of the Council of People's Commissars of July 25 and October 11, 1922, the State Bank received the right to issue new banknotes - banknotes of large denominations. It was planned to put into circulation banknotes in denominations of 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 25 and 50 chervonets. Money got its name from “chervonnoye gold” (high-grade pure gold), which had a red, that is, red tint. Subsequently, banknotes in denominations of 2 and 50 chervonets, which were provided for by the decree, were never put into circulation. The Soviet chervonets was equal to the 10-ruble gold coin of the Russian Empire weighing 7.74 g. The chervonets was 25% backed by gold, other precious metals, and foreign currency; 75% of it was provided by short-term government obligations and goods.

Sovznak was not completely abolished; there was not enough security. Chervonets was a very large sum, and in fact it could only be used for large and wholesale purchases. In small retail trade, small amounts were needed. Metal chervonets were mainly used by the Soviet government for foreign trade; domestic circulation was limited. As a result, a hard Soviet currency was created on a gold basis, but without the circulation of gold money. By the summer of 1923, the chervonets was firmly introduced into circulation as the main currency of Soviet Russia. The number of bank notes in circulation increased from 3.5 million rubles on January 1, 1923 to 237 million rubles on January 1, 1924. Their share in the entire mass of money, calculated in chervonets, increased from 3% to 75%.

Along with the release of the chervonets in October 1923, the so-called transport certificates with a 5 ruble banknote were put into circulation; they were accepted as payments by the railway along with the chervonets. In fact, transport certificates were accepted as payments not only by railways. Transport certificates entered the country's monetary circulation as a small chervonets denomination.

Monetary reform stabilized the country's position, but could not eliminate a number of negative phenomena. The depreciation of Sovznak continued at a rapid pace. The falling Sovznak remained the leading currency in rural areas for some time, since the chervonets had too large a denomination. Chervonets, with low productivity (when peasants produced a little more than they consumed themselves) and the low level of cash income of peasants, was not available to the broad masses of the population. In addition, in the villages there were no compensation mechanisms to protect cash income from the depreciation of sovznak, which were available in the cities. Thus, the problems that the falling currency generated fell mainly on the Soviet peasantry. In essence, the burden of building the Soviet state was placed on the shoulders of the peasantry.

The continued decline in the currency also had a negative impact on the workers. Salaries were still largely paid not in chervonets, but in Sovznak. Jumps in the exchange rates of the Sovznak and the Chervonets and fluctuations in the exchange rates of the same funds in different markets created the ground for speculation. The layer of “NEPmen” (“new Russians” of the 1920s) and kulaks benefited from the speculative rise in prices and the depreciation of their debts. The wealthy peasantry (kulaks) profited from usury and speculative transactions. This showed the need to introduce a single currency.

Resistance was provided not only by representatives of the Nepman bourgeoisie and kulaks, but also by Trotskyists. They prophesied the failure of the monetary reform and proposed to cancel it or stop there. Economists at the Narkomfin Institute of Economic Research also predicted the collapse of the monetary reform, speaking about the impossibility of quickly cutting budget expenditures and finding other sources of covering the budget deficit. Thus, certain sections of the population in the Soviet Union wanted to maintain the weakness of the ruble and the dependence of Soviet monetary circulation on the world money market and our economy and on foreign capital. Private traders and Nepmen wanted the free exchange of chervonets for gold in order to be able to take gold abroad and escape there themselves.

At the beginning of 1924, the final stage of the reform was carried out. In the spring of 1924, treasury notes in denominations of 1, 3 and 5 rubles began to enter monetary circulation. They stopped issuing Sovznak and began to withdraw them from circulation by buying them back at a fixed rate. Sovznaki of the 1923 model were bought from the population at the rate of one gold ruble in treasury notes for 50 thousand old ones (50 billion rubles in old banknotes). At the same time, high-grade silver coins in denominations of 1 ruble and 50 kopecks, as well as small change silver and copper coins, were put into circulation.

The successful completion of monetary reform in 1924 led to the creation of a single, stable Soviet currency. Without outside help, they eliminated the disorder of the monetary system on their own, which lasted 10 years. After the release of treasury notes and small change coins, before the withdrawal of sovznak, five types of banknotes were in circulation for some time: treasury notes, chervonets, small change coin, sovznak and transport certificates.

Monetary reform was of great importance for the economy of the USSR. 1924-1925 - the first economic year after the monetary reform - was the year of the maximum industrial growth for the entire recovery period. Industrial output increased by 57% compared to the 1923-1924 industrial year. A stable currency has created conditions for reducing costs, strengthening cost accounting, control and planning in industry. Thus, in the second half of 1924, production costs fell by almost 20%. Labor productivity in 1925 reached pre-war levels. Wages also reached pre-war levels. The reform was also of great importance for the development of agriculture. The losses of peasants from the depreciation of money stopped, the conditions for the sale of agricultural products improved; The price difference between industrial and agricultural goods has decreased somewhat. This contributed to the rise of peasant farming and expanded the raw material and industrial base for industry. The sales market for industrial products was expanded.

Thus, over three years of serious work with the financial system, the Soviet government, without any external loans or credits, managed to strengthen the monetary system so much that a paper chervonets was worth more than a gold coin of the same denomination - more expensive than gold. The introduction of hard currency calmed the population. And with a sharp increase in production, there was an increase in the amount of money. The USSR was able, like the British with the pound sterling and the Americans with the dollar, to receive a net profit from the issue - from the operation of the printing press.

But ultimately everything still rested on the Soviet peasantry. “Price scissors” continued to exist in the USSR: prices for industrial goods were high, and prices for agricultural goods were low. The peasants were not given a fair price for their products, since funds were needed for the development of the Soviet Union. Actually, the Bolsheviks did not hide this. They honestly said that, in addition to the usual taxes, direct and indirect, they also have to receive a “super tax” in the form of overpayments on manufactured goods and in the form of underpayment by peasants for agricultural goods. As Joseph Stalin noted at the April 1929 plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, this is “something like a tribute for our backwardness.” The supertax was necessary for the development of industry and the elimination of the backwardness of the USSR from the advanced Western powers. It was believed that this tax was feasible for the peasants, since they had a personal farm, the income from which allowed them to pay an additional tax. This distinguished peasants from workers who lived only on wages. As a result, at the expense of the Soviet peasantry, agricultural products were exported and foreign currency was received.

In the Russian Empire they did the same thing, but the difference was that in the USSR the funds received were used for development. In addition, the Soviet Union had an industrial development strategy and a planned economy. Machine tools were purchased and heavy industrial enterprises were built. Patience and “belt tightening” made it possible to quickly eliminate the gap between the USSR and the advanced Western countries, create a powerful industry and not only survive the bloody World War II, but also win and become a superpower.

Soviet chervonets 1923

Pre-war period.

Before the start of the Great Patriotic War, banknotes were issued on the basis of credit operations of the State Bank. Money was released into circulation in accordance with the needs of the national economy. During this period, the planned Soviet system of credit and money circulation was finally formed based on the concentration in the hands of the state of commodity masses, which were put into circulation at stable prices.

In 1929, the Soviet government temporarily introduced a card system. This was done to maintain real wages and provide workers with bread at low prices from government reserves. At the end of 1934, when large-scale mechanized production was finally established in agriculture and collective and state farms took a dominant position in agriculture, it became possible to fully provide for the population without rationing cards. The card system was cancelled. At the same time, two price levels have developed in trade turnover - high in commercial and collective farm trade and low in the closed trading network.

The purchasing demand of the population continued to grow during this period. Thus, the number of workers and employees in the USSR doubled from 1928 to 1934 and exceeded 23 million people. The average annual salary during the same period increased from 703 rubles to 1,791 rubles, and the wage fund increased from 8.2 billion rubles to 41.6 billion rubles. In 1937, the average annual salary increased to 3,047 rubles. The incomes of collective farmers also increased. At the same time, government spending on education, free medical care and other socio-cultural activities has increased significantly. State budget expenditures for these needs in 1937 increased 17 times compared to 1928.

We must remember how the Soviet leadership developed industry in the USSR. The goods require a buyer. If goods are bought up and more are needed, production will develop. But the buyer needs money to buy goods. Stalin chose the so-called the “American path” of industrial development (“the English path” involves the seizure of colonies and the use of their markets), the path of developing one’s own market. In the 1930s, hundreds of factories and enterprises came into operation, but buyers were needed. Then the government began to consciously carry out the issue, throwing money into the Soviet market. At the initial stage, the debts of state-owned enterprises were covered. Then they began to regularly increase the purchasing power of the population. In the post-war period, regular reductions in prices for goods began.

The USSR formed the internal market. At the same time, the country had a positive balance in foreign trade; since 1933, the USSR always sold a little more than it bought. The Russia-USSR breakthrough was amazing. If we make a comparison in 1928 prices, then the level of industrial production in 1913 was 11 billion rubles. The Soviet Union reached this level in 1927. The following year, 1928, the country significantly exceeded the pre-revolutionary level - the level of industrial production reached 16.8 billion rubles. In 1938, industrial production in the USSR reached 100.4 billion rubles. In terms of the volume of commercial products produced, the Union has risen from fifth place in the world and fourth in Western Europe to second in the world and first in Europe. The Soviet Union produced 13.7% of the world's industrial output. The Americans were the leaders - the USA produced 41.9%. The leading European powers were inferior to the USSR: Germany produced 11.6% of world industrial output; Great Britain - 9.3; France - 5.7%.

Thus, the key to the success of the USSR were the following prerequisites: 1) mobilization of the people, “tightening of belts” for the sake of the highest goal - the creation of a developed and powerful industry. This made it possible, by temporarily reducing population consumption, to impose a “super tax” on industrial development; 2) the issue of money in the initial period of industrialization, this made it possible to expand the domestic market, making it “insatiable.” The population trusted the Soviet ruble, so it did not depreciate; 3) foreign trade monopoly. Stalin fenced off the domestic market and launched an attack on the world market.

10 chervonets 1937

War.

During 1940 and the pre-war months of 1941, state budget reserves constantly increased. By the beginning of the war they reached 9.3 billion rubles. As a result, the Soviet government did not spend all the money that was collected in the budget. The government was preparing for war and stockpiled goods. To prevent these goods from being sold, the amount of money was reduced. During this period, more than a quarter of the money supply was taken out of circulation.

In total, 582 billion rubles were spent on the war, and the budget received 1,117 billion rubles during the war. The war and military restructuring of the economy significantly changed the state of monetary circulation in the Soviet Union. The material and monetary resources of the Soviet state were switched to meeting the needs caused by the war with Germany. Huge military expenditures, a sharp decrease in the production of consumer goods (enterprises began to produce military products), and, consequently, a significant decrease in the volume of retail trade turnover and state budget revenues - all this caused an overstrain of the USSR's financial resources. Military spending increased continuously from 1940 (57 billion rubles) to 1944 (152.6 billion rubles) and began to decrease from 1945 (144.5 billion rubles). The share of military expenditures in the total budget expenditures reached its peak in 1942-1943. Expenditures on financing the national economy fell from 58.3 billion rubles in 1940 to 31.6 billion rubles in 1942. Then they began to grow rapidly, and in 1945 they reached 74.4 billion rubles. It should be noted that most of the allocations for the national economy were directed to capital construction related to the war and to the restoration of what was destroyed.

Due to the occupation of a significant part of the territory, in connection with the transfer of industry to the production of military products, the production of consumer goods and the production of food products sharply decreased. Thus, bread production decreased from 24 million tons in 1940 to 11 million tons in 1945; cereals from 1.7 million tons to 1.1 million tons; meat from 1417 thousand tons to 624 thousand tons; fish catch from 14 million quintals to 11.3; sugar from 2151 thousand tons to 465; cotton fabric from 3952 million meters to 1615; leather shoes from 211 million pairs to 63.1, etc. Moreover, the greatest decline in production was recorded in 1942-1943.

At the same time, there was an increase in non-market consumption of most of the goods produced by the light and food industries. This further reduced market funds and government retail turnover. Retail trade turnover in 1940 prices decreased in 1942 to 34% of the pre-war level. Even in the victorious year of 1945, it accounted for 47% of the 1940 trade turnover.

While commodity funds for the population were seriously reduced, monetary incomes decreased only in the first years of the war, in 1944-1945. they began to rise again and exceeded pre-war levels. Expenditures on salaries for military personnel, pensions and benefits for military personnel and their families were significantly increased.

The war upset the balance between the population's monetary income and trade turnover. This created a threat to monetary circulation. Therefore, the government took a number of serious measures to eliminate the sharp discrepancy between the income and expenses of the population. On the one hand, they began to increase payments and contributions from the population, on the other hand, they began to increase prices for some goods - vodka, tobacco, perfumes, etc. In addition, they began to expand commercial trade, giving the opportunity to part of the population with extra money, buy goods at high prices.

Thus, with the beginning of the war, a military surcharge was introduced to the income tax on workers and employees, and to the agricultural tax on collective farmers and individual farmers. In 1942, a war tax was introduced. At a higher level than before the war, people subscribed to government loans (76 billion rubles were collected during the war years). Large sums were received from the placement of cash and clothing lottery tickets among the population. A tax levy was established for bachelors and small families. Unmarried persons over 18 years of age and childless married couples paid 2% of their income. Due to the cancellation of vacations, compensation for non-use was not issued in person, but was transferred to personal deposits in savings banks. A significant source of income was collecting funds for the Defense and Red Army funds, attracting cash deposits from military personnel to the field cash desks of the State Bank. During the war years, due to these events, more than 200 billion rubles were raised from the population.

Increases in prices for vodka, tobacco, perfumes and some other goods, as well as revenues from organized commercial trade, generated an additional 172 billion rubles. At the same time, they were able to maintain pre-war prices for basic goods. And in conditions of a shortage of food products and a number of manufactured goods, a rationing system for food distribution was introduced to ensure a living wage. This allowed us to maintain a minimum level of consumption for everyone.

All these measures provided about 90% of the financial resources the country needed. The budget deficit in the first years of the war and the lag in the flow of funds into the budget from expenditures necessitated the issue. A total of 54.4 billion rubles were put into circulation during the war years. As a result, the money supply at the beginning of 1946 reached 73.9 billion rubles and exceeded the pre-war money supply by 3.8 times. Especially a lot of rubles had to be printed in the second half of 1941, when huge expenses were required to transfer the country to a “war footing” (15.3 billion rubles were printed).

Emissions, a reduction in the state supply of goods to the population, and a reduction in food surpluses among the rural population led to a large increase in market prices. For agricultural products the growth was 1020% in 1943 from the level of 100% in 1940. Then prices began to fall. It must be said that the huge gap between the prices of state trade and market trade, as well as the difference in price levels in different cities and regions led to widespread speculation during the war years. Unfortunately, even in the most difficult years of the Great Patriotic War, when the overwhelming majority of the people gave literally everything to the front (from their lives to their last money), there were subhuman self-dealers who grew rich on the misfortune of others.

In general, the USSR monetary system withstood the test of war. Despite the severe wounds that the war inflicted on the country's economy, emissions were relatively small. For comparison, during the three years of the First World War, Russia increased the money supply by 9.5 times, and during the four years of the Great Patriotic War - by 3.8 times. Already during the war, it was possible to stop the deterioration of the situation and begin to strengthen the monetary system. The advantage of the socialist economy was proven by the most brutal war in human history.

The Soviet monetary system withstood the test of war. Thus, the money supply in Germany increased 6 times during the war years (although the Germans brought goods from all over Europe and a significant part of the USSR); in Italy - 10 times; in Japan – 11 times. In the USSR, the money supply during the war years increased only 3.8 times.

However, the Great Patriotic War gave rise to a number of negative phenomena that needed to be eliminated. Firstly, there was a discrepancy between the amount of money and the needs of trade turnover. There was a surplus of money. Secondly, several types of prices appeared - ration, commercial and market. This undermined the importance of cash wages and cash income of collective farmers based on workdays. Thirdly, large sums of money ended up with speculators. Moreover, the difference in prices still gave them the opportunity to enrich themselves at the expense of the population. This undermined social justice in the country.
Immediately after the end of the war, the state carried out a number of measures aimed at strengthening the monetary system and increasing the well-being of the population. The purchasing demand of the population increased through an increase in wage funds and a decrease in payments to the financial system. Thus, in August 1945, the war tax on workers and employees began to be abolished. The tax was finally abolished at the beginning of 1946. They no longer held monetary lotteries and reduced the size of the subscription for the new government loan. In the spring of 1946, savings banks began paying workers and employees compensation for unused vacations during the war. Post-war industrial restructuring began. There was some growth in the stock of goods due to the restructuring of industry and due to a reduction in the consumption of the armed forces and the sale of trophies. To remove money from circulation, commercial trade continued to expand. In 1946, commercial trade acquired a fairly wide scope: a wide network of shops and restaurants was created, the range of goods was expanded and their prices were reduced. The end of the war led to a drop in prices on collective farm markets (by more than a third).
However, by the end of 1946, the negative phenomena had not been completely eliminated. Therefore, the course towards monetary reform was maintained. In addition, the release of new money and the exchange of old money for new ones was necessary in order to eliminate money that went abroad and improve the quality of banknotes.
According to the testimony of the People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR Arseny Zverev (who managed the finances of the USSR since 1938), Stalin first inquired about the possibility of monetary reform at the end of December 1942 and demanded to submit the first calculations at the beginning of 1943. At first, the monetary reform was planned to be carried out in 1946. However, due to famine, which was caused by drought and crop failure in a number of Soviet regions, the start of the reform had to be postponed. Only on December 3, 1947, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to abolish the card system and begin monetary reform.

The conditions for the monetary reform were determined in the Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated December 14, 1947. The exchange of money was carried out throughout the Soviet Union from December 16 to 22, 1947, and in remote areas ended on December 29. When recalculating wages, money was exchanged in such a way that wages remained unchanged. The coin was not subject to change and remained in circulation at face value. For cash deposits in Sberbank, amounts up to 3 thousand rubles were also subject to exchange one to one; for deposits from 3 to 10 thousand rubles, savings were reduced by one third of the amount; for deposits over 10 thousand rubles, two-thirds of the amount was subject to withdrawal. Those citizens who kept large sums of money at home could exchange at the rate of 1 new ruble to 10 old ones. Relatively preferential conditions for the exchange of cash savings were established for holders of government loan bonds: the 1947 loan bonds were not subject to revaluation; bonds of mass loans were exchanged for bonds of a new loan in a ratio of 3:1, bonds of a freely marketable loan of 1938 were exchanged in a ratio of 5:1. The funds that were in the settlement and current accounts of cooperative organizations and collective farms were revalued at the rate of 5 old rubles for 4 new ones.
At the same time, the government abolished the card system (before other victorious states), high prices in commercial trade and introduced uniform, reduced state retail prices for food and industrial goods. Thus, prices for bread and flour were reduced by an average of 12% compared to current ration prices; for cereals and pasta - by 10%, etc.
Thus, the negative consequences of the war in the field of the monetary system were eliminated in the USSR. This made it possible to switch to trading at uniform prices and reduce the money supply by more than three times (from 43.6 to 14 billion rubles). Overall, the reform was successful.
In addition, the reform had a social aspect. The speculators were pinned down. This restored social justice that had been violated during the war. At first glance, it seemed that everyone suffered, because everyone had some money in their hands on December 15th. But the ordinary worker and employee living on his salary, who by the middle of the month no longer had much money left, suffered only nominally. He was not even left without money, since already on December 16 they began to issue wages in new money for the first half of the month, which they usually did not do. Salaries were usually paid monthly after the end of the month. Thanks to this issue, workers and employees were provided with new money at the beginning of the reform. The exchange of 3 thousand rubles of deposit 1:1 satisfied the overwhelming majority of the population, since people did not have significant funds. Based on the entire adult population, the average deposit in a savings book could not be more than 200 rubles. It is clear that the Stakhanovites, inventors and other small groups of the population who had super-profits lost part of their money to the speculators. But taking into account the general decline in prices, although they did not win, they still did not suffer much. True, those who kept large sums of money at home could be dissatisfied. This concerned speculative groups of the population and part of the population of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, who did not know war and for this reason had the opportunity to trade.
It should be noted that the Stalinist system was unique, which was able to remove most of the money from monetary circulation and at the same time the majority of ordinary people were not harmed. At the same time, the whole world was amazed that just two years after the end of the war and after the crop failure of 1946, basic food prices were maintained at the level of rations or even reduced. That is, almost all food was available to everyone in the USSR.
This was a surprise and an offensive surprise for the Western world. The capitalist system has literally been driven into the mud up to its ears. Thus, Great Britain, on whose territory there was no war for four years and which suffered immeasurably less in the war than the USSR, could not abolish the card system even in the early 1950s. At this time, in the former “workshop of the world,” there were strikes by miners who demanded that they be provided with a standard of living similar to that of the miners of the USSR.

The Soviet ruble has been pegged to the US dollar since 1937. The ruble exchange rate was calculated against foreign currencies based on the US dollar. In February 1950, the Central Statistical Office of the USSR, on the urgent instructions of I. Stalin, recalculated the exchange rate of the new ruble. Soviet specialists, focusing on the purchasing power of the ruble and the dollar (compared prices of goods), came up with the figure of 14 rubles per 1 dollar. Previously (before 1947) the dollar was worth 53 rubles. However, according to the head of the Ministry of Finance Zverev and the head of the State Planning Committee Saburov, as well as those present at this event, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and the head of Albania Enver Hoxha, Stalin crossed out this figure on February 27 and wrote: “At most, 4 rubles.”
The resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of February 28, 1950 transferred the ruble to a permanent gold basis, and the peg to the dollar was abolished. The gold content of the ruble was set at 0.222168 grams of pure gold. On March 1, 1950, the purchase price of the USSR State Bank for gold was set at 4 rubles. 45 kopecks for 1 gram of pure gold. As Stalin noted, the USSR was thus protected from the dollar. After the war, the United States had dollar surpluses that it wanted to dump on other countries, shifting its financial problems onto others. As an example of indefinite financial, and therefore political dependence on the Western world, Joseph Stalin cited Yugoslavia, where Josip Broz Tito ruled. The Yugoslav currency was pegged to a “basket” of the US dollar and the British pound sterling. Stalin actually predicted the future of Yugoslavia: “...sooner or later the West will “collapse” Yugoslavia economically and dismember it politically...” His prophetic words came true in the 1990s.
For the first time, national money was freed from the American dollar. According to the UN Economic and Social Council, the UN European and Far Eastern Commissions (1952-1954), Stalin's decision almost doubled the efficiency of Soviet exports. Moreover, at that time it was industrial and knowledge-intensive. This happened due to the exemption from dollar prices of importing countries that had lowered prices for Soviet exports. In turn, this led to increased production in most Soviet industries. The Soviet Union also had the opportunity to get rid of imports of technology from the United States and other countries that relied on the dollar and speed up its own technological renewal.

The transfer to the “Stalinist gold ruble” of most of the USSR’s trade with the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), created in 1949, as well as with China, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam and a number of developing countries led to the formation of a financial and economic bloc. A common market emerged, which was free from the dollar and, therefore, the political influence of the United States.
In the first half of April 1952, an international economic meeting was held in Moscow. At it, the Soviet delegation led by Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Shepilov proposed establishing a common market for goods, services and investments. It was free of the US dollar and was created as a counterweight to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and US expansion. At this time, the Marshall Plan was already in full force. The economies of most European countries became dependent on the United States.
Back in 1951, CMEA members and China declared the inevitability of close cooperation among all countries that do not want to submit to the US dollar and the dictates of Western financial and trade structures. The idea was supported by countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, India, Indonesia, Yemen, Syria, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and Uruguay. These countries became co-organizers of the Moscow Forum. Interestingly, the proposal was also supported by some Western countries - Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Iceland and Austria. A total of 49 countries took part in the Moscow meeting. During his work, more than 60 trade, investment and scientific and technical agreements were signed. Among the main principles of these agreements were: the exclusion of dollar payments; the possibility of barter, including to pay off debts; policy coordination in international economic organizations and in the global market; mutual treatment of maximum favored nation in loans, investments, credits and scientific and technical cooperation; customs and price benefits for developing countries (or their individual goods), etc.
The Soviet delegation proposed at the first stage to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements on customs, price, credit and commodity issues. Then they planned to gradually unify the principles of foreign economic policy and create a “all-bloc” trade zone. At the final stage, they planned to create an interstate settlement currency with a mandatory gold content (the ruble was already prepared for this), which led to the completion of the creation of a common market. It is clear that financial and economic integration led to political integration. Not only socialist, but also people's democracies and former colonies, that is, developing states, would unite around the USSR.
Unfortunately, after the death of Stalin, the authorities of the USSR and most other CMEA countries moved away from the proposals of the great leader, gradually falling under the power of the dollar (and their elite under the power of the “golden calf”). They tried to “forget” about the great Stalinist project. Moreover, in view of Khrushchev’s socio-economic and political adventures (“Khrushchevschina” as the first perestroika), it was necessary to greatly devalue the “Stalinist gold ruble” (10 times) and reduce its gold content. At the end of the 1970s, the gold content of the Soviet ruble was de facto completely eliminated. Since the time of Khrushchev, Soviet foreign trade began to move into a subordinate position in relation to the dollar system. The cost of goods supplied from the Union to capitalist countries was calculated in conventional “foreign currency rubles” at the rate of 1 dollar = 0.6 foreign currency rubles. In addition, the Soviet Union became a “donor” to developing countries and began to supply the Western world with cheap energy and industrial raw materials. And the gold reserves that were created under Stalin began to be rapidly lost.
The idea of ​​“Soviet globalization” at the financial and economic level and freedom from the US dollar, dependence on the US Federal Reserve System, is now more relevant than ever. Actually, there is no need to invent anything. Joseph Stalin has already given everything to Russia. We just need to show political will and bring his plans to their logical conclusion. Then Russia will be completely independent on financial and economic priority, will undermine the power of the Federal Reserve, Western TNBs and TNCs and will receive a powerful tool for “Russian globalization.” Russia will receive a powerful tool for the development of the national economy and the well-being of the people.

Currency reform of 1947 in the USSR was carried out from December 16 to December 29, 1947. The second monetary reform in the USSR. Currency reform was carried out in the form of denomination with confiscation. Simultaneously with the monetary reform, the rationing system for the supply of food and industrial goods was abolished and uniform, reduced state retail prices for food and manufactured goods were introduced. During the reform, cash exchange was carried out within one week, in remote areas of the Far North - within two weeks.

Reform goals

The monetary reform in December 1947 was carried out with the aim of removing excess money from circulation and replacing old ones that had been devalued during the Great Patriotic War with new, full-fledged money.

During the Second World War, the country's expenses for maintaining the army and developing the military industry increased sharply, while the production of consumer goods decreased. Enormous military expenditures required the release of large amounts of money into circulation. At the same time, the production of goods intended for sale to the public decreased, and retail trade turnover decreased significantly. The amount of money in circulation increased significantly in the USSR, as in all states that participated in the war (most countries in Eastern and Western Europe also underwent monetary reforms after the war). In addition, counterfeit money was issued in temporarily occupied Soviet territories. Large reserves of cash have accumulated in the hands of speculators.

The second most important aspect of the reform was propaganda: the abolition of the card system for the population who survived the hardships of the war was supposed to mean the elimination of the rigid distribution of products and demonstrate the strength and endurance of the Soviet economy.

Terms of reform

The conditions for the monetary reform were set out in Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. 4004 of December 14, 1947, “On carrying out monetary reform and the abolition of cards for food and industrial goods.” The resolution was signed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR I. Stalin and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A. Zhdanov.

The Resolution established the procedure for exchanging old money for new ones, and also determined the conditions for the revaluation of cash deposits in savings banks and the State Bank of the USSR. When recalculating wages, money was exchanged in such a way that wages remained unchanged. For deposits in Sberbank, amounts up to 3 thousand rubles were also exchanged one to one, for deposits from 3 to 10 thousand rubles, savings were reduced by one third of the amount, for deposits in the amount of over 10 thousand rubles, two thirds of the amount were withdrawn. Those who kept money at home received one new ruble for ten old ones upon exchange. Preferential conditions for the revaluation of savings were also established for holders of government loan bonds: bonds of mass loans were exchanged for bonds of a new loan in a ratio of 3:1, bonds of a freely marketable loan of 1938 - in a ratio of 5:1, and bonds of a loan of 1947 were not subject to revaluation .

Reform results

After the abolition of the card system, state retail prices in 1948 were 17% lower than the pre-reform state of prices, and market prices decreased by more than 3 times. The reform significantly strengthened the public credit system; there was a large influx of deposits during the reform period and after its implementation. As a result of the reform, the consequences of the Second World War in the field of monetary circulation were eliminated, without which it was impossible to abolish the card system and move to trading at uniform prices.

According to some economists, the cash supply has decreased more than three times from 43.6 to 14 billion rubles. According to the State Bank, after the exchange, the population had about 4 billion rubles left in their hands. When carrying out the reform, great importance was attached to eliminating the deficit in order to avoid excessive demand for goods and inflation. For a year, the goods were kept so that after the exchange of money they were thrown onto the market. In addition, goods from state reserves worth 1.7 billion rubles were released. They were intended for trade after the abolition of cards and the transition to uniform retail prices in cities (1.1 billion rubles) and in rural areas (0.6 billion rubles).

The monetary reform in the USSR in 1947 was of a confiscatory nature, just like the monetary reforms carried out almost simultaneously in Western and Eastern Europe, but in certain aspects its conditions were softer and more lenient in relation to the population than in other countries.

On December 14, 1947, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was issued “On carrying out monetary reform and the abolition of cards for food and industrial goods.”

Currently, the Soviet state is faced with the task of carrying out monetary reform in order to strengthen the ruble exchange rate, as well as the task of abolishing the card supply system and transitioning to expanded trade at uniform state prices.

Great Patriotic War 1941–1945 required the exertion of all the forces of the Soviet people and the mobilization of all the material resources of the country. During the Patriotic War, the Soviet state's expenses for maintaining the army and developing the military industry increased sharply. Enormous military expenditures required the release of large amounts of money into circulation. The amount of money in circulation increased significantly, as in all states participating in the war. At the same time, the production of goods intended for sale to the public decreased, and retail trade turnover decreased significantly.

In addition, as is known, during the Patriotic War, on temporarily occupied Soviet territory, German and other occupiers issued large quantities of counterfeit money in rubles, which further increased the surplus of money in the country and clogged our monetary circulation.

As a result of all this, there was significantly more money in circulation than was needed for the national economy, the purchasing power of money decreased, and now special measures are required to strengthen the Soviet ruble.

Despite wartime conditions, the Soviet government managed to maintain pre-war state prices for rationed goods unchanged throughout the war, which was ensured by the introduction of a rationing system for the supply of food and industrial goods. However, the reduction in state and cooperative trade in consumer goods and the increase in population demand in collective farm markets led to a sharp increase in market prices, which in some periods were 10–15 times higher than pre-war prices.

It is clear that speculative elements took advantage of the large gap between state and market prices, as well as the presence of a mass of counterfeit money, to accumulate money in large quantities for the purpose of profiting at the expense of the population.

Now that the task of moving to open trade at uniform prices is in order, the large amount of money issued during the war prevents the abolition of the rationing system, since excess money in circulation inflates market prices, creates an exaggerated demand for goods and facilitates the possibility of speculation.

It is also impossible to allow speculative elements who profited during the war and accumulated significant sums of money to be able to buy goods after the abolition of the rationing system.

Therefore, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to carry out a monetary reform, which provides for the release into circulation of new, full-fledged money and the withdrawal from circulation of both counterfeit and defective old money. This reform will be carried out on the following basis.

Firstly. The exchange of cash currently in circulation and in hand for new money will be carried out with a restriction, namely: ten rubles in old money for one ruble in new money.

Secondly. Cash deposits in savings banks and the State Bank will be revalued on more favorable terms than cash exchange, with deposits up to 3 thousand rubles. will be revalued ruble for ruble. This means that the deposits belonging to the vast majority of depositors are maintained at the same amount.

Third. All previously issued government loans will be converted, with the exception of the 1947 loan, i.e. previously issued loans are combined into a single loan, and the exchange is made at the ratio of 3 rubles. in bonds of previous loans for 1 rub. in bonds of the new single loan, i.e. at a more preferential rate than the exchange of cash. At the same time, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proceed from the task of protecting in every possible way the savings that the population lent to the state. However, one cannot ignore the fact that a significant part of the state debt on loans was formed during the war years, when the purchasing power of money fell, and meanwhile, after the monetary reform, the state will repay this debt with a full ruble.

Fourthly. When carrying out a monetary reform, the wages of workers and employees, as well as the income of peasants from state procurement and other labor income of all segments of the population will not be affected by the reform and will be paid in new money in the same amounts.

Carrying out monetary reform is common in all states after major wars. However, the implementation of monetary reform in our country is fundamentally different from the implementation of reform in capitalist countries.

In capitalist states, the elimination of the consequences of war and monetary reform are accompanied by a large increase in prices for consumer goods, consequently, a decrease in the real wages of workers and employees, a reduction in employed workers and employees, and an increase in the army of unemployed. Thus, capitalist states shift the main burden of the consequences of war and monetary reform onto the working people.

In the USSR, the elimination of the consequences of the war and monetary reform are not carried out at the expense of the people. The number of employed workers and employees is not decreasing. We do not and will not have unemployment. The wages of workers and employees not only do not decrease, but, on the contrary, increase, because commercial prices are reduced several times, and ration prices for bread and cereals are also reduced, which means an increase in the real wages of workers and employees.

Still, carrying out monetary reform requires certain sacrifices. The state takes on most of the victims. But it is necessary for the population to take on some of the victims, especially since this will be the last victim. Due to these restrictions, the exchange of cash for new ones will affect almost all segments of the population. However, this exchange order will primarily hit the speculative elements who have accumulated large reserves of money and keep them in “boxes.” The losses of the vast majority of workers associated with the exchange of money will be short-term and insignificant and will be completely covered by the abolition of high commercial prices and a reduction in existing ration prices for bread and cereals.

Simultaneously with the monetary reform, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to abolish the card system for food and industrial goods, abolish high commercial prices and move to selling goods at uniform state prices while reducing ration prices for bread and cereals. This creates great material benefits for the population.

The abolition of the card system for food and industrial goods will be carried out on the following basis.

Firstly. The sale of food and industrial goods will be carried out in open trade without cards.

Secondly. Unified state retail prices are being introduced to replace the existing commercial and ration prices.

Third. Uniform prices for bread and cereals are set at a lower level than current ration prices, and ration prices for bread are reduced by an average of 12%, for cereals - by 10%, and compared to current commercial prices they are reduced by more than two and a half times.

Fourthly. Uniform prices for other food products are mainly maintained at the level of current ration prices.

Fifthly. Uniform prices for industrial goods are set at a slightly higher level compared to low ration prices, and compared to commercial prices they are reduced on average by more than 3 times.

Thus, as a result of monetary reform, the abolition of cards and the transition to open trade at uniform prices, the population will receive a full ruble instead of the currently circulating ruble with reduced purchasing power. The streamlining of monetary circulation, the growth in the production of consumer goods and retail trade turnover will make it possible to reduce prices in the future, that is, they will lead to a new increase in real wages and incomes of collective farmers.

This is not the first time that monetary reform has been carried out in our country.

After the First World War, the Civil War and the intervention, money became completely worthless and the monetary system was undermined at its very core. A radical monetary reform was needed. The depreciation of money was so great that at the completion of the monetary reform, the ruble in new money was equal to 50 thousand rubles. old money of the 1923 model, or to 5 million rubles. old money of the 1922 model. As a result of the monetary reform carried out in 1922–1924. According to the instructions and leadership of Lenin, new money was created, which contributed to the rapid development of the national economy of the USSR.

The Great Patriotic War was immeasurably more difficult than all previous wars. However, the situation with money circulation in Russia during the First World War, when money circulation suffered a complete collapse, cannot be compared with the state of money circulation in the USSR after World War II. The Soviet state successfully withstood the exceptional trials of the war of 1941–1945, despite the fact that this war was much more devastating and was accompanied by many times greater casualties as a result of the German occupation than the First World War. The strength and vitality of the Soviet system, created by the working people of the Soviet Union under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, and the heroic efforts of the entire people who rose to defend their socialist Motherland, ensured military and economic victory over the enemy. The Soviet monetary system withstood the difficult trials of the war of 1941–1945. Despite the decrease in the purchasing power of the ruble, the monetary circulation of our country does not need a radical restructuring.

Now, when exchanging old money for new ones, we do not need those extreme measures that were carried out during the period of monetary reform of 1922–1924. The monetary reform of 1947 was designed to eliminate the consequences of World War II in the field of monetary circulation, restore a full-fledged Soviet ruble and facilitate the transition to trade at uniform prices without cards. Currency reform will strengthen the importance of money in the national economy, increase the real wages of workers and employees, and increase the value of cash incomes of the rural population. Carrying out monetary reform will help improve the level of material well-being of workers, restore and develop the national economy and further strengthen the power of the Soviet state.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decide:

I. Currency reform
1. Issue new money in rubles of the 1947 model into circulation from December 16, 1947.

2. All cash held by the population, state, cooperative and public enterprises, organizations and institutions, as well as collective farms, is subject to exchange, with the exception of small change.

The change coin cannot be exchanged and remains in circulation at its face value.

3. The State Bank of the USSR will be responsible for the exchange of old money for money of the 1947 model.

Exchange money throughout the USSR within a week, i.e. from December 16 to December 22 inclusive, and in remote areas within two weeks, i.e. from December 16 to December 29 inclusive according to the list approved by the Council of Ministers THE USSR.

4. Exchange the cash currently in circulation for new money at a ratio of 10 rubles. in old-style money for 1 rub. in 1947 money

5. From the date of issue of money of the 1947 sample and until the end of the exchange period, old-style money is accepted in all payments at the rate of one tenth of its face value.

Old-style money that is not presented for exchange within the prescribed period is canceled and loses its payment power.

6. Payment to individual citizens of amounts of money under internal transfers, letters of credit and deposit accounts for which funds were received by government institutions before the issue of money of the 1947 model is made at the ratio of 10 rubles. old-style money for 1 rub. money of the 1947 model

7. Wages and salaries for workers and employees for the first half of December 1947, monetary allowances for military personnel, scholarships, pensions and benefits for December 1947 should be paid in money of the 1947 standard during December 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20, 1947. everywhere on the territory of the USSR, regardless of the established deadlines for payment of wages.

8. Simultaneously with the issue of money of the 1947 model, revaluate deposits and current accounts of the population in savings banks and the State Bank of the USSR as of the day of issue of money of the 1947 model on the following grounds:

A) deposits up to 3 thousand rubles. inclusive remain unchanged in the nominal amount, i.e. they are revalued ruble for ruble;

B) for deposits up to 10 thousand rubles. inclusively, the first 3 thousand are credited to the deposit without changing the nominal amount, and the rest of the deposit is revalued: for 3 rubles. old money - 2 rubles. new money;

C) for deposits over 10 thousand rubles. The following are credited to the deposit: the first 10 thousand rubles. in the amounts provided above in paragraph “b”, and the rest of the deposit is revalued: for 2 rubles. old money - 1 rub. new money.

Operations for accepting and issuing deposits in savings banks and cash desks of the State Bank will not be carried out during December 15, 16 and 17, and, starting from December 18, will be carried out as usual.

9. Funds held in settlement and current accounts of cooperative enterprises and organizations, as well as collective farms, are revalued at the rate of 5 rubles. old money - 4 rubles. new money.

10. Simultaneously with the monetary reform, carry out the conversion of all previously issued government loans and certificates of savings banks for special deposits on the following basis:

A) bonds of the State loan of the second five-year plan (issue of the fourth year), a loan for strengthening the defense of the USSR, all issues of the loan of the third five-year plan, issues of war loans, a loan for the restoration and development of the national economy, as well as obligations issued to cooperative organizations for loans, and certificates of savings banks are exchanged for bonds of a conversion loan, subject to issue at 2% per annum in 1948. Bonds of a new conversion loan are exchanged for bonds of previous loans at a ratio of 3 rubles. in bonds of previously issued loans for 1 rub. in conversion loan bonds.

The exchange of bonds of previous loans and certificates of savings banks will be carried out from May 3 to August 1, 1948;

B) The second state loan for the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR, issued in 1947, is not subject to conversion. Subscribers to the specified loan continue to pay the subscription on the same basis and receive bonds of this loan for the entire amount of contributions at their nominal value after the end of the subscription payment;

C) bonds of the State winning loan of 1938 are exchanged for bonds of the new freely circulating State 3% domestic winning loan issued on December 13 of this year, and the exchange of bonds of the 1938 loan is carried out within the period established for the exchange of money, at the ratio of 5 rubles. in 1938 loan bonds for 1 rub. in 3 percent domestic winning bonds. During the specified period, savings banks purchase 1938 loan bonds for cash at the same ratio.

11. From the date of announcement of the conversion of government loans until August 1, 1948, the next drawings of winnings and the payment of the next coupons on bonds of loans subject to conversion are postponed; Since August 1948, regular circulations and payments have been resumed, including for the previous period.

12. Tax payment rates, the amount of debt and contractual obligations between enterprises, institutions and organizations, the amount of obligations for payments from the population to the state, as well as the amount of contractual obligations between the USSR and foreign states remain unchanged.

II. Cancellation of card supply system
1. Simultaneously with the implementation of monetary reform, i.e., from December 16, 1947, abolish the rationing system for the supply of food and industrial goods, abolish high prices for commercial trade and introduce uniform, reduced state retail prices for food and manufactured goods.

2. When establishing uniform retail state prices for food and industrial goods, proceed from the following:

A) reduce prices for bread and flour by an average of 12% compared to current ration prices;

B) for cereals and pasta, reduce prices by an average of 10% compared to current ration prices;

C) for meat, fish, fats, sugar, confectionery, salt, potatoes and vegetables, keep prices at the level of current ration prices;

D) for milk, eggs, tea, fruit, in order to cancel the current high commercial prices and too low ration prices, establish new prices in relation to the level of current ration prices for basic food products;

E) for fabrics, shoes, clothing, knitwear, in order to cancel the current high commercial prices and the too low prices of rationed supplies established in cities and workers' settlements, set new prices at a level 3.2 times lower than commercial prices;

G) reduce prices for beer by an average of 10% compared to current prices;

3. Instruct the USSR Ministry of Trade to establish, in accordance with this resolution, new, reduced state retail prices for food products by belt, as well as new state retail prices for industrial goods for cities and villages.

4. The prices established by this resolution do not apply to the collective farm market and to cooperative trade in goods of their own purchases.

Chairman
Council of Ministers of the USSR
I.STALIN

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
A. ZHDANOV

Decisions of the party and government on economic issues.

T.3. 1941–1952 M., 1968. pp. 460–467.

Simultaneously with the monetary reform, the card system for supplying food and industrial goods was abolished. During the reform, cash exchange was carried out within one week, in remote areas of the Far North - within two weeks.

Encyclopedic YouTube

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  According to the People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR Arseny Zverev, the question of carrying out monetary reform first arose during the Great Patriotic War. At first, monetary reform was planned for 1946. However, due to famine caused by crop failure and drought in a number of regions of the USSR, it had to be postponed. Finally, on December 13, 1947, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a decision “On the abolition of the card system and monetary reform.”

  Rumors about the upcoming reform have been circulating for a long time. They especially intensified in the late autumn of 1947. Since it was not possible to keep the government’s plans secret from the population, queues began to form at the savings banks of those wishing to deposit money into the savings book. On December 2, the Ministry of Internal Affairs noted “cases when depositors withdraw large deposits (30-50 thousand rubles and more), and then invest the same money in smaller deposits in other savings banks for different persons.” Trying to save their cash, people rushed to buy furniture, musical instruments, hunting rifles, motorcycles, bicycles, gold, jewelry, watches, manufactured goods, long-life food products (chocolate, canned food, smoked sausages, etc.), vodka and other alcoholic drinks . Turnover in restaurants in large cities has increased.

  Terms of reform

  The conditions for the monetary reform were set out in Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) No. 4004 of December 14, 1947 “On carrying out monetary reform and the abolition of cards for food and industrial goods.” The resolution was signed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR I. Stalin and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A. Zhdanov.

  The Resolution established the procedure for exchanging old money for new ones, and also determined the conditions for the revaluation of cash deposits in savings banks and the State Bank of the USSR. When recalculating wages, money was exchanged in such a way that wages remained unchanged. For deposits in Sberbank, amounts up to 3 thousand rubles were also exchanged one to one, for deposits from 3 to 10 thousand rubles, savings were reduced by one third of the amount, for deposits in the amount of over 10 thousand rubles, half of the amount was withdrawn. Those who kept money at home received one new ruble for ten old ones upon exchange. Preferential conditions for the revaluation of savings were also established for holders of government loan bonds: bonds of mass loans were exchanged for bonds of a new loan in a ratio of 3:1, bonds of a freely marketable loan of 1938 - in a ratio of 5:1, and bonds of a loan of 1947 were not subject to revaluation .

  1. Simultaneously with the implementation of monetary reform, that is, from December 16, 1947, abolish the rationing system for the supply of food and industrial goods, abolish high prices for commercial trade and introduce uniform, reduced state retail prices for food and manufactured goods.

  2. When establishing uniform retail state prices for food and industrial goods, proceed from the following:

  a) for bread and flour, reduce prices by an average of 12% compared to the current ration prices;

  b) for cereals and pasta, reduce prices by an average of 10% compared to current ration prices;

  c) for meat, fish, fats, sugar, confectionery, salt, potatoes and vegetables, keep prices at the level of current ration prices;

  d) for milk, eggs, tea, fruit, in order to cancel the current high commercial prices and too low ration prices, establish new prices in relation to the level of current ration prices for basic food products;

  e) for fabrics, shoes, clothing, knitwear, in order to cancel the current high commercial prices and the too low prices of rationed supplies established in cities and workers' settlements, set new prices at a level 3.2 times lower than commercial prices;

  g) reduce prices for beer by an average of 10% compared to current prices;

  4. When carrying out a monetary reform, the wages of workers and employees, as well as the income of peasants from state procurement and other labor income of all segments of the population will not be affected by the reform and will be paid in new money in the same amounts.

  Reform results

  As a result of the reform, the consequences of the Second World War in the field of monetary circulation were eliminated, without which it was impossible to abolish the card system and move to trading at uniform prices.

  According to some economists, the cash money supply decreased more than three times, from 43.6 to 14 billion rubles. . According to the State Bank, after the exchange, the population had about 4 billion rubles in their hands. When carrying out the reform, great importance was attached to eliminating the deficit in order to avoid excessive demand for goods and inflation. For a year, the goods were kept so that after the exchange of money they were thrown onto the market. In addition, goods from state reserves worth 1.7 billion rubles were released. They were intended for trade after the abolition of cards and the transition to uniform retail prices in cities (1.1 billion rubles) and in rural areas (0.6 billion rubles).

  The monetary reform in the USSR in 1947 was of a confiscatory nature. This reform is sometimes compared to the depreciation of savings in the early 90s.

  After the abolition of cards at the end of 1947, with salaries of the majority of the urban population at 500-1000 rubles, a kilogram of rye bread cost 3 rubles, wheat - 4 rubles 40 kopecks, a kilogram of buckwheat - 12 rubles, sugar - 15 rubles, butter - 64 rubles, sunflower oil - 30 rubles, frozen pike perch - 12 rubles, coffee - 75 rubles; liter of milk - 3-4 rubles; a dozen eggs - 12-16 rubles (depending on the category, of which there were three); a bottle of Zhigulevskoe beer - 7 rubles; half-liter bottle of “Moscow” vodka - 60 rubles.

  
  
  

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