The battle between the Russian-Austrian and Prussian armies on August 1, 1759 on the Kunersdorf Heights near Frankfurt an der Oder in Prussia became one of the pitched battles of the Seven Years' War of 1756–1763. This war was a continuation of a series of continuous European wars in the first half of the 18th century, caused by mutual territorial claims based on political, military, economic and national reasons. Almost all European states took part in the Seven Years' War. In 1754–1755, Anglo-French colonial rivalry in North America erupted into armed conflict, and in 1756 England officially declared war on France. This conflict disrupted the established system of military-political alliances in Europe and caused a foreign policy reorientation of a number of European powers.

In the middle of the 18th century, the foreign policy of Prussia acquired a particularly aggressive character in Europe, having by this time significantly increased its territory as a result of the Northern War of 1700–1721 and the War of the Austrian Succession of 1740–1748. In addition to other reasons, Prussia, which had no colonies, was pushed towards territorial expansion of neighboring lands by the rapid development of its manufacturing industry and trade. Soon after King Frederick II came to power, the Prussian army became one of the strongest in Europe. This gave Prussia additional grounds to claim a leading role in European politics.

The ambitions of Frederick II aroused fears of neighboring states, including Russia, for which the strengthening of Prussia created a real threat to its western borders in the Baltic states. Beginning in the 1740s, the ruling circles of Russia discussed the idea of ​​weakening Prussia and limiting its expansion through diplomatic and military pressure. As a result, in the new military conflict that flared up, the Russian government decided to take the side of the anti-Prussian coalition.

Austria, which experienced the same fears as Russia, concluded an alliance treaty with the latter back in 1746. Having entered into a military conflict with France, England entered into an alliance treaty with Prussia in January 1756. This, in turn, forced Austria to move closer to France, which had previously been its irreconcilable enemy for several centuries. At the end of 1756, Russia also joined the defensive alliance concluded between them at Versailles. Thus two coalitions of European powers were formed. Austria, France, Russia, Sweden, and Saxony opposed Prussia. On Prussia's side are England and some small North German states.

Prussia had a well-trained and equipped army of 150,000. Its opponents had significantly greater forces, but by 1756 they had not yet had time to prepare for military action (See: Korobkov N.M. The Seven Years' War. M., 1940. P. 53). Taking advantage of this, Frederick II invaded Saxony in August 1756 and occupied it. In the hostilities that followed, Prussian troops inflicted a number of brutal defeats on the Austrians and French during 1756–1757. However, Russia's entry into the war in 1757 negated all the results of the Prussian victories.

In the summer of 1757, Russian troops numbering about 65 thousand people under the command of Field Marshal S. F. Apraksin concentrated in the area of ​​​​Kovno and at the end of June began an offensive in the Baltic states, with the strategic goal of capturing East Prussia. Military operations developed successfully for Russia, and already in August, having won several victories, Russian troops were on the approaches to the capital of East Prussia - Koenigsberg. However, on August 27, at the military council of the army, it was decided to retreat from East Prussia, since the troops had exhausted their supplies and were far removed from the main supply bases. In addition, palace intrigues in St. Petersburg could have influenced such a decision. Russian troops retreated and went to winter quarters in Courland.

The following year, 1758, the Russian army under the command of Chief General Count V.V. Farmer, who replaced Apraksin as commander-in-chief at the end of 1757, again occupied East Prussia without any particular difficulties. Then she moved west to Prussia, where in August 1758, near the village of Zorndorf, a large battle took place between Russian and Prussian troops. Both sides suffered heavy losses but continued the military campaign the following year.

In 1759, Field Marshal General Count P. S. Saltykov was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian army concentrated in Poznan instead of V.V. Farmer. On June 26, 1759, the army moved west to the river. Oder, in the direction of Crossen, intending to connect with Austrian troops. On July 23, 1759, the allies met in Frankfurt an der Oder, which had been occupied by Russian troops two days before.

On July 31, Frederick II with an army of 48 thousand people, going towards the enemy from the south, crossed from the left bank of the river. Oder to the right and took a position east of the village of Kunersdorf, near which was the main group of Russian-Austrian troops led by Commander-in-Chief Saltykov. In preparation for meeting the enemy, the allied troops positioned themselves on three dominant heights, separated from each other by ravines and swampy lowlands. This position, protected by rows of trenches and batteries located on the tops of the hills, was quite strong and advantageous for defense - and at the same time inconvenient for attack from the enemy. The number of Russian troops stationed here was 41 thousand people, the Austrian corps occupying the third line of defense was 18.5 thousand people. (See: Marine Atlas. T.Z. Descriptions of maps. M., 1959. P. 278.)

The plan of Saltykov, who chose this position, was to force the Prussians to attack the well-fortified left flank of the allied forces located on rough terrain, which was closest to the enemy, exhaust his forces here and then, firmly holding the center and right flank, move to general offensive. On August 1, at 3 o’clock in the morning, the troops of Frederick II began to maneuver, approaching the left flank of the Russian-Austrian troops and trying to enter their front. At 9 o'clock in the morning, Prussian artillery opened fire on the left flank, at 10 o'clock Russian artillery responded, trying, first of all, to suppress the enemy batteries. At about 12 o'clock, Prussian troops with superior forces attacked the left flank of the Russian army, pushed the Russians out of their positions and occupied one of the heights dominating the left flank. Having placed their artillery on it, which immediately began shelling, the Prussian troops, after artillery preparation, launched an attack on the central positions of Saltykov.

A fierce battle ensued. Frederick II threw more and more forces into the attack, but the Russians repulsed them, bringing additional forces of the main reserve and part of the troops of the right flank to the center. Finally, trying to turn the situation around, Frederick II threw his cavalry, then considered the best in Europe, into battle. However, the terrain limited her maneuverability, and she was unable to properly clear the approach to the Russian positions. Met by massive artillery and rifle fire, she immediately suffered serious losses, and then Russian and Austrian cavalry attacked her from the flanks. Unable to withstand the powerful blow, the Prussian cavalry, suffering huge losses, fled.

Straining their last strength, the Prussian infantry with a desperate throw captured the main height of the right flank of Saltykov, where a strong Russian battery was located, but was soon dropped by a counterattack. After some time, the surviving units of the Prussian cavalry again made their way to this peak, but were again knocked out by the combined forces of the Allies. This was a turning point in the situation. Frederick II's military reserves were exhausted, and there was no more strength left for attacks. Seeing and understanding this, Saltykov issued an order for a general offensive, which put the exhausted enemy to flight. The battle, which lasted about seven hours, ended with a crushing defeat of the Prussian army, the remnants of which fled across the Oder.

Frederick II had only about 3 thousand people left in the ranks, 18 thousand were killed and wounded, the rest scattered. The Russian troops lost 13 thousand people killed and wounded, the Austrians - 2 thousand people. (See: Marine Atlas. T.Z. Descriptions of maps. M., 1959. P. 279.)

After the victory, the road for the Allied attack on the capital of Prussia, Berlin, was open, but at the request of the Austrian command, Russian troops were transferred for military operations to Silesia. Only at the end of September of the following 1760 did the Allied troops approach Berlin. The number of Russian formations was about 24 thousand people, Austrian - 14 thousand people. The Berlin garrison, together with the linear Prussian troops who came to the rescue, numbered about 14 thousand people. (See: Marine Atlas. T.Z. Descriptions of maps. M., 1959. P. 279.)

The general attack on Berlin was scheduled for the morning of September 28. On the evening of September 27, at a military council in Berlin, a decision was made to retreat, and that same night Prussian troops left the city. On the morning of September 28, 1760, the Russian army entered Berlin. Three days later, on October 1, Russian units, by order of the command, left the Prussian capital and went to join the main forces at Frankfurt-on-Oder.

Russia continued the campaign until 1761, when Peter III, who ascended the throne after Elizabeth, revered Frederick II, stopped hostilities and ordered the withdrawal of Russian troops from Prussia.

1. Baiov A.K. Course on the history of Russian military art. - St. Petersburg, 1909.

2. Golitsyn N. S. General military history of modern times. - Ch.Z. Wars of the second half of the 18th century in Western Europe. 1740–1791. Wars of Frederick the Great. - St. Petersburg, 1874.

3. Delbrück G. History of military art within the framework of political history. - T.4. New time. - M., 1938. P. 318–319.

4. Drake L.L. About the Prussian monument on the Kunnensdorf battlefield. [SPb., 1910].

5. History of military art / Under the general. edited by P. A. Rotmistrov. - M., 1963. - T.1. -WITH. 140–143.

6. Korobkov N.M. Russian fleet in the Seven Years’ War. - M., 1946.

7. Korobkov N. M. The Seven Years' War (Russia's actions in 1756–1762) - M., 1940. P. 223–241.

8. Maslovsky D.F. The Russian Army in the Seven Years’ War. - Vol. 1–3. - M., 1886–1891.

9. Marine Atlas/Ans. ed. G. I. Levchenko. - M., 1958. -T.3.

10. The Russian army in the Seven Years' War. - M - 1886.

Why the Prussian army of Frederick the Great failed to put the Russian “iron men” to flight

“These are iron men! They can be killed, but they cannot be broken!” - with these words, the Prussian king Frederick II summed up one of the bloodiest battles of the 18th century. In the battle of Zorndorf, a small village in East Prussia, the Russians and Prussians lost a total of about 30 thousand people.

The battle became one of the symbols of the perseverance of Russian soldiers, which was appreciated by both their opponents and outside observers. Moreover, the soldiers showed this resilience not by order from above, but on their own initiative. In fact, for almost the entire battle, the Russian army was forced to fight without any control from above, since the commander-in-chief, after the first attacks of the Prussian cavalry, fled to the rear and returned only at dusk.

And in general, the Seven Years' War, one of the episodes of which was the Battle of Zorndorf, became an example of how the army finds itself hostage to politics. And - at the same time - an example of how courage becomes an irresistible force at a time when there is no worthy commander. “Iron men” at such moments themselves make the decision to fight to the death, thereby turning actual defeat into a real moral victory.

"The general is fussy and indecisive"

As often happens with wars that a country wages not because it defends its independence or repels an aggressor, but because its foreign policy allies force it to do so, the Seven Years' War did not bring great glory to Russia. And this despite the fact that it was during its course that the Russian army won three resounding victories. The first was the victory at Gross-Jägersdorf: on August 19, 1757, the Russian corps under the command of Field Marshal Stepan Apraksin managed to defeat the Prussians, commanded by Field Marshal Johann von Lewald. The second is the same battle of Zorndorf. And the third, which cost the Prussian king Frederick II almost his entire army, was the victory at Kunesdorf. There, Russian troops under the command of Chief General Pyotr Saltykov managed to literally trample the Prussians, so that immediately after the battle, Frederick had no more than three thousand combat-ready soldiers at his disposal.

Russia was forced to join the anti-Prussian coalition by the alliance treaty concluded with Austria in 1746, as well as the defensive Austro-French treaty, which St. Petersburg joined in 1756. Russian troops made up more than a third of the total number of all armed forces of the coalition: Vienna and Paris found on whose shoulders to shift the main burden of the battles. It is not surprising that in such conditions, Russian commanders were forced to try to take into account all the nuances of political processes in St. Petersburg and the capitals of European powers. This, in particular, killed Stepan Apraksin. After the Grossegersdorf Victoria, he received news that Empress Elizabeth Petrovna was seriously ill and the heir Peter Fedorovich, an ardent admirer of Prussia and its king, was preparing to ascend the throne. The field marshal, realizing that with Peter's accession the foreign policy course would change, played a retreat - and was mistaken. The Empress recovered, and he eventually found himself under investigation and trial on charges of treason. This had the most negative impact on the course of the war: after Gross-Jägersdorf, the Russian army and its Austrian allies had a chance to finish off the Prussian troops, but it was missed. But Frederick, having learned that the commander in the Russian army had changed, which meant that other changes were inevitable that would temporarily reduce the enemy’s combat effectiveness, was not slow to take advantage of the opportunity that presented itself.

General-in-Chief Willim Fermor, the son of the Scottish nobleman Major General Willim Fermor, who had once entered the Russian military service, replaced the guilty Apraksin. As the outstanding Russian military historian Anton Kersnovsky spoke about Fermor the Younger, “General Fermor is an excellent administrator, a caring boss (Suvorov remembered him as a “second father”), but at the same time fussy and indecisive.”

Indeed, in the role of one of the senior officers who achieves the fulfillment of the task assigned to him by the commander-in-chief, Fermor was in his place during the Crimean campaigns of Minich, and in the battle of Stavuchany, and in the Swedish campaign of 1741. And at the beginning of his participation in the Seven Years' War, Chief General Fermor also proved himself well - both in the Battle of Grossegersdorf and by organizing the capture of Konigsberg and all of East Prussia. But still, the general was primarily concerned about the well-being and safety of the people. Which is not bad for a military leader, as long as this circumstance does not conflict with the strict need to sacrifice both his subordinates and himself for the sake of victory. It was precisely this determination, this courage to send people to certain death that General-Chief Fermor apparently lacked in the battle of Zorndorf. And his subordinates made this decision instead.

General-in-Chief Willim Fermor. Artist Alexey Antropov. wikipedia.org

Frederick, who on the eve of the Seven Years' War considered the Russian army one of the weakest in Europe, if he did not change this opinion after Gross-Jägersdorf, at least began to take the Russians quite seriously.

Having assessed all the advantages of the position on the banks of the Oder, which Fermor had chosen for the decisive battle, the king immediately saw what the Russian Scot had missed. Alas, the impeccable position of the Russians had one critical drawback: as soon as the enemy attacked not from the front, but from the rear, the ideal position turned into an ideal trap. Frederick, whom no one had yet called the Great, but who had already demonstrated his military genius more than once, could not miss such a chance.

“Fermor received true news about the approach of the king and about his intention to cross the Oder,” writes in his memoirs one of the direct participants in the Zorndorf battle, a Lutheran pastor, Prussian Christian Tege, who accompanied the Russian army on the campaign. - Lieutenant General Kumatov was immediately dispatched to meet him with an observation corps. But this did not prevent Frederick from safely crossing the Oder; Kumatov overlooked the king, through whose fault I don’t know.”

Frederick scheduled the attack on the Russian positions, the weakness of which by that time had become obvious to both Fermor and his headquarters, for the early morning of August 14, 1758. This is how Tege describes the beginning of the battle: “Our soldiers woke me up shouting: “The Prussian is coming!” The sun was already shining brightly; we jumped on our horses, and from the height of the hill I saw the Prussian army approaching us; the rest of it shone in the sun; it was a terrible sight... The terrible beating of Prussian drums reached us, but no music could be heard yet. When the Prussians began to approach closer, we heard the sounds of oboes playing the famous hymn Ich bin ja, Herr, in deiner Macht (“Lord, I am in Thy power”)... While the enemy was approaching noisily and solemnly, the Russians stood so motionless and quiet, that there seemed to be no living soul between them.”

“It was not a battle, but better said, a massacre to death.”

The first blow was taken by the unfired observation corps: Frederick understood perfectly well who should be hit first. But, to his greatest surprise, the recruits not only did not rush to their heels, but did not even begin to move back much, meeting the attackers first with dense rifle fire and then with bayonets. And this battle abounded in such surprises for the Prussian army from the first to the last minute!

Map of the Battle of Zorndorf. wikipedia.org

When the troops rested a little, the battle began to boil with renewed vigor. “The Russian cavalry rushed to the right wing, but the cannon fire of the Prussians forced it to retreat; The enemy cavalry pursued her, causing her great damage and took the battery back, writes Weydemeyer. - ... Widespread horror spread among the Prussians, whom neither the requests nor the threats of the officers could restrain, and they left the battlefield in shameful flight; even in the center many regiments fell into disarray. But Seydlitz with the cavalry... and then corrected the position of the Prussian troops... Meanwhile, the infantry of the Prussian right wing penetrated the Russian left and handed it over to the defeat of the cavalry. Both sides fought with the greatest ferocity; finally engaged in hand-to-hand combat; Both opposing armies were in great disorder, but the Prussians, accustomed to rapid movements, soon entered the lines and, despite the stubborn resistance of the Russians, overthrew them. Ours, retreating, rushed to the Mitsel River in order to cross to the opposite ... bank; but the bridges... were destroyed in advance by order of Frederick in order to cut off the Russian retreat; however, this means, used by the king to destroy our army, saved it. The Russians, having come to Mitsel and not finding bridges, saw that they could either defend themselves or die in the river. Little by little they began to come into order and formed different detachments that served as points for connecting the entire army.”

In the monograph “Frederick the Great” by the Russian historian Fyodor Kony, it is said this way: “The Russians fought like lions. Entire rows of them lay down in place; others immediately stepped forward, challenging the Prussians at every step. Not a single soldier gave up and fought until he fell dead to the ground. Finally, all the shots were spent: they began to fight cold. The stubbornness of the Russians further inflamed the anger of the Prussians: they chopped and stabbed everyone without mercy. Many soldiers, throwing away their weapons, bit each other with their teeth. Before the start of the battle, Frederick did not order pardon. “Let us also stand up for ourselves, brothers!” the Russians shouted. “We will not give pardon to the German, and we will not accept it from him: it’s better that we all lie down for Holy Rus' and Mother Queen!” There has never been an example of such a battle in history. It was not a battle, but rather, a massacre to death, where there was no mercy for the unarmed.”

In the battle of Zorndorf, the Russian army lost half of its personnel, the Prussian army lost a third. In absolute numbers it looks like this. Koni’s monograph says: “In the Zorndorf affair, the Prussians had 31,000 people, the Russians - up to 50,000; the loss of the former extended to 13,000 dead and prisoners, the latter to 19,000 people. The Prussians captured 85 cannons, 11 banners and most of our convoy. The Russians captured 26 guns, 8 banners and two standards from them.” According to later calculations by historians, the Prussians lost 11,000 people in the battle, the Russians - 16,000. But even lower figures make it possible to classify the Battle of Zorndorf as one of the bloodiest in the 18th–19th centuries.

"The Russian army accomplished this impossible..."

The parties interpreted the outcome of the battle in their favor. Frederick, who managed to stop the Russian troops rushing deep into Prussia, rightly believed that it was he who had the upper hand. At the same time, Fermor, reporting to Elizabeth about the results, wrote: “In a word, Most Gracious Empress, the enemy is defeated and cannot boast of anything!”

Historians, who do not need to take into account the political and palace interests of the contemporaries of Frederick and Fermor, give the battle a Solomon-like assessment: they say that in fact the victory remained with the Prussians, legally - with the Russians, who retained the battlefield. But the main victory, which even experts in military history rarely remember, still belonged to the Russians. The historian Fyodor Nesterov wrote about it very accurately in the book “A Link of Times”: “Discipline in this (Prussian - author’s note) army was cruel, but discipline itself can only provide an average effort of the army and is not capable of inspiring it to " impossible", exceeding the norm. The Russian army under Zorndorf just accomplished this “impossible”, because it fought under unthinkable conditions, not provided for by any regulations... The officers, in the confusion, release their soldiers from under their control, but give orders to the first ones they come across, and they carry them out. Soldiers obey the orders of officers they do not know because they are afraid of disciplinary action: now they are not afraid of anything. But because they feel trust in them, they need leadership, organization amid chaos in order to better fulfill their duty. But the enemy is driven back... and everyone hurries to the banner of his regiment. The evening roll call is made, a memorial service is served - and again before the eyes of Frederick there appears a slender, formidable fighting force, standing unshakably in the same place, as if there had been no skillful maneuver by him, Frederick, there had been no crushing volleys of all his artillery, there had been no swift blow of his cavalry and measured and methodical onslaught of his infantry.”

That is why the Battle of Zorndorf can rightfully be considered one of the worthy victories of Russian weapons. Over time, political winds begin to blow in a different direction, the assessments of contemporaries are replaced by balanced conclusions of historians, and only soldier’s courage and officer’s valor remain the constant guarantee of any victory.

The campaign plan for the Russian army in the Seven Years' War for 1759 provided for concentration in Poznan and movement to the Oder to join the Austrians. The commander of the Russian army, Saltykov, defeated a detachment of Prussians (under the command of Wedel) and united with the Austrian corps of Laudon on the right bank of the Oder River, taking up positions on the Kunersdorf Heights. The combined army consisted of 41 thousand Russian and 18.5 thousand Austrian infantry, 200 and 48 guns, respectively.

Horse reconnaissance reported all movements of Frederick's army. Already on July 30, the Prussians were seen preparing to cross the Oder below Frankfurt, that is, north of Kunersdorf.

Having received information about the Prussians’ intention to attack the Russian army, Saltykov ordered to turn the battle formation around and begin to strengthen a new position, from which he intended to act in one way or another, depending on “enemy requests.”

The Kunersdorf heights have a general direction to the northeast, and the front of the Russian army was now turned to the southeast, from where only the Prussian offensive could follow, since completely impassable swamps stretched to the north of the Russian location. The total length of the position is about 4.5 km, the depth on the right flank (near Frankfurt) reached 1.5 km, on the left flank (Mühlberg height) did not exceed 600 m. The Russian army was located on three heights, which are separated by two ravines (Laudonov and Kungruid) with rather steep banks. The right-flank height Judenberg commanded over the surrounding terrain, the center of the position was on Mount B. Spitz, the left flank on Mount Mühlberg. In general, the depth of the position was small, and its front was cut by ravines, which made communication between units and their mutual support difficult.

The position was strengthened by artificial structures. On the right-flank height, behind which there was a bridge over the Oder - the path to Crossen to connect with the Austrian army - 5 batteries were erected, of which one was the most powerful in terms of the number of guns and the strength of the fortifications. Another strong battery was erected on B. Spitz. Mühlberg had 4 relatively weak batteries installed. Trenches for infantry were prepared between the batteries, which, however, were not completed to the intended profile.

On Judenberg, Russian-Austrian troops settled in three lines: in the first - 8 Russian regiments, in the second - 2 Russian and 8 Austrian regiments, in the third - Russian and Austrian cavalry. The center of the position between Loudonov Ravine and Kungrund was occupied by 17 Russian infantry regiments. The left flank (Mount Mühlberg) was occupied by 5 regiments of young soldiers. All the cavalry and Austrian troops located behind the right flank essentially constituted a general reserve.

The Russian and Austrian convoys were located below Frankfurt, on the left bank of the Oder River, near the bridge on the road to Crossen, in two Wagenburgs with cover of two infantry regiments.

Frederick II had 48 thousand people and about 200 guns. On July 31, he transported his army across the Oder River at Goeritz north of Frankfurt. He decided to divert the attention of the Russian command with a demonstration by two detachments from the Tretino Heights, and with the main forces to attack the Russian troops on Mount Mühlberg from M. Spitz.

At 2:30 a.m. On August 1, Frederick's main forces, built in two lines, with Seydlitz's cavalry in front, crossed the swampy valley of the Guner River. By this time, the Russian army was in full combat readiness.

At 9 o'clock, two strong batteries of the Prussians opened fire from the Tretino Heights, then their artillery took up positions on the M. Spitz and near the ponds south of Kunersdorf. Russian artillery responded with heavy fire.

Having discovered the grouping of the main forces of the Prussians, Saltykov made a partial regrouping of his troops, strengthening the defense of the center, where a private reserve was formed. The Russian cavalry was moved to the center.

The main body of the Prussian infantry lined up in two lines east of M. Spitz, with cavalry on the left flank. On the right bank of the river. Güner, near Tretin and Bischofsee, two more groups of Prussians were built. At 11 o'clock 30 min. The Prussians launched an attack on Mount Mühlberg from the front and left flank. 15 Russian battalions of inexperienced soldiers had the entire Prussian army against them, but they put up significant resistance. Crushed by numerical superiority, the young Russian regiments left the Mühlberg heights. 15 battalions and 42 guns were out of action, as a result of which the forces of both armies were balanced. Having occupied Mühlberg, the Prussians could bombard the Russian army with longitudinal fire. Friedrich completed his first task. Now we had to take B. Spitz.

When the Prussians occupied Mühlberg, part of the Russian troops built a new front behind the Kungrund ravine. 5 or 6 lines formed here. In addition, the regiments located in the second line carried out a counterattack on Mühlberg. It was not possible to take back the mountain, but the counterattack delayed Frederick’s further advance.

Now Frederick decided to advance through the Kungrund ravine. A strong battery was moved to the edge of the ravine. The infantry lined up in oblique battle formation on Mount Mühlberg, with part of the cavalry positioned to the left. Part of the army was allocated to attack B. Spitz from the north, the other part was supposed to attack this height from the south from the village of Kunersdorf.

The Prussian right flank was unsuccessful, suffered heavy losses and was driven back. The attack of the Prussian cavalry through Kungrund was initially successful, but then Rumyantsev took part of the Russian cavalry and overthrew the Prussian cuirassiers. The infantry attack was also initially successful; the Prussians had already begun to climb Bolshaya Spitz. Large crowds of Prussian infantry accumulated in the Kungrund ravine, and well-placed Russian artillery began to shoot these masses of Prussians. Now Frederick’s only hope was an attack by Seydlitz’s cavalry on the Russian infantry stationed on Bolshaya Spitz. But Seydlitz had to lead an attack over rough terrain, advance between ponds under cross-artillery fire and attack trenches whose profile he did not know. Receiving one order after another from the king, Seydlitz had no choice but to attack at random. This attack, under heavy artillery fire from Russian batteries, was quickly repulsed with heavy losses for the Prussians. At this time, the Russian-Austrian cavalry rushed from three exits towards the frustrated Prussian cavalry. Now the Russian troops launched a general counter-offensive and pushed the Prussians into Kungrund, in whose ranks panic began. Disorderly crowds of Friedrich's army, accumulated on Mount Mühlberg, were shot by Russian artillery. The Russian infantry cleared Mühlburg with bayonets and returned everything that had been lost earlier. Seydlitz took advantage of the Russians' transition to a counteroffensive and led the cavalry into the attack a second time. With artillery fire and an attack from the left by Russian-Austrian cavalry, Seydlitz was again driven back. Frederick's last desperate attempt to prevent disaster was unsuccessful. The Prussians were completely defeated. To pursue them, Saltykov sent Russian-Austrian cavalry, but this pursuit by weak forces was soon stopped, which saved the remnants of Frederick's army from final destruction. Prussian losses reached 19 thousand people and 172 guns. The Allies lost about 16 thousand people (Russians - about 13.5 thousand, Austrians - 2.2 thousand). A significant part of the remnants of Frederick's army fled.

Rice. 2

Frederick suffered a decisive defeat. He finally lost heart and contemplated suicide. “Everything is lost, save the courtyard and archives,” he wrote to Berlin.

The battle of Kunersdorf showed the extreme dependence of the linear battle order on terrain conditions, which made it difficult for the Prussian army to maneuver.

The Russian army showed great resilience, mutual assistance, the ability to maneuver infantry and artillery in battle and fight stubbornly. Counterattacks revealed its high combat effectiveness.

If a linear battle formation struck one point if it was unsuccessful, it would lead to crowding of units and deprivation of their maneuverability. Clausewitz noticed that Frederick at Kunersdorf was entangled in the networks of his own oblique battle formation.

In 1760, Russian troops took Berlin by raid, and in 1761 they captured Kolberg. Prussia was exhausted and on the verge of defeat. She was saved by the death of the Russian Empress Elizabeth. Peter III, who ascended the throne, was a great admirer of the Prussian king and immediately made peace.

The first impression turned out to be deceptive, the “old man” launched a successful offensive and began to win battle after battle, skillfully maneuvering and forcing the enemy to take battles in places convenient for Russian troops to operate. Soon the main battle of the war took place, which took place near the village of Kunersdorf. The troops led by Frederick II himself were defeated, losing 19 thousand people wounded, killed and captured, and losing all their artillery and convoys. In the battle, Frederick was almost captured and was forced to flee the battlefield. The hat he lost during his escape is now kept in St. Petersburg in the A.V. Museum. Suvorov.

For this victory, Saltykov became a field marshal and received a special medal with the inscription “To the winner over the Prussians,” and all the troops were worthily awarded. The war continued. Despite the lack of coordination of actions with the allied Austrian army and conflicting instructions from St. Petersburg and Vienna, Saltykov’s troops fought successful battles in Pomerania and even took Berlin.

Conclusion: A supporter of decisive offensive actions, Saltykov was literally shackled by the need to coordinate every step with the two capitals... In the end, he got tired of this and, citing poor health, he first received permission to leave for treatment, and then left his post altogether.

BATTLE OF KUNERSDORF

Battle of Kunersdorf- one of the largest battles of the Seven Years' War of 1756–1763 . It happened 250 years ago - August 12, 1759. This last large-scale armed clash between Russian-Austrian and Prussian troops ended in the complete defeat of the Prussian army of Frederick II. The decisive role in the defeat of one of the strongest armies in Europe belonged to the Russian army. She once again proved the superiority of her military system over the outdated Prussian one.
After the Battle of Palzig on July 23, 1759, General Pyotr Saltykov remained the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, having proven his abilities as a commander. After the defeat of the Prussians, the Russian army approached Crossen, where it was supposed to unite with the troops of Field Marshal L. Down, but the Austrians were not there. Saltykov, according to a previously developed plan, decided to capture Frankfurt and threaten the capital of Prussia, Berlin, from here. However, Down, dissatisfied with the bold and independent actions of the Russian commander-in-chief, prevented the attack on Berlin. Only the 18,000-strong Austrian corps of General B. Laudon joined the Russian troops.

While fruitless negotiations were going on between the commanders of the Allied armies about a plan for further action, Frederick II with a large army crossed the Oder below Frankfurt and attacked Russian troops who had taken up positions near the village of Kunersdorf.

The Russian army numbered about 60 thousand people (41 thousand Russians and 18.5 thousand Austrians) with 248 guns. Prussian troops - 48 thousand people with 200 guns.

The Battle of Kunersdorf, which lasted 7 hours, ended in the complete defeat of the Prussian troops. The pursuit of the remnants of the enemy troops, entrusted to the Austrian cavalry and Totleben's light Russian cavalry, stopped not far from the battlefield. The Prussian army lost about 19 thousand people (including 7627 killed) and 172 guns. Russian losses amounted to 13 thousand people (2,614 killed and 10,683 wounded), Austrians - about 2 thousand people.

In the battle of Kunersdorf, Frederick II lost almost his entire army. Prussia was on the brink of disaster. “I’m unhappy that I’m still alive,” he wrote, “out of an army of 48 thousand people I don’t have even 3 thousand left. I no longer have any funds and, to tell the truth, I consider everything lost.” In this battle, the Russian army demonstrated the complete superiority of its tactics over Prussian formulaic tactics. On the Kunersdorf field, the oblique linear tactics of the troops of Frederick II, with the help of which they won victories over the Austrians and the French, turned out to be untenable in a clash with Russian troops. The Russian army did not adhere to a dogmatically linear battle order; troops were transferred during the battle from one sector to another and maneuvered in separate units. Strong reserves were allocated. On the battlefield, all types of troops and parts of the battle formation interacted with each other, ensuring the success of the battle.
After Kunersdorf, Russian and Austrian troops did not immediately march on Berlin and thereby gave Frederick II the opportunity to gather his strength and continue the war. The campaign against Berlin was thwarted by the Austrian command. Saltykov (promoted to field marshal after Kunersdorf) urgently demanded an attack on Berlin, linking this with the victorious end of the war by the Allies. However, the Austrians did not agree with Saltykov’s plan and prevented its implementation. The brilliantly conducted campaign of 1759 by Russian troops did not lead to the end of the war due to the inactivity of the Austrian command.

“By the opening of the 1759 campaign, the quality of the Prussian army was no longer the same as in previous years. Many military generals and officers, old, experienced soldiers died. Prisoners and defectors had to be placed in the ranks along with untrained recruits.”

Until now, Frederick had waged an offensive war. He adhered to the rule of “not allowing the enemy to come to his senses and preventing his actions.” All previous campaigns opened with offensive actions by the Prussians. Now, when Frederick’s forces were significantly depleted, and the energy of his enemies increased due to his stubbornness, he decided to adopt a defensive system and, while defending his lands, destroy the plans of his opponents. Therefore, until the summer we see him inactive: he calmly waited for decisive enterprises from Austria and Russia.

In 1759, as in the previous year, the campaign was opened by Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick. The French, led by Soubise, treacherously captured Frankfurt am Main in the winter, despite the fact that this city belonged to the imperial alliance and, therefore, was supposed to remain inviolable. Possession of Frankfurt and Wesel opened the French to communication with the Imperial and Austrian armies and, moreover, ensured the supply of provisions and field supplies from the main camp of Contada. Ferdinand had to use every effort to take away this important point from them. With his army, reinforced by English troops (about 30–40 thousand people in total), he went on the offensive in the direction of Münster, Paderborn and Kassel with the aim of driving the enemy out of both Frankfurt and Wesel, which became the main bases of the French.

On April 13, a battle took place at Bergen, near Frankfurt; but the French, whose chief command was taken over by the Duke de Broglie instead of Soubise, held fast to their position. Ferdinand was forced to retreat to the Weser River. Then both French armies entered Germany again, quickly captured Kassel, Munster and Minden and captured bridges across the Weser, taking up excellent positions for a further offensive. But then Ferdinand stopped their progress. On the first day of August, near Minden, with 42,500 Prussian, Hanoverian and English soldiers at his disposal, he met the 60,000-strong army of Marshal Marquis Louis de Contade.

The battle proceeded with varying degrees of success: at first, Ferdinand held a demonstration against the French right flank. Contad went on the attack to deal a decisive blow to the enemy, but Ferdinand unexpectedly counterattacked him with eight “folar” columns. Two English and one Hanoverian infantry brigades attacked the French cavalry, which was in the center of Contada's positions under artillery cover. The French cavalry, in turn, attacked the British, who curled up in a square and repulsed all attacks with rifle fire, after which they launched a bayonet attack on the French infantry and with a frontal attack broke through the center of the first line (of the 4.5 thousand British who participated in the battle, every third).

At the same time, a 10,000-strong Hanoverian corps came to the rear of the French. Ferdinand realized that the battle was won and ordered five reserve regiments of English cavalry to attack the enemy and complete their defeat. However, the commander of the cavalry, Lieutenant General Lord George Sackville (as it later turned out, bribed by the French government) three times refused to carry out the order and go on the attack. If not for Sackville's treason, the entire French army would certainly have perished. The French, defeated and disorganized, managed to avoid complete defeat and retreated in order, losing 7,086 people killed, wounded and prisoners, 43 guns and 17 banners. Ferdinand pursued them to the Rhine. The Allies lost 2,762 people, most of them British. By the way, the French in this battle also owe a lot to the steadfastness of several Saxon regiments that were in their service. The Saxons here for the first time did not live up to the words of Peter the Great, which he said to Field Marshal Ogilvy in 1706: “There is little hope for the Saxons; if they come, they will flee again, leaving their allies to perish.” At the same time, Ferdinand's nephew, the Crown Prince of Brunswick, defeated a French detachment near the town of Wetter.

The victory at Minden was supplemented by several more successful operations of Ferdinand, so that by the end of the year the French had to abandon all their happy conquests, leaving Hanover. The Duke of Württemberg was also among Frederick's enemies. For money, he sent 10 thousand soldiers to the French and led them himself, being on salary under the banner of Broglie. By the end of the year, he occupied the city of Fulda with his army.

In early December, the Duke gave a magnificent ball. Suddenly the dance music was interrupted by heavy gunfire and the sound of guns in the streets: everyone was dumbfounded. The Crown Prince of Brunswick with hussars and dragoons captured the city. Most of the garrison was cut down, 1,200 people were taken prisoner, the rest fled, throwing away their weapons. The Duke himself barely managed to escape. The ladies were forced to end the ball with the Prussian gentlemen. They were the least likely to despair of the misfortune that befell the city. Thus ended the southern campaign. The real confrontation with Frederick's main enemies began in the summer.

In the Seven Years' War, all army movements were associated with major transitions. The store system played an important role in every enterprise: before the army could act, it had to provide itself with food. The magazines showed the point from which the enemy intended to begin his operations, and gave the enemy a means of predicting his intentions. Frederick paid special attention to the store system of his opponents. Before his enemies moved, he wanted to deprive them of all means of maintaining troops and thus slow down their actions. Thus, the king’s main idea was to maneuver on the enemy’s communications: being interested in the lack of funds for the short-term course of the campaign, Frederick tried to delay the timing of the Allies’ speech and launched a series of cavalry raids on their rear with the aim of destroying stores. Since armies could not travel more than five days' march from their bases, this could completely disrupt the execution of the campaign plan.

In February, Frederick sent a small corps to Poland, where the main Russian stores were located along the banks of the Warta. The Prussians managed to destroy a three-month supply of 50 thousand people. In addition, they captured Pan Sulkowski, the main supplier of provisions for the Russian army. By the way, during the winter Rumyantsev tried in vain to prove to Fermor that the location of the Russian winter quarters was extremely unprofitable and dangerous. As a result, the commander-in-chief, who did not believe in the activity of the enemy, removed Rumyantsev from the active army and appointed him as a rear inspector (from where Saltykov had already requested him). The Prussians, however, judged the dispute between both generals.

The same expedition was undertaken to Moravia; it failed, but provided Frederick with other benefits. Daun believed that the Prussians intended to invade Moravia, and concentrated his main forces here. By this he exposed the Bohemian borders from Saxony. Prince Henry took advantage of the opportunity and in April sent several corps to Bohemia, where they destroyed all Austrian stores in five days (because of this raid, the Austrians were so frightened that they abandoned all active actions during the spring and early summer). The prince himself came with his army to Franconia against the imperials, who were located in detachments between Bamberg and Gough. When the Prussian columns appeared, the imperials left their cantonier apartments and fled. Only at Nuremberg did the imperial army unite again and take a breath. Meanwhile, the Prussians captured all its stores and carts, took many prisoners and collected significant indemnities from the Franconian cities. But Saxony, to whose borders Daun had already moved part of his troops, had a need for protection. Therefore, Prince Henry left the imperials and hurried back. This expedition took place in May.

At this time, Frederick stood motionless at Landshut, opposite Daun's army, which occupied a fortified camp in Bohemia, and guarded its every movement. Down was waiting for maneuvers on the part of the Russians, because he had agreed with Fermor to act with joint forces. In the last days of April, the Russians crossed the Vistula and again set up their shops.

In St. Petersburg, meanwhile, they developed a general plan of operations for 1759, according to which the Russians became auxiliary forces for the Austrians. The size of the Farmer's army was planned to be increased to 120 thousand people. Ninety thousand were supposed to be sent to join the Austrians, and 30 thousand were to be left on the lower Vistula to guard stores (the February raid, as we see, also had an effect on the Russians).

While the plan for the 1759 campaign was being discussed in the highest spheres, the Russian army was preparing for a new, third campaign. Battles and campaigns brought with them not only losses and disappointments. Having gone through the crucible of Gross-Jägersdorf and Zorndorf, the army acquired invaluable combat experience.

The orders of the Conference, which previously sought to control the smallest movements of troops and demanded a report on every day of the campaign, sounded different notes: “Avoid such resolutions as were adopted in all military councils held during the current campaign, namely with the addition of the words to every resolution: if the time , circumstances and movements will allow. Such resolutions only show indecision. The direct art of a general consists in taking such measures that neither time, nor circumstances, nor enemy movements could hinder.”

Seven Years' War (1756–1763). Campaigns of 1759–1761.

The attitude towards the enemy also changed. Not a trace remained of the arrogant judgments about Frederick. M.I. Vorontsov, who replaced A.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin as chancellor, urged Fermor to think about correcting shortcomings and to adopt everything new and useful from the enemy: “We have nothing to be ashamed of that we did not know about other useful military orders that the enemy introduced; but it would be unforgivable if we neglected them, having learned their usefulness in business. It is bold to liken our people, in consideration of their strength and legalized obedience, to the kindest matter, capable of taking on any form that they want to give it.”

By 1759, much had changed for the better in the army. The troops became more maneuverable (during the 1758 campaign alone they covered at least a thousand miles), and the supply system was improved. The energetic P.I. Shuvalov managed to re-equip the artillery during the winter of 1758–1759. The regimental artillery received howitzers of an improved design - “unicorns”, lighter and faster-firing than the old ones. In addition to replacing the guns, the field artillery underwent fundamental structural changes. The study of the experience of the Zorndorf battle, which was unsuccessful for the artillery, prompted the creation of special cover regiments, the soldiers of which, following the example of the Austrian “Hand Langers”, were obliged to act in complete unity with the artillerymen and not only cover them, but also, if necessary, help them, replacing those who were out of action . The soldiers of these regiments were taught “turns, withdrawal and advance of artillery, and so on, so that in a future campaign it would be more convenient to use them with better benefit than those sent temporarily from the regiments.”

The plan for the 1759 campaign was built on different principles than the plans for previous campaigns. Active actions in the Pomeranian-Brandenburg direction were not envisaged. According to the aforementioned agreement with the Austrians, the Russian army was to advance into Silesia with the aim of uniting with the Austrian army and joint actions against the main forces of Frederick II. The starting points of such a plan were in line with a decisive strategy. The final version of the plan (a rescript addressed to the army commander dated June 3, O.S.) states that “by the happily subsequent rapprochement or union (of the Russian and Austrian armies. - Yu. N.) it is possible, with God’s help in the beginning, with good hope, to fight a decisive battle and put an end to the whole war.”

Unfortunately, the plan contained many caveats and considerations that weakened this guidance. In particular, the possibility of difficulty in food supply was highlighted in advance: it was stipulated that after the union of the allied armies, “lack of food would force them to disperse and retreat back.” Considering the case “how long will you not be in close proximity or connection with Count Down, but on the contrary, the King of Prussia would be in the middle of you,” the drafters of the plan unconditionally recommended avoiding battle, “for in this case a skillful retreat ... is worth almost the whole victory.” . The plan suggested that the army commander advance to Karolat (on the Oder), but allowed for the possibility of choosing a direction somewhat further north, to Crossen (also on the Oder, approximately 50 kilometers below Karolat).

As we can see, Fermor was not explained at all exactly where exactly he should meet the Austrians and what he should be guided by when maneuvering: “up or down the Oder.” However, Villim Villimovich was not able to implement the provisions of this plan. The experience of the 1758 campaign convinced the government that V.V. Fermor did not show the qualities necessary for the commander-in-chief of the army. In addition, General Kostyurin’s inspection showed that Fermor was unpopular in the army and “for the most part, although they do not dare to grumble, they are dissatisfied with him.” Kostyurin wrote in his report: “Many generals and staff officers with me said in discussion that everyone wants to be a Russian commander. Including in the army of E.I.V. in the service of the Germans... they also have a desire, if the main one between them was Russian.”

In the spring of 1759, a decision was made to remove Fermor from command. However, the latter, “a man who is always cautious in everything,” managed to ask to be relieved of command of the troops (in St. Petersburg they said that he did this on a “strong recommendation” from the Conference). On May 31, the third Commander-in-Chief was appointed - 60-year-old Chief General Pyotr Semenovich Saltykov.

This appointment was a complete surprise to everyone. Probably, any reader of military historical literature knows the characterization of Saltykov, which was given to him by the Russian writer Andrei Bolotov, who was with the army during the war. Bolotov, who saw the new commander-in-chief in Koenigsberg, on his way to the active army, wrote about Saltykov like this: “A gray-haired old man, small, simple, in a white Landmilitsky caftan, without any decorations and without all the pomp, he walked the streets and did not have behind him more than two or three people. Accustomed to pomp and splendor in commanders, this seemed strange and surprising to us, and we did not understand how such a simple and apparently insignificant old man could be the commander of such a great army and lead it against such a king who surprised everyone. Europe with his courage, agility and knowledge of the art of war. He seemed to us like a real chicken, and no one even dared to think that he could do anything important.”

Saltykov was, figuratively speaking, unlucky in military historiography. Some issues related to his life and military activities have been reflected in Russian historiography, but no significant, full-blooded work devoted to him has yet been created, although the personality of the commander is very attractive and interesting. And most importantly, it is with P.S. Saltykov that the process of strengthening national principles in the development of Russian military art begins. The personality of P. S. Saltykov appears before us with a certain shade of mystery. Sincerity, charm, attentive and caring attitude towards the soldier, amazing modesty - this is how Saltykov was characterized by his contemporaries. One gets the impression that historical circumstances seemed to impede the manifestation of Saltykov’s leadership talent. Neither before nor after Palzig and Kunersdorf does his military biography contain anything special.

However, Bolotov was somewhat mistaken about Saltykov. The general was very close to the reigning house. His father, General-in-Chief Semyon Andreevich, on his mother’s side was related to Empress Anna Ioannovna. This circumstance ensured the start of Saltykov Jr.’s career.

He began serving in 1714 as a soldier in the guard, and soon, along with other “pensioners,” he was sent by Peter I to France to study maritime affairs (Saltykov served in the French fleet for more than 15 years). In 1734, already with the rank of major general, he took part in the War of the Polish Succession. In 1742, as a lieutenant general, he fought against the Swedes under the command of Field Marshal Lassi; from 1743, after the signing of peace with Sweden, as part of Keita's corps (he commanded the rearguard), he was in Stockholm in case of an attack against the “pacified” Danish troops, which had already become friendly to Sweden. Upon his return from Stockholm, he accepted the Pskov division, in 1754 he became general-in-chief, and in 1756 he was appointed commander of the Ukrainian Landmilitian regiments, and in addition, he had the court rank of chamberlain.

The soldiers loved Saltykov for the already mentioned simplicity and “extraordinary equanimity in the fire.” He had a creative attitude to military affairs, an extraordinary mind, energy and at the same time caution, composure, firmness and intelligence in a moment of danger, he strove to see everything, if possible, with his own eyes, in order to then independently resolve the problems that arose. This became the data thanks to which the 60-year-old, hitherto unknown Russian general turned out to be a worthy rival to the most outstanding commander in Europe in the mid-18th century.

Meanwhile, it turned out that the army could not be staffed even by 50%. In accordance with the general plan and yielding to the insistent demands of Austria, she set out on a campaign from Bromberg to Poznan at the beginning of the Nun, without waiting for the arrival of reinforcements, with the aim of concentrating in the vicinity of this city. The troops arrived at their destination only a month later, where a rescript from the Conference was received, transferring command to Count Saltykov (Fermor received one of the three divisions). Saltykov, who arrived at the army and took command on June 30, received the already known instructions to unite with the Austrians at a point that they themselves would appoint (“if Daun does not agree at Carolat, then at Crossen”). In addition, the commander-in-chief was prescribed the following curious measures: “without obeying Down, listen to his advice” (!), not to sacrifice the army for the sake of Austrian interests and, finally, not to engage in battle with superior forces (“superior” to at least one of the allied forces there were no Prussians even in 1756, let alone in 1759). Thus, the position of the army was difficult and uncertain.

By mid-June 1759, Frederick I, having the main forces in Silesia and a group of troops of Prince Henry in Saxony (a total of about 95 thousand people), occupied a central position between the Allied armies. In addition, a strong separate corps of Prussian troops under the command of Dona (up to 30 thousand people) operated against the Russian army in Poland. The Don was tasked with preventing the Russians and Austrians from uniting in the middle reaches of the Oder. The forces of the Austrian troops opposing Frederick II under the overall command of Daun numbered up to 135 thousand people.

Having in the plan drawn up by the Conference only one very definite instruction: to seek connections with the Austrians on the Oder in the area of ​​​​Karolat or Crossen, Saltykov made a bold decision for his time: to advance towards the Oder in the direction of Crossen, first hitting the Dona corps hanging over his flank from the north. On July 17, Saltykov left Poznan to the south - to Karolat and Crossen to join the allies, having about 40 thousand people (although 7-8 thousand of them were Cossack and Kalmyk cavalry, which was then considered unsuitable for field battle). The Austrian army was waiting for them in the south. During the march, Russian cavalry moved in dense masses ahead of the army, conducting reconnaissance and preventing the Prussians from harassing Saltykov’s main forces with cavalry raids.

Campaign of 1759.

Confident of Down's passivity, Frederick, as already mentioned, sent Count Christopher Dona's 30,000-strong corps stationed in Pomerania against the Russians with instructions to attack the left-flank columns of the Russian army during its campaign. But Dona, like Manteuffel, acted sluggishly and did not succeed in this enterprise: the cautious and managerial Count P.S. Saltykov managed to forestall his every move and finally united his army. At first, Don tried to impede the movement of the Russian army with complex maneuvers, but Saltykov persistently advanced towards the Oder.

On July 5, the Russian army moved against the Don. The latter avoided battle, after which Saltykov began a march to the Oder on July 15, ignoring the threat to his communications. Conscious, apparently, of the low effectiveness of attempts to bind the enemy with such threats, Don chose a more reliable solution - to block the path of Russian movement, taking a strong position at Züllichau. Saltykov, having discovered the enemy, undertook a flank march bypassing this position through Goltzin, Palzig - a decision even bolder than the first, since the threat of losing communications with stores hung over him (the calculation was made for supplies from Austrian stores lying ahead), and exemplary completed.

Don still could not decide to fight such a strong army and was content with only counter-marches and attacks on small detachments and Russian stores. Meanwhile, Saltykov kept moving forward and was already approaching the Oder. This extremely risky flank march was completed exactly as planned, with the Russians having made arrangements in advance in case they were cut off from their bases in Poznan.

Frederick, dissatisfied with the actions of the Don, decided to replace him with a more courageous and enterprising commander. He chose K. G. Wedel, the youngest of his generals. In order not to offend his elders, he called him the “dictator” of the army. “From this moment,” the king told him, “you represent my face with the army; Every order you give must be carried out as if it were my own. I completely rely on you! Act as in the Leuthen affair: attack the Russians wherever you meet them, defeat them completely and do not let them unite with the Austrians, I don’t demand more from you.” Lieutenant General Wedel received under his command the Prussian covering troops stationed along the Oder.

But Wedel did not justify the king's trust. He wanted to carry out his instructions too literally and paid dearly for it. Rushing after the Russians to cut them off from Crossen, he, with a weak 28 thousand-strong corps (18 thousand infantry, 10 thousand cavalry) with 100 guns, met a 40 thousand-strong Russian army (28 thousand infantry, 12.5 thousand cavalry, of which only 5 thousand regular , 240 guns) near the town of Palzig (right bank of the Oder), ten miles from the city of Zellihau.

The Russians quickly established the location of the enemy: Wedel positioned his army in a wooded and swampy area at the confluence of the Oder and Obra rivers. The right flank of the Prussians was covered by Obra (through which the Russian patrols unsuccessfully searched for fords), but the left was open, and therefore Wedel concentrated his main forces on it. Thus, standing at the Oder, Wedel cut off the path of the Russians and forced a battle on them. Saltykov was afraid to attack the Prussians, since they had superiority in regular cavalry and could present unpleasant surprises to the attackers. Therefore, the general plan of action provided for a possible bypass of the Prussian troops from the left flank and a further march to connect with Daun (if possible without a fight).

Having left the bivouac on the afternoon of July 22, the Russians, after an eight-hour march, stopped at about midnight for a rest. After spending the night completely calmly, at dawn they continued their march. Saltykov’s flanking maneuver turned out to be a complete surprise for the enemy: the Prussian forward posts tried to delay the Russians with artillery fire, but the maximum firing distance did not allow them to cause any damage to the attackers. In the absence of Wedel himself and his staff (the latter were on reconnaissance), the Prussians did not dare to decisively attack the Russians. Only in the middle of the day, when the Russian columns were already approaching the village of Palzig, did the Prussian commander launch an attack. Malakhovsky's Prussian hussars tried to attack Saltykov's vanguard, but the terrain cut by swamps and streams thwarted this attack, and the Russians put forward several cannons and opened fire on the enemy with grapeshot.

The Russian army reached Palzig unhindered and took up a position in front of the village, deciding to rely on its more than double superiority in infantry, and especially in artillery. The Russian center was covered by the Floss River, which made it extremely difficult for the Prussians to deploy forces, but the left and especially the right flanks were open. Two lines of Russians lined up at a distance of 300–400 meters, numerous artillery was consolidated into eight batteries (four on each flank).

Despite the superiority of the Russian positions and their significant forces, the young and hot-tempered Wedel led his troops into the field and himself attacked Saltykov’s army, which had deployed in advance, at sunset on July 23. The swampy terrain did not allow him to act in correct lines: he had to conduct his troops along narrow defiles in small detachments. At three o'clock in the afternoon the Prussians opened fire with all their guns.

The battle began with a quick “oblique attack” of the Prussians on the Russian right flank, where the Siberian, Uglich and 1st Grenadier regiments were in the first line. A column of General von Manteuffel (four infantry regiments and three cavalry squadrons) moved against them. At the same time, the main forces of the Prussians began to overcome the sparse forest to attack the enemy in the center. The terrible fire of Russian cannons thwarted the attack, and Manteuffel himself was wounded. However, Wedel did not lose heart: he reinforced his left flank with five battalions of von Gulsen and again threw him into battle. However, this attack, like the one that followed it, was again repulsed without hand-to-hand combat. The four regiments sent by Wedel to cover the Russian right wing were late and were forced to attack alone, without support from the front. The Prussians were again stopped by fire, after which the Chuguevsky Cossack regiment hit them with spears, throwing the enemy back into the forest and capturing one gun. The fourth attack (of General Kanitz's cavalry on the Russian left flank) was repulsed by a counterattack by Totleben's cavalry.

Wedel completely discredited himself as a military leader by throwing his already small forces into uncoordinated attacks piecemeal. But the battle still continued: at six in the evening a strong detachment of General von Wapersnow approached the Prussians. Wedel decided to once again repeat the attack on Saltykov’s right flank, entrusting this to Vapersnov. The latter quickly assessed the power of the Russian artillery fire (the field in front of the positions was completely strewn with corpses and wounded) and decided to change tactics: despite the wooded area, he intended to quickly attack the Russians with only cavalry forces, giving the infantry a support function.

At seven o'clock in the evening, after heavy artillery preparation, the fifth attack began. General von Wapersnow's cuirassiers quickly turned around and struck at the Russians in order to mix up their ranks and pave the way for their infantry. The main blow was directed at the junction between the Perm and Siberian regiments, where the fire was weaker. The terrible blow of the cuirassiers completely scattered both regiments and shook the entire right wing of the Russian army. The heavy cavalry pursued the fleeing for some time, and then fired a volley in pursuit and returned to their infantry, which was trying to widen the breakthrough.

However, the outcome of the battle was decided by a counterattack by a united mass of Russian cuirassiers: four Russian cuirassier regiments with the support of a squadron of Nizhny Novgorod dragoons attacked the Prussian cavalrymen from the front and both flanks. The Prussians took the blow: Vapersnov personally gathered hussars and dragoons around him, with whom he hurried to the aid of his cuirassiers. A brutal hand-to-hand battle began, about which Saltykov himself later wrote: “There was not a single shot here, only broadswords and swords sparkled!” The commander of this counterattack of the Russian cavalry, who had distinguished himself at Zorndorf, was Lieutenant General Thomas Demicou, who rode in the front ranks and was killed by a stray bullet in the very first minutes. Nevertheless, the forces were too unequal: having crushed the Prussian cuirassiers, our cavalrymen on their shoulders burst into Wedel’s advanced infantry battalions, instantly crushed them and put them to flight. Vapersnov was shot with a pistol.

Wedel still tried to restore the situation - the Prussians renewed the attack five times and each time were repulsed with significant damage. Neither the proven courage of the Prussian soldiers, nor the personal courage of the dictator himself could withstand the numerous Russian artillery.

Against the Prussian battle formation, Saltykov used “playing with reserves” - the large numerical superiority of the Russians gave him the opportunity to engage in tactical delights. Nevertheless, the scales tipped several times. Nevertheless, as a result, Vedel was completely defeated, his soldiers scattered, some were trampled into the swamps, and some lay down on the spot. The Russians captured 600 prisoners, 14 cannons, 4 banners and 3 standards. 4,228 killed Prussians were found on the battlefield (total losses, according to Prussian data, reached 5,700 killed and wounded with 1,500 prisoners). The damage on the Russian side amounted to only 894 killed and 3897 wounded. The pursuit was weak, limited to a short distance from the battlefield. With complete superiority in cavalry, Saltykov was unable to organize a truly energetic pursuit of the Prussians, which did not allow the victory to be achieved to the complete destruction of the enemy: his remnants went beyond the Oder to the Krossen fortress. The losses of the Russian army, which spent almost the entire battle shooting the enemy with impunity, were for the first time during the war less than the Prussian army: 900 killed and about 4,000 wounded.

This was a very important victory that inspired the troops. The Russian command successfully used the experience of the war and many tactical discoveries, quickly and promptly moved reserves, which led to victory. In the Battle of Palzig, the large-scale interaction of infantry, artillery and cavalry was also successful. The strategic consequences of the victory, which cleared the way for the Russian army to join the allied army of Down, were also invaluable.

Saltykov was in a hurry to use the victory at Palzig, which opened the way for him to the Oder, in order to unite with the Austrians. Five days later, on July 28, the Russians reached the Oder near Crossen. Wedel, who had locked himself in the Krossen castle, did not dare to lose any more people and, together with a small garrison, went to join the king.

All this time, the Austrians of Down were inactive, diverting the enemy's attention to the Russians. Despite the great superiority in forces, Daun was still afraid to engage in open battle with Frederick and therefore summoned Saltykov to the depths of Silesia, where the Prussians would inevitably meet him. However, the Russian commander-in-chief did not succumb to the Austrians and after Palzig decided to move to Frankfurt, from where he could directly threaten Berlin. Meanwhile, Daun with the main forces of the Austrian army at the end of June very slowly moved out of Bohemia to the north, approximately in the direction of the planned junction area, took up a strong position without reaching the Oder more than five marches and remained there for more than 20 days. When the Russian army fought at Palzig, Daun also made no attempt to distract the enemy from it. Frederick II also waited; the activities of both opponents were expressed in maneuvers of forward and flank detachments and small skirmishes.

Unable to establish contact with the Austrians, Saltykov again made an active decision: to go along the Oder to Frankfurt, thus creating a threat to Berlin. Although the union of the allied armies did not occur, the political plans of Austria did not include the defeat of Prussia by the forces of the Russians alone. Therefore, Daun, standing with all his troops against a weak enemy barrier, sent an 18,000-strong corps under the command of Lieutenant General Gideon Ernst Laudon to Frankfurt-on-Oder.

General Loudon.

Russian and Soviet historians claim that Loudon wanted to occupy the city before our troops and “profit” from the indemnity there. One way or another, he did not succeed: when the Austrians approached Frankfurt, he was already busy with the Russian avant-garde, who occupied the city on July 31, ripping off indemnity from its inhabitants. The Russian vanguard passed through the abatis, occupied the suburbs and began shelling the city from quickly deployed guns. After the first shots, the magistrate surrendered, reporting that the Prussian garrison (only 20 officers and 300 privates), not hoping to repel the assault, had left the city to join the main forces. The retreaters were chased by a detachment of hussars under Colonel Zorich, who, after a small skirmish, captured them. Laudon united with Saltykov, coming under his command. Now the road to Berlin was completely open.

On August 3, the entire Russian army approached Frankfurt and settled on the heights in the Kunersdorf area on the right bank of the Oder. There were a little more than 80 kilometers left to Berlin. Daun demanded that Saltykov, together with Laudon, climb up the Oder and cross to its left bank to the intended meeting place of the armies at Crossen. In this case, Daun took upon himself the provisions of the Russians. Before making a final decision, Saltykov received alarming news about the rapid movement of Frederick and the army towards the Oder.

The threat to the capital caused an immediate reaction from the enemy: Kony writes that “the news of this shocked Frederick. But he wanted to try one last, decisive effort. Having written a spiritual will in which he appointed his nephew as heir to the throne, he summoned Prince Henry to his camp, gave him command of the troops, appointed him as the heir’s guardian and took an oath from him - never to conclude a peace shameful for the House of Brandenburg.”

“Win or die without fail!” - this is the motto that he chose for himself when he gathered up to 40 thousand troops on the banks of the Oder and began to transport them across the river in order to bypass the enemy from the north.

So, at this moment, three large Allied groups concentrated on the near approaches to Berlin: from the east, approximately 59 thousand Russians (taking into account Loudon’s forces) were separated by approximately 80 miles, from the south - 65 thousand Austrians of Daun’s army (150 miles) and from the west - 30 thousand soldiers of the imperial army (100 miles). Thus, the main Prussian army found itself squeezed on three sides and at the same time faced with the need to defend Berlin, which was under immediate threat. “Frederick decided to get out of this intolerable situation by attacking with all his forces the most dangerous enemy, the enemy who had most advanced, the most brave and skillful, and who, moreover, did not have the custom of evading battle, in short, the Russians” (Kersnovsky A.A. History of the Russian Army . M.: Voenizdat, 1999. P. 76).

Frederick's actions, as always, were lightning fast. With part of the troops from his main forces, he linked up with reinforcements given to him by Prince Henry, and with a forced march moved towards Frankfurt in order to strike in the rear of the allies and defeat them. Along the way, he united with Wedel’s troops, whom the Russians were never able to finish off, and who, after the Battle of Palzig, went unhindered to the left bank of the Oder. In total, the king led 48,200 soldiers and officers into battle with 200 guns. On August 10–11, Frederick crossed the Oder below Frankfurt and the town of Lebus, leaving a strong detachment of Wünsch (about 7,000 people) on the left bank. Infantry and artillery crossed the river along pontoon bridges, and cavalry forded. It was already too late to leave - having established Friedrich’s performance on August 5 (the Russian cavalry discovered the Prussian vanguard at Lebus), Saltykov took up a position on the Kunersdorf Heights with a front to the south and began to equip it. The Russian army, together with Loudon's corps, consisted of 59 thousand people. Saltykov, waiting for the second Austrian corps under the command of Gaddik to join (the latter, being seven miles from Kunersdorf, did not have time to approach the battlefield), stood in a fortified camp on the heights along the right bank of the Oder, almost opposite Frankfurt. The convoys were sent to the left bank, in addition, all convoys moving towards the army were stopped by a special order.

The Russian commander was fully aware that by moving towards Berlin, he would bring upon himself the main forces of the enemy. From the very beginning of the campaign, the Russian general thus showed his determination to engage in a general battle and created the appearance of conceding the initiative to the enemy, which was due to tactical considerations. At the news of the approaching Prussian army, he did not even consider it necessary to change his position, despite the fact that Frederick was approaching his rear in three columns. He only strengthened the communication between his flanks by means of a retranchement, which covered the front of the entire army.

It is necessary to say a few words about the Russian positions. The ridge of heights on which Saltykov’s troops took up a position consisted of three groups separated by ravines: the western, close to the Oder (dominant) - Judenberg, the central - Big Spitz, the eastern (lowest) - Mühlberg, located in front of Kunersdorf and separated from Spiez by the Kungrund ravine. The right flank of the position rested on the low, marshy bank of the Oder, the left - on the Bekkergrund ravine. To the north of the ridge of heights, in the western part of this space, the area was forested and swampy, so approaches to the heights from the west and north were hampered by this factor and the Guner stream, which flowed parallel to the Russian positions.

All this made it almost impossible to access the position from the rear (bypassing the left flank was unlikely, since the Prussians would have to immediately attack the most inaccessible part of the position. In addition, if the bypass from the right flank failed, the enemy could immediately be thrown back into impenetrable swamps) . In front of the front of the position at the Kungrund ravine, which separated the Big Spitz and Mühlberg, lay the village of Kunersdorf, behind which the left wing of the Russians entered; further to the south, at an obtuse angle to the front, a chain of lakes and a channel stretched between them. Russian troops occupied all three heights and fortified them. The position of the Russian army was invulnerable from the Oder side, but shallow and cut by ravines.

The right-flank division, located on Judenberg and abutting the Oder, was commanded by Count Fermor; the left-flank Observation Corps (stood on the Mühlberg up to its slope towards the valley covered with arable land and swamps) - Prince Alexander Mikhailovich Golitsyn. The center was commanded by Count Rumyantsev, and the vanguard was commanded by Lieutenant General Count Villebois, who stood with Fermor (in total there were 17 infantry regiments on the Big Spitz). Laudon and his corps were positioned behind the right wing, behind Mount Judenberg, and formed a general reserve. The left wing, as I already said, was covered by the village of Kunersdorf. All elevations were defended by strong artillery (248 guns in total, of which 48 were Austrian). The Allied army included 41,248 Russian and 18,500 Austrian soldiers. The infantry was built in two lines traditional for linear tactics, although Saltykov for the second time, as at Paltsig, used deep echeloning of his troops in depth on a relatively narrow front with a very strong reserve.

True, there were also disadvantages in this - the forested mountains and the peculiarities of the position occupied by the Russians did not allow the use of 36 squadrons of Russian cavalry (5 cuirassiers, 5 horse-grenadier regiments and 1 dragoon regiment - not counting the Austrians, as well as the dragoons who were under Rumyantsev). As a result, the entire mass of the Russian cavalry, together with the Austrian corps, was concentrated behind the right flank as a general reserve before the start of the battle. By the way, this “deep echeloning” in this case was not some kind of tactical innovation by Saltykov at all - the Russian commander simply sought to place all his forces on the ridges of the heights and therefore all the regiments simply did not fit into the position. The main forces of Russian infantry and artillery were sent to hold the central and right-flank heights; the position on the 4.5-kilometer front was reinforced with trenches. The convoys in two Wagenburgs were taken to the rear under the cover of the Chernigov and Vyatka regiments. The soldiers were given 50 rounds of ammunition, the grenadiers - two grenades. There were some oddities: before the battle, the personnel were ordered to sew pieces of multi-colored garus onto their hats in order to distinguish the regiments during the battle. However, there were not enough supplies of braid; as a result, not all regiments received this distinction, and in regiments, not all battalions and companies.

The bulk of the Allied troops were concentrated on Judenberg - this height was considered as a stronghold of the position, from which regiments on Spiez could be supported as necessary. For the same reason, five artillery batteries were equipped on Judenberg, on which the longest-range guns were installed. There was one battery on the Big Spitz, and two on the Mühlberg. At the end of three o'clock in the morning on August 12, the allied armies were completely ready for battle.

It was assumed that Frederick should approach from the north, so Fermor initially occupied the left flank and Golitsyn the right. But true to himself, Friedrich appeared from the opposite side (he nevertheless decided on a risky bypass of the right flank), and Saltykov had to turn the army around, so that the right flank became the left, and the left became the right. At the same time, the cavalry also changed positions: horse grenadiers and dragoons stood at the foot of the heights, next to the Kungrund ravine. The cuirassiers went to the far right flank. This turn did not weaken the position of the Russian army, but, as under Zorndorf, it cut off its path to retreat. Either victory or extermination awaited her.

Having drawn up a very ingenious and bold plan for attacking the allied positions, Frederick (which, in general, is not entirely like him) completely did not take into account the nature of the terrain. Moreover, the King of Prussia became acquainted with them only during the march to the starting positions, based on the stories of the forester guide. Thus, while the Prussian army was making its way through the forest, swamps and ponds, precious time was running out: the maneuver, which was planned to take 2 hours, took as much as 8. Only by ten in the morning did the Prussians, exhausted by the hardest march, reach the Russian positions.

On August 12, Frederick with a 48,000-strong army stood against the Russian army, east of its positions. The "extraordinary activity and continuous movements" in his troops showed that he wanted to attack the Russians from all sides. But at that time he himself, having questioned the re-soldiers brought to him, looked out for our position and chose the point from which it would be more convenient to launch an attack, consulting about this with his generals. The Prussian army was deployed at right angles to the Allied front, and batteries were advanced to the heights northeast, east and southeast of Mühlberg - the field of the upcoming battle. Having started regrouping early in the morning, Friedrich crossed the swampy Guner stream and took up convenient positions covering the left flank of the Russian army, fortified on Mount Mühlberg. Here he intended to deliver one powerful knockout blow with an oblique battle formation against the Russian entrenchments on the mountain, and then take possession of the entire Allied position.

After the Prussian artillery fired at Golitsyn’s corps, around noon the king’s infantry and cavalry, built in two lines, went on the attack. The concentration, when Friedrich did not allow Saltykov to guess the location of the offensive, and the initial phase of the attack with superior infantry forces over rough terrain were carried out in an exemplary manner.

Saltykov did not interfere with the enemy’s maneuver; he only sought to limit the advance of the Prussians further to the west, to the right wing of the Allied position. For this purpose, on his orders, the village of Kunersdorf was set on fire and the crossing across the interlake channel south of this village was destroyed. In this way, Saltykov prevented the enemy’s attempts to pin down the Allied forces from the front and left the possibility of maneuvering his troops along the position.

So, after a powerful three-hour artillery bombardment, Frederick II attacked the Allied left wing. At nine o'clock in the morning the Prussians established two batteries on the mountain, directly on the flank of our left wing, at the same time parts of cavalry and infantry entered the ravine and began an attack from three sides: north, north-east and east, with a strong cross-fire. The Russian artillery, followed by the infantry, opened fire back, but it was too late: the Prussians managed to turn around in an oblique battle formation. Only after this did the Russians realize that they had made a serious mistake: the artillery positions of the left flank were opened unsuccessfully. The hollows in front of the positions turned out to be in a “dead space” that could not be shot, and therefore at the most critical moment of the attack, the Russian guns stopped firing. This was another mistake: even without causing damage to the attackers, the roar of their guns at all times had a calming effect on the mood of the infantry. Now the regiments of the Observation Corps, already depressed by the sight of superior enemy forces advancing from several sides, completely lost heart.

From the Russian positions located on the hills, we saw more and more ranks of blue uniforms and sparkling copper grenades appearing on the flanks of the leading battalions and stretching into a long line. After this, the bayonets of muskets descending on the aiming line flashed, and a volley of crushing force was heard. The famous “old Fritz’s mill” began to work: the firing rate of the Prussian infantry, brought to perfection, allowed them to fire six bullets per minute. Multiplying this number by several thousand soldiers standing in deployed formation, one can imagine the hell that reigned on the Russian flank. Then the drums began to rumble again, and the Prussian infantry launched a bayonet attack.

Despite heavy rifle fire, the Prussians climbed up onto the hills between the vineyards, occupied our fortifications on Mount Mühlberg and pushed back the left wing. The grenadier companies of the Observation Corps were immediately driven from their positions and fled to the swampy banks of the Oder. A second line was formed from two regiments, but it managed to delay the enemy only for a short time - the Shuvalovites, as at Zorndorf, could not withstand the concentric attack and left their positions on Mühlberg in panic. Prince Golitsyn was wounded. The Prussians took possession of the hill and rushed at the Russian batteries with bayonets. Very soon the left wing of the Russians was completely upset and fled - 15 battalions were partly killed, partly scattered, the guns and several thousand prisoners went to the Prussians.

The Prussians immediately installed cannons on the mountain (they immediately put into action all 42 serviceable guns captured from the Russians on Mühlberg) and fired grapeshot at the fleeing and reforming regiments. After this, they began a destructive longitudinal shelling of Russian positions on the Big Spitz. The concept of “longitudinal” shelling means that the artillery opened fire almost point-blank on the flank of the long Russian lines huddled together, which at that time were also repelling attacks from the front. Under these conditions, cast iron 9-pound cannonballs killed and maimed sometimes several dozen people standing in close formation shoulder to shoulder. The fire from Mühlberg became increasingly stronger, and there was nowhere to hide from the shelling - the regiments stood in small ravines that provided almost no shelter from grenades and grapeshot.

Many of our authors prove that Saltykov deliberately decided to give up positions on Mühlberg after a short battle, so as “not to waste reserves and allow the Prussians to storm the increasingly stronger positions of the Russians.” However, it is easy to understand that this is complete nonsense. To deliberately let your wing be destroyed, exposing the central position to terrible crossfire and a combined attack from the front and flank - this is something unheard of in world practice. And the nervous and chaotic actions of the Russians at the subsequent stage of the battle quite clearly illustrate the absurdity of such statements.

So, the Prussians’ enveloping attack on the left wing of the Russian position was successful for them: they managed to break into the fortifications covering the left flank, overturn the regiments of the Observation Corps and capture Mühlberg. The crossfire of Prussian artillery, the presence of dead spaces in front of the fortifications and the insufficient stability of the privileged troops of the “Shuvalov” corps led to this outcome of the first phase of the battle.

Frederick put forward new columns to help his vanguard. Saltykov dispatched General Panin to reinforce his own: he promptly gave the order to the leftmost regiments stationed on the Big Spitz to turn across the former front and take on the blow of the Prussian infantry that had crossed Kungrund. The outermost regiments of both Russian lines, reinforced by Austrian grenadier companies, turned to the left and met the enemy with fire. The command of this barrier was taken over by the general on duty under Saltykov, Brigadier Yakov Aleksandrovich Bruce (1732–1791). Behind his regiments stood another barrier - the Belozersky and Nizhny Novgorod regiments. Since the ridge of the Big Spitz was narrow, six “lines” (two regiments in each) were soon formed perpendicular to the front, which entered the battle in turn - as the front line died.

A contemporary describes the subsequent dramatic events as follows: “And although they (Russian lines) were in this way exposed powerfully as if to be beaten by the enemy, who, multiplying every minute, moved forward from time to time and with indescribable courage attacked our small lines, one after another exterminated to the ground , however, just as they, without clasping their hands, stood, and each line, sitting on their knees, fired back until there was almost no one left alive and intact, then all this stopped some of the Prussians ... "

Frederick continued the attack, hoping to use a longitudinal blow, supported by artillery firing from Mühlberg, to “wind up” the Russian battle formation. At the same time, the front of the attack in difficult terrain narrowed greatly, and the king’s infantry, like the Russians, piled up in several lines, unintentionally received a deep formation. As Saltykov describes the enemy’s actions in his report, “... the enemy... made a column out of his entire army, rushed with all his might through Your Majesty’s army to the very river.”

Saltykov responded to this enemy attack by reorganizing the battle formation of the center regiments closest to the left flank, which created a defense on the eastern slopes of the Big Spitz, and by transferring forces taken from the right wing and from the reserve along the front. The Russian and approaching Austrian regiments, forming several lines (just like the enemy), offered staunch resistance to the attacker. What would have been beneficial in strike tactics played a negative role in fire tactics. Finding themselves in a deep formation, the Prussian infantry could not use most of their guns, and in this case they did not have the impulse for a bayonet strike - the Prussians had to make their way through the forest, endless ponds and swamps, and then climb up the mountain, where abatis and trenches.

Nevertheless, Frederick triumphed. He no longer doubted the final success and even sent messengers to Berlin and Silesia with the joyful news of the victory (when, at the height of the battle, Prince Henry’s messenger arrived at headquarters with a detailed report on the victory at Minden, the king, grinning meaningfully, said: “Well, , perhaps we can offer something too!”).

One could believe that the Russians, after suffering enormous losses overnight, would retreat and complete victory would remain on Frederick’s side. The main success now depended on the capture of the Big Spitz mountain, which dominated a fairly vast area, was occupied by the best Russian and Austrian regiments and protected by reliable artillery.

A dispute broke out at the king's headquarters about this: Fink, Gulsen Putkammer, and especially Seydlitz argued to the king that the battle needed to be suspended - the soldiers were tired of the difficult march and the heat, the battle was practically won and it was necessary not to continue the attacks, but to intensify the shelling in order to force the enemy to retreat. However, Frederick did not think so. His goal was not to inflict a tactical defeat on the Russians, as at Zorndorf, but a decisive defeat from which they would not be able to recover. In this, the king was supported by the young Wedel, who longed for revenge for Palzig and believed that it was necessary to decisively attack the center of the allied forces; with luck, the right flank would not have held out for long. The general saw that Russian resistance was gradually weakening, and insisted on continuing the offensive. Then Frederick gave the order to attack the Big Spitz.

By three o'clock in the afternoon half of the battlefield was in the hands of the Prussians; the infantry cleared the field for Frederick; Now all that remained was for the cavalry and artillery to finish what they had started. The king tried to expand the front of the attack and deeply cover the center of the allies. To this end, he moved a group of troops of his right wing to bypass the Allied position on the Big Spitz on the left, and sent a strong cavalry of the left wing to the front of the main Russian position.

But his cavalry was at the other end, opposite the Russian right wing. She could not make it on time because she had to parade and make long detours between ponds and swamps. The cannons could also only be transported with great difficulty.

Saltykov took advantage of the delay in bringing the Prussian heavy cavalry into battle and opened heavy fire on the Prussians from 80 guns, as if in a fortress, hidden behind open trenches and stone walls of the cemetery. In general, it should be said that Russian artillery played a very important role in this phase of the battle. Even during the battle for Mühlberg, the regrouping of the Russian field artillery of the center and right wing to the left flank began; Later, during the battle for the Big Spitz, such a maneuver was carried out on a relatively large scale. The guns of the Shuvalov system (“secret howitzers” and “twins”, created specifically for canister fire) performed an important function in repelling the outflanking right-flank group of the Prussians. It is significant that when performing this maneuver, the field artillery guns were moved by horse traction. Regimental artillery played an even greater role in the battle for Big Spitz. It can be assumed that the “unicorns” of the regimental artillery, who were with their regiments not in the first line of battle formation, successfully fought the Prussian batteries, firing over the heads of their infantry battle formations. On the contrary, the Prussians were able to move only part of the field artillery to Mühlberg; the heaviest guns remained in their original positions, too far from the front (the viscous sandy soil prevented a timely change of positions).

In many Russian-language sources you can read that Saltykov allegedly foresaw such a development of the event and calmly transferred artillery from the right flank to the threatened left, “covering the transfer of guns with smoke from burning buildings and firing along the entire front.” However, in reality this was not at all the case: there were no orders to transfer specific batteries; the commanders, having received an order to change positions, acted at their own discretion. The Russians, sweating profusely, frantically moved their guns, sometimes even in front of their own infantry, resulting in the loss of large amounts of artillery. Places for placing batteries were also not indicated, so the guns were placed randomly and randomly, which led to an almost complete loss of fire control by senior officers. Some shot with cannonballs and grenades, some with buckshot; there was no proper volley fire.

Artillery at Kunersdorf. 1759

Nevertheless, Saltykov succeeded in this desperate maneuver, and the Prussians, who continued their attack on the Russian left flank, immediately felt the power of fire from several dozen guns hastily transferred there. The masses of Prussian infantry accumulated on Mühlberg suffered heavy losses from Russian artillery fire.

However, all the benefits of the battle were still on Frederick's side: his troops shot down the first two lines of Russians, capturing 70 guns. The Russian-Austrian army, completely upset, concentrated in its last retranchement, defended by fifty guns.

Nevertheless, having managed to bring up the clumsy artillery, Frederick II continued the efforts of his troops to capture the central position, which was defended by Rumyantsev’s regiments. The main battery on Spit was directly covered by the 3rd and 4th Grenadier, Apsheron, Pskov, and Vologda regiments. Seeing the preparations for a frontal attack, Rumyantsev ordered brigadiers Berg Derfelden to change the front: the Siberian, Azov and Nizovsky regiments moved to the first line, and the Uglitsky and Kyiv regiments, already battered by enemy fire, to the second. The commander of the Russian artillery, General Borozdin, reinforced these units with “unicorns” from the reserve. The Pskov regiment covered the retranchement on the left, opposite Mühlberg.

The Prussians climbed the steep cliff of the Spitz through the Kungrund ravine: grapeshot splashed at them and the ditches were filled with corpses, which were immediately covered with earth. Several times the soldiers renewed their attempts, and each time the terrible ravine was filled with new victims. Nevertheless, the Prussian grenadiers did the impossible: they crossed Kungrund, which had turned into a mass grave, and started a bayonet battle at artillery positions. The Novgorod musketeer regiment was shot down and scattered; the remaining regiments of Rumyantsev's division are surrounded and isolated.

Simultaneously with the attack on the flank of the Russian positions on the Big Spitz mountain, the Prussian cavalry attacked the same positions from the rear, and the infantry from the front, not far from Kunersdorf. The critical moment of the battle had arrived. The loss of positions in the center inevitably led the Russian army to complete and crushing defeat. However, the attack from the flank, from the slopes of Mühlberg to the slope of the Big Spitz, floundered - the Russian lines died one after another, but defended their positions.

Frederick ordered Seydlitz to launch an attack with all his cavalry forces on the front of the Russian regiments stationed on the Big Spitz, in order to break the resistance of the Russian center. The king planned in advance the use of cavalry from the southeast and south and deployed it in advance to the west of the Kunersdorf ponds. Now its time has come: the cavalry of the cavalry general, famous after Rosbach and Zorndorf, after the retreat of the infantry, rushed to the fortified positions of the Russian regiments and batteries ready for battle, but this attack failed: the heavy cavalry that untimely attacked the Russians, built in dense battle formations, fell under the concentrated fire of numerous Russian batteries. They were joined by muskets from the Nevsky, Kazan, Pskov and two grenadier (3rd and 4th) regiments. The cavalry of the Prussian left wing of the Prince of Württemberg, sent to the rear, but forced under heavy Russian artillery fire to overcome the defile between the lakes south of Kunersdorf, was unable to attack at all. After a hot battle, during which Seydlitz, together with the infantry, managed to break into the retrenchment from the front and flank (the Prussian cavalry did the incredible - it managed to overcome the fire of Russian artillery, break through the infantry lines on Spiez and break through to the top of the hill), the entire right-flank group of the Prussians was overturned and partially scattered. The cuirassiers of the Prince of Württemberg, who hesitated under fire, were finally dispersed by the true leadership of Rumyantsev and Laudon: Rumyantsev led his cavalry into the attack - the Arkhangelsk and Tobolsk dragoon regiments crushed the famous “White Hussars” of General von Putkammer. Laudon supported the allies by leading two squadrons of Austrian hussars into battle.

In this battle, the brave Putkammer himself was shot. Seydlitz was one of the first to be seriously wounded by grapeshot in the arm, but did not get off his horse. Prince Eugene of Württemberg, who did not leave the battlefield and tried to gather his cuirassiers and dragoons for a new attack, was also wounded. During the battle on Spiez, Fink, Gulsen and several other Prussian generals were wounded. Pale from loss of blood, Seydlitz managed to gather his thinned squadrons behind the ponds and built them up again, although Russian cannonballs flew there too.

The battle on the Big Spitz was difficult for the Russian infantry (the enemy partially retained the initial enveloping position), and the Russian troops of the center, showing unshakable steadfastness, had difficulty restraining the enemy. With the arrival of reinforcements from the virtually inactive right wing and from the reserve, the front of the allied forces, now located across the previous one, was lengthened, and their position began to improve, and the Prussian attacks began to choke. The state of the Prussian army at this moment was well described by Kony: “Nature itself disarmed them: for fifteen hours the Prussian army was in forced marches, the battle had already lasted nine hours, a hot day, hunger, thirst and continuous efforts exhausted their last strength; the soldiers dropped their guns and fell on the spot in complete exhaustion.”

The Russian troops of the center, reinforced by reserves constantly approaching from the right flank, drove back the Prussian infantry with powerful counterattacks - numerical superiority passed to the Russian side. After a fierce four-hour battle on the slopes of the hill with the arrival of new reinforcements, success began to clearly lean towards the side of the allied forces. The transition of some units of the Russian infantry to bayonet counterattacks (apparently at the initiative of private commanders) carried away the remaining units and quickly led to a decisive turning point in the course of the battle.

At the same time, Prussian attacks on other heights were also happily repulsed. Frederick tried to move one of his columns behind our second line in order to put the Russians between two fires, but this also failed. Major General Berg met her with bayonets and Shuvalov howitzers and pushed her back; and Villebois and Prince Dolgoruky, hitting the Prussians in the flank, put them to flight and took back not only all our guns, but also took away many of the enemy’s. Narvsky. The Moscow, Vologda and Voronezh regiments threw the Prussians into Kungrund and began to develop an offensive along the front and in the direction of Mühlberg. On the other hand, the Vologda, Absheron and Azov regiments went on the attack.

Now the critical moment had arrived for the Prussians. Frederick used the last resort: he again ordered Seydlitz to attack the heights. The wounded general again moved his squadrons across the ponds and rushed into the Russian trenches. But the grapeshot was too devastating: the Prussian cavalry, shot from the front, was upset, and before it could come to order, Laudon with the Austrian hussars of Kolovrat and Liechtenstein, and Major General Totleben with the Russian light troops attacked it in the rear and flank. At this time, Rumyantsev threw into the attack all the cavalry he had: Kyiv and Novotroitsk cuirassiers, Arkhangelsk and Ryazan horse grenadiers and Tobolsk dragoons.

In this battle, the Prussian heavy cavalry was killed almost in its entirety. After the Russian-Austrian cavalry struck Seydlitz’s upset squadrons from several positions, the Russian infantry continued the offensive, again occupying Mühlberg in a hot bayonet battle. When the Prussian infantry and cavalry began to run out of steam, the Allied reserve struck along the front. Under incessant artillery fire, the Prussians fled, despite Frederick’s exhortations and requests, and Rumyantsev’s cavalry rushed after them, completing the rout.

Rumyantsev and Laudon, having slipped through the allied trenches, struck the flanks of the Prussian squadrons with the Russian cuirassiers of the heir's regiment and the Austrian hussars and overthrew them; Prince Lyubomirsky with the Vologda, Pskov and Apsheron regiments and Prince Volkonsky with the 1st Grenadier and Azov regiments threw the still resisting Prussian infantry into chaos. Even the personal courage of the wounded Seydlitz did not help against this rapid counterattack: the Prussians became upset and fled. The Russian-Austrian army continued its unstoppable advance through Mühlberg, pressing the remnants of the enemy troops to the swampy banks of the Güner.

Rumyantsev himself reported on his actions at Kunersdorf:

“... Major General Count Totleben, who was pursuing the enemy with a light army, reported to me that night that he had sent Cossacks through the swamp into the forest to the enemy left wing to cut off the cavalry from the infantry, and he, with the hussars and cuirassiers of His Imperial Highness, sent a regiment of 2 squadrons , who showed themselves very bravely, lined up on this side of the swamp; The enemy cavalry, seeing that the Cossacks were driving in from the rear, began to retreat, but at that time it was attacked from both sides by the Cossacks and hussars, upset and defeated, many were beaten and captured, in addition, a whole enemy cuirassier squadron of 20 was separated from the others. 15 men of Cossacks and 15 men of hussars were driven into the swamp, beaten and captured, whose standard was taken as booty; from this place, further than a mile, the enemy was chased..."

Frederick's attempts to seize the initiative came to nothing. The Prussian infantry and cavalry, almost destroyed by enemy artillery fire, fled from the battlefield. The king called Lieutenant Colonel Biederbee to him and ordered him to take the Life Cuirassier Regiment in order to stop or at least delay the enemy. The life cuirassiers went to the flank of the Narva regiment that had taken the lead and almost completely cut it down, but, in turn, were attacked by the Chuguev Cossack regiment. Biederbee was captured; The regiment's standard was captured by the Russians, and the regiment itself was killed almost to the last man.

This marked the end of organized resistance to the royal army: throwing down their weapons, they ran into the forests and bridges built in the early morning. On narrow passages between lakes and on bridges, people crushed each other, surrendering everywhere. The pioneer regiment capitulated in full force at the first appearance of enemy cavalry.

Finally, the frantic cries of the pursuing enemy put the last handful of brave Prussians to flight. Among them was a small detachment of hussars under Captain Prittwitz; The Cossacks were chasing him. “Mr. Captain! - one of the hussars shouted. “Look, this is our king!” The entire squad rushed to the hill. But Frederick stood there, alone, without a retinue, with his hands folded on his chest and with mute insensibility he looked at the death of his glorious army. Prittwitz almost forced him onto his horse, the hussars grabbed the horse by the reins and dragged him along. But the Cossacks had already overtaken them, and the king would probably have been killed or captured (Prittwitz had no more than a hundred people) if the captain had not killed the officer who led the Cossack detachment with a successful pistol shot. His fall stopped his pursuers for several minutes, and the Prussians managed to gallop away. Nevertheless, the king lost his hat on the battlefield, which was subsequently solemnly placed in the Hermitage.

Frederick was completely lost; all his good spirits, all his energy disappeared. “Prittwitz! I'm dead! - he exclaimed incessantly dear. And as soon as the detachment escaped pursuit, he wrote a note in pencil to his minister Fink von Finckenstein (brother of the general wounded at Kunersdorf) in Berlin: “Everything is lost! Save the royal family! Goodbye forever!

Late in the evening he arrived in a small village on the Oder. From here a new messenger was sent to Finkenstein. “I'm unhappy that I'm still alive. Out of an army of 48 thousand people,” the king wrote to him, “I don’t have even 3 thousand left.” When I say this, everything runs away, and I no longer have power over these people. In Berlin they will do well if they think about their safety. Cruel misfortune! I won't survive him. The consequences of the case will be worse than itself. I have no more funds, and, to tell the truth, I consider everything lost. My funds are depleted. But I will not witness the destruction of my Fatherland. Goodbye forever!"

An order was immediately given to Fink, to whom the king was handing over command over the remnants of his unfortunate army: “General Fink has a difficult assignment ahead of him. I hand over to him an army that is no longer able to fight the Russians. Gaddik is behind him, and Loudon is in front, for he will probably march on Berlin. If General Fink moves after Loudon, Saltykov will attack him from the rear; if he remains on the Oder, he will be suppressed by Gaddik. In any case, I think it is better to attack Laudo. The success of such an undertaking could check our failures and slow down the progress of things, and the gain of time means a lot in such circumstances. My secretary Kehrer will send the general newspapers from Torgau and Dresden. General Fink must inform my brother, whom I named Generalissimo of the Army, about everything. It is impossible to completely correct our misfortune; but all my brother’s orders must be carried out unquestioningly. The army will pledge allegiance to my nephew, Friedrich Wilhelm. This is my last wish. In my plight, I can only give advice, but if I had at least some means, I probably would not have left the world and the army. Friedrich."

Frederick spent the night in a dilapidated peasant hut. Without undressing, he threw himself onto a bunch of straw, and the adjutants settled down at his feet, on the bare floor.

All night he tossed about on his bed in terrible excitement: his state of mind was terrible. In the morning, those close to him barely recognized him, all his features had changed so much: his abrupt, incoherent, almost unconscious speech showed that he was close to madness. One of the officers reported that several salvaged guns had been brought in. "You are lying! - Friedrich shouted at him in rage. “I don’t have any more guns!”

He received artillery Colonel Moller in almost the same way when he came with a report. But “Moller withstood the first ardor and then tried to calm and console the king. He assured him that all the soldiers were devoted to him in soul and body, ready for every new feat and glad to redeem with all their blood the freedom of the fatherland and the life of the king. This had an effect on Frederick; Tears appeared in his eyes and he felt better. New hopes took the place of gloomy despair and constant thoughts of suicide in his soul.” Even on the battlefield, the adjutant barely managed to knock the bottle of poison out of the king’s hands, but now these sentiments gradually began to disappear.

The Prussians lost 19,172 killed, wounded and prisoners in the Battle of Kunersdorf (the Russians buried 7,626 killed enemies on the battlefield alone). Kersnovsky believes that this figure is underestimated by a third and actually amounts to 30 thousand, although this is very doubtful, given the further mysterious development of the events of the 1759 campaign. At least 2,000 people deserted. Among the dead was Major Ewald von Kleist, a famous German poet whose name resounded throughout Germany. He led the soldiers to attack Spitz, the cannonball tore off his right hand, he grabbed the sword with his left and rushed forward again, but did not reach the top: buckshot crushed his leg. The soldiers carried Kleist to the ravine and left him until the end of the battle. Here the Cossacks found him; stripped naked and thrown into a swamp. During the battle, the Russian hussars, passing by, heard his groans, pulled him half-dead out of the swamp, dressed him as best they could, bandaged the wound, quenched his thirst, but could not take him with them, but left him near the road. Here he lay until late at night. The new Cossack picket committed new violence against him.

The next day, a Russian officer found him in a terrible position, covered with wounds, almost bleeding to death. Kleist was immediately sent to Frankfurt, where all medical remedies were tried on him. But nothing could bring him back to life: he died on August 12 and was buried with great honors. The leaders of the University of Frankfurt and Russian troops accompanied his coffin to the grave. One of the Russian officers, seeing that there was no sword on Kleist’s coffin, put his own on the lid, saying that such a worthy officer could not be buried without this insignia.

The randomly running crowds of Prussians could have been completely dispersed by vigorous pursuit - it would have been possible to push them back from crossing the Oder and deprive them of the most convenient routes of retreat. However, the forces allocated for the pursuit were insufficient - only Russian and Austrian light cavalry, and it was carried out very sluggishly. The commander of the Russian light cavalry, General Totleben, pursued the enemy for no more than 5 kilometers from the borders of the battlefield, and the Austrians, apparently, even less (by nightfall the Austrian cavalry had already returned to the bivouac). Prussian troops crossed unhindered to the left bank of the Oder.

Historians estimate the damage on the Russian side to be up to 16 thousand people killed and wounded (according to other sources, 15,700). Evidence of this is the fact that Count Saltykov, in his report to the Empress, said in order to justify his significant losses: “What to do! The King of Prussia sells victories over himself dearly! If I win the same battle again, then I will be forced to carry the news to St. Petersburg alone with a staff in my hands.”

But all this (according to Koni) is unfair. 10,863 Russians were wounded, including Prince Golitsyn, Prince Lubomirsky and General Olitz. As for the killed, Count Saltykov later said in his report: “I can testify to Your Imperial Majesty that if there is a place where this victory is more glorious and more perfect, then, however, the jealousy and art of the generals and officers, and courage, bravery, obedience and the unanimity of the soldiers must remain an example forever. As for the damage on our part, it is much less than I could have thought at first. We have only 2,614 people killed in general of all ranks.” Loudon's troops lost 2,500 soldiers and officers, thus, according to official figures, the Allies lost approximately 16 thousand people killed and wounded.

The Russian booty consisted of 26 banners, 2 standards, 172 cannons and howitzers (almost all of which the Prussians had at the beginning of the battle) and a huge number of field shells (all the artillery convoys of the Prussian army fell to the Russians and Austrians). In addition, 4,555 privates and 44 officers were captured and more than 10 thousand guns were taken, not counting 100 thousand musket cartridges and other military property. The scale of the defeat of the Prussians and the number of trophies taken is evidenced by the fact that in 1759 Russia sold the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth so many captured Prussian muskets that they rearmed the entire, although not very numerous, army of this country. War booty was sent to Poznan, prisoners - to East Prussia; at the same time, as Saltykov reported to St. Petersburg, 243 Prussian artillerymen expressed a desire to enlist in the Russian army.

Count Saltykov was awarded the rank of Field Marshal for the Kunersdorf victory. On the occasion of the battle, two types of award medals were even minted at once - perhaps for the first time in Russia! One of them, cast in silver and intended for regular troops, had on the obverse the profile of the empress and the motto “B. M. Elizabeth I, Emperor. I I Samod. All-Russian." The reverse of the medal depicted a warrior in armor holding a banner with a double-headed eagle in his left hand and a spear in his right hand. To the left of the figure are the spiers of Frankfurt, to the right are figures of Prussians running in panic. The field is littered with abandoned trophies. The warrior rests his foot on a jug, from which a stream of water runs with the explanatory inscription “r. Oder". The motto is placed on the top and bottom of the medal: “To the winner over the Prussians, Aug. 1. D. 1759.” For the commanders of the Cossack regiments, their own example of a medal was minted with a slightly different reverse design: it depicted various military fittings with the same inscription.

The Battle of Kunersdorf was one of the most outstanding victories of the Russian army of the 18th century. Russian troops demonstrated their high fighting qualities to the fullest and covered themselves with glory. Frederick II suffered one of the most severe defeats in his entire military leadership.

Assessing Saltykov’s decisions and actions in this battle, it is necessary first of all to say that he showed himself not only to be an outstanding practical commander, which is recognized by a number of authors. An important fundamental point and a noticeable contribution to the development of military art was Saltykov’s introduction of a new element into the traditional scheme of linear order - a strong general reserve (although, as I said above, of a somewhat improvised nature), which was expediently and effectively used during the battle.

The contrast was the attitude of Saltykov’s opponent, Frederick II, to this issue, who, in accordance with the accepted rules of linear tactics, had practically no reserve. Meanwhile, the presence of one would allow him to strengthen the group of troops of the right wing, attacking bypassing the Big Spitz from the northeast (the only direction that, given the enemy’s superiority in forces and a strongly fortified position, promised success to the Prussians), and this, perhaps, change the course battles.

Clausewitz and Delbrück believed that under Kunersdorf, Friedrich became a victim of his tactics: a flank attack in a narrow space, the inability to fully use cavalry, refusal to attack the right wing of the Russian army, from where Saltykov calmly transferred reserves to threatened areas (Austrian regiments on the right flank , except for the eight grenadier companies that died on the Big Spitz and two hussar regiments that attacked the Prussians together with Rumyantsev, did not participate in the battle at all) - all this predetermined defeat. At the same time, they noted the skillful use by the Russians of the terrain, significantly fortified with trenches and abatis, as well as the steadfastness of the Russian soldiers on the slopes of the Big Spitz.

During the management of the battle, Saltykov showed firmness, composure and consistency. The pre-planned maneuver along the front by reserve forces and the unattacked part of the battle formation was carried out in a fairly systematic and timely manner. Dwelling on the assessment of the losses of the allied army, I must say that Koni (following Saltykov himself) greatly understates their number. 2614 “generally killed of all ranks” does not correspond either to the number of troops who took part in the battle, or to its course (the defeat of the Russian left flank, the Prussians’ capture of Mühlberg, the installation of a battery on it and the opening of “destructive longitudinal fire” on the Allied positions), nor to the duration of the battle (more than 19 hours), nor, finally, to its fierceness. As an example, we can cite a curious distinction that the Absheron Infantry Regiment was subsequently awarded with - red boots, and then, with a change in uniform, cuffs on boots. This distinction, as stated in the order, was given to the regiment as a sign that “in the Battle of Franfort the regiment stood knee-deep in blood.” Even near Zorndorf, where the battle was shorter in time, and the Russians also defended themselves, standing in fortified trenches, the Russians lost, according to various sources, from 17 to 18.5 thousand people - half of the entire army. The number of killed by the Russians (slightly more than 2,600) does not correspond to the number of wounded they “claimed” (more than 10 thousand).

Finally, it is characteristic that Saltykov, immediately after Kunersdorf, was so afraid to attack the defeated and demoralized Frederick again that he watched indifferently as the Prussians maneuvered and gathered reserves literally under his nose. This even affected the final stage of the “Franfort battle”: as Kersnovsky writes, “the pursuit (by Rumyantsev’s cavalry. - Yu.N.) was fought briefly: after the battle, Saltykov had no more than 22–23 thousand people left (the Austrians of Laudon could not count: their submission was conditional), and he could not reap the fruits of his brilliant victory.”

One reproach cannot be taken away from Saltykov: the persecution was indeed unjustifiably weak. One can look for the reasons for Totleben's behavior in conscious betrayal: Totleben was later (in 1761) exposed as an agent of the Prussian king. However, it must be noted that the army commander did not pay due attention to the persecution. As for the sluggish actions of the Austrian cavalry, this was generally typical for them, and Saltykov could not put significant pressure on Laudon.

The pursuit was not properly organized, it was carried out with excessive caution, and therefore the cavalry by no means “completely finished off the Prussians,” as Kersnovsky and his ilk relish, but only battered the stragglers during the general flight of the enemy (this is also evidenced by the funny: with the army in complete disarray enemy, the number of prisoners taken was less than 5,000 people) and returned to its location. The fruits of the battle were indeed lost: the same “zealot of Russian glory” in his “History of the Russian Army” reluctantly drew parallels between Kunersdorf and the defeat of the Prussians by Napoleon at Jena and Auerstedt in 1806: “The defeat of the Prussians itself was, perhaps, not as strong as at Kunersdorf: everything was completed by a persecution that can be considered exemplary in military history.”

The open route to Berlin was also not used by the Allies (as Soviet historians write, “due to Austro-Russian contradictions”). If the irretrievable losses of the Allies had really amounted to less than 3,000 people, the Russians would have taken the enemy capital without the help of the Austrians. According to Saltykov’s report, after Kunersdorf he had 20 thousand people left, and Loudon had 15–10 thousand (“minus losses”). Moreover, our authors somehow forget that two days after the battle, the second 12,000-strong Austrian corps, General Gaddick’s, arrived at Saltykov, which brought the number of allied troops to the original 48,000 people. Even Laudon alone could have attacked Berlin, with almost 100 Austro-Imperial troops behind him.

In addition, when using figures about the supposedly completely “insufficient” number of Russian troops to take Berlin (just think, some “no more than 22-23 thousand”!), all our historians somehow forget that a few lines above they relished Frederick’s complete despair and the fact that at that time he had only 3,000 fighters left. But even in such conditions, Saltykov remained in place. This suggests either that his losses were truly catastrophic (much higher than stated), or that the Russian army was afraid of another meeting with the enemy before the arrival of reserves or without large-scale assistance from the allies. Therefore, completely defenseless Berlin fell into our hands only a year later. This strange contradiction, in no way explained by our historians, largely comes from quoting the excitedly panicked letters of the king, who greatly dramatized his heavy, but by no means fatal, defeat.

The chain of successive decisions and actions of Saltykov ends with the Kunersdorf victory. She brought the Allies close to the possibility of ending the war as soon as possible. This entire chain lies in the plane of strategic ideas that are opposite to the foundations of Western European strategy of that time and precede the development of a new strategy, continued in Russian military art by Rumyantsev and brought to the highest levels by Suvorov.

It turned out that Saltykov was unable to carry out a consistent strategy of this nature in the future. The Kunersdorf victory remained unused. If the Russian commander is responsible for the weakness of tactical pursuit, then the strategic “exploitation” of success was largely thwarted by the Austrians. And such “exploitation” was quite possible. Saltykov, upon joining Gaddik's second Austrian corps, proposed moving to Berlin, but received the answer that Austrian troops could not act without Down's instructions.

I must say that Saltykov (whom many compare with Kutuzov) did not show any special talents either before the Seven Years' War or during it. Rather, it can be compared to the Duke of Wellington, and Kunersdorf to Waterloo. Like Wellington, Saltykov gave the enemy complete initiative, and he himself did the only thing: he bit into the ground like a bulldog. It is easy to blame the commander (Napoleon or Frederick, it does not matter) for the fact that while actively attacking, he makes some tactical miscalculations. There seems to be nothing to reproach a commander buried in defense - he is simply passively fighting off the enemy, relying not on superiority in tactics, but only on the quantity and quality of his soldiers. In 1815, the British, who were much inferior to the French in numbers, were saved by the approach of the Prussians, and in 1759 the Russians were saved by their large superiority in forces, especially in artillery, and, above all, by the advantage of the position. But no one except the British makes Wellington a great commander...

So, after standing for several days on the battlefield. Saltykov set out on a campaign, but not to Berlin, where they were waiting for him with fear, but in the other direction - to join the Austrian army of Down. Meanwhile, Frederick pulled himself together and managed to improve matters somewhat.

Why didn’t Saltykov go to Berlin? It seems that the Russian commander-in-chief was not confident in the success of such a campaign: immediately after the battle, the tired army, burdened with the wounded, trophies, and prisoners, could not set out on a campaign, and having counted the losses, which amounted to a third of the personnel, Saltykov “considered the campaign possible only if active Austria's participation in it."

As I said above, Frederick was always inclined to exaggerate his failures and sorrows. His emotional, panicked letter to Fink above testifies more to the unbalanced character of the Prussian king than to the real situation. Although the Kunersdorf defeat, along with Colin and Hochkirch, was indeed the heaviest blow for him during his entire reign, in fact the king’s position was not so dire.

Although immediately after the battle the Prussians managed to gather and organize only 10 thousand soldiers and officers (and by no means three), Frederick soon became convinced that his fear and despair were unfounded, he abandoned thoughts of suicide and again took command. Soon, up to 18 thousand more people gathered around him, scattered by the enemy in the Battle of Kunersdorf (all of them got to the gathering place individually or in small groups and, of course, could easily have been finished off and captured if the glorious cavalry of the allies had not been, to put it mildly, too cautious ). With them he crossed the Oder, destroyed the bridges behind him and became a fortified camp between Küstrin and Frankfurt.

The Russians, meanwhile, also crossed the Oder and encamped at Lossow, while Daun advanced with the main Austrian army to Lower Lausitz. Everything showed that both troops wanted to unite, enter the Brandenburg Mark together and take possession of the defenseless capital of Prussia. Frederick annexed all the troops from the garrisons that he could have and decided to prepare for the last battle: the defense of the capital. To do this, he stood at Furstenwalde, covered by the Spree River (on the road to Berlin), where he demanded new artillery from the Berlin arsenal and fortress cannons, waited for reinforcements from Ferdinand and reorganized his army. By August 29, just two weeks after the defeat at Kunersdorf, the king already had 33 thousand people (!), and “he could calmly look to the future.” But Frederick waited in vain for the enemies: they did not appear.

Saltykov stubbornly did not want to go to Berlin without the Austrians. The enraged Down allocated to him, in addition to the 10,000-strong corps of Loudon, the 12,000-strong corps of General Gaddick, but he himself refused to go on the offensive with the entire army. There were reasons for this. The most important of them is the presence in the rear of the Austrian army of two Prussian armies: Prince Henry in Saxony and General Fouquet in Silesia (at least 60 thousand people in total). In the event of an attack by the Tsars on Berlin, both of these corps, held back by Daun’s army, would immediately become more active and cut off Austrian communications, so Daun wanted to first take Dresden and drive the Prussians out of Saxony. However, in the fair opinion of G. Delbrück, a campaign of Russian-Austrian troops against Berlin was still possible, “but only on the condition that the commanders-in-chief acted unanimously and decisively. Such cooperation in the allied armies, as experience shows, is achieved with difficulty: not only the commanders have different views, but behind these views lie various, very large interests.”

Due to disagreements that arose between Saltykov and Down, the Russians did not take advantage of their benefits. Daun demanded that Saltykov march to Berlin without fail, while he himself covered his rear. Saltykov grumpily responded to this that he had already won two bloody victories and expected the same from the Austrian field marshal. Then Daun moved forward somewhat (in fact, it was only by this time that agreement was reached on a joint attack on the Prussian capital), but he had barely gone a few miles when Prince Henry, who was watching him in Silesia, through a cunning maneuver hit him in the rear, destroyed everything shops in Bohemia and forced him to hastily return to his original positions. This completely confirmed the Austrians’ fears for their operational rear and, moreover, deprived them of supplies of food and ammunition.

In the end, the Austrians proposed their own plan: their army would besiege the Silesian fortresses, while the Russian army was assigned the task of covering siege operations. In the future, it was planned to leave the Russian army in Silesia in winter quarters. The political meaning of these decisions was clear: the Austrians wanted to use the victories of the Russian army to achieve one of their main goals - the return of Silesia. The strategic side of their plan is also very characteristic: instead of actions against the enemy army, the tasks of capturing the territory were put forward.

On August 22, in Guben, Saltykov met with the Austrian commander, who still insisted on his plan to continue the campaign. At the very first meeting with Saltykov, Daun proposed a plan for joint actions in Saxony and Silesia with the subsequent deployment of the Russian army to winter quarters in Silesia. At first, Saltykov agreed with Down’s plan, but gradually became more and more opposed to its implementation.

Firstly, he was afraid of the severing of communication lines with East Prussia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the event of movement into the depths of Saxony or Silesia and did not believe that the Austrians would be able to provide supplies and comfortable winter quarters in the still unconquered Silesia. Secondly, he believed that the Austrians themselves were doing too little to defeat Frederick and were placing higher hopes than they should on the participation of the Russian army in operations against Prussia.

When Down, through the sent general, invited Saltykov to move the army to Peutz in order to block Frederick’s road to Saxony, the Russian commander-in-chief refused: “... the enemy has already taken the place near Peutz, so should I attack him and drive him out of there, which I don’t want to dare, because Even without that, the army entrusted to me has already done enough and endured a lot; now we should be given peace and they should work, for they missed almost the entire summer fruitlessly.” The Austrian general, according to Saltykov, objected to this: “... their hands were tied behind us for three months, what he wanted to say was that we marched for a long time, but I, picking up his speech, repeated, I’ve done enough this year , I won two battles. Before I start acting again, I expect you to win two battles too. It is unfair for only the troops of my Empress to act,” etc., etc. Mutual reproaches, as we know, do little to advance the common cause of the allies (Stalin would have been good if he had communicated with the Anglo-Americans in a similar style - I’m afraid the Second the world war would not have ended in the 50s!).

If we step back from the specific circumstances of the feud between the allied generals and do not demand from Daun greater respect for the victor of Frederick at Kunersdorf, and from yesterday’s commander of the land militia - the tact and diplomatic talent necessary in relations with the allies (inherent, for example, in A.V. Suvorov), then at the heart of the inconsistency in the actions of the allies one can see the main contradiction of the Austro-Russian agreement on the joint struggle against Prussia.

As already noted, this treaty assigned Russia the role of an auxiliary force and limited its actions to military demonstrations. Therefore, the Russian government did not seek an equal role for Russia in the union and did not set a specific goal in the war, which, as noted in the resolution of the Conference on March 26, 1756, was waged “to prevent the king of Prussia from acquiring new nobility, but even more so within moderate limits bring it in and, in a word, make it no longer dangerous for the local empire.” It is also known that the father of this plan was A.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who did not count on a serious war. When Russian troops occupied East Prussia and began to operate a hundred kilometers from Berlin, Russia’s role in the war changed due to circumstances. However, St. Petersburg politicians did nothing to change Russia's role in the union and the conditions of its participation in the war with the Prussian king. The result of this was a certain inconsistency in Russian foreign policy and, accordingly, the behavior of Russian commanders in chief.

On the one hand, the alliance agreement placed the Russian army entirely at the service of the interests of Austria, and according to it, before each new campaign, the Austrian generals demanded that the operations of the Russian army be planned in the strategic direction of Silesia (for the sake of which Austria started a war with Prussia and entered into an offensive alliance with Russia) , and on the other hand, St. Petersburg had no illusions about joint actions with the allies in Silesia. In the rescript of the Conference on December 31, 1758, the following was said to Fermor about the Silesian theater of military operations: “... unfortunately, it must be admitted that, due to the great agility of the King of Prussia, he will never allow such generals to unite, who need to explain and agree about every step... in every possible way must Make it a rule for yourself that he will only be directly defeated when the powers fighting against him begin to act as if each one were at war with him alone.”

The bitter but useful experience of three years of war dictated these thoughts. In 1757–1759, the superior forces of the Austrian (160 thousand people), French (125 thousand), Russian (50 thousand), imperial (45 thousand) and Swedish (16 thousand) armies - a total of 400 thousand people - were unable to cope with Frederick's 200,000-strong army. The actions of the allies were not coordinated - there was no talk even of a joint command of the armies of the closest allied countries (Austria and Russia); each of the allied armies did not conduct the war in the best way; indecision, unjustified maneuvers of troops, unused victories, inertia of strategic and tactical thinking of commanders - all this allowed Frederick, surrounded on all sides by the armies of the allies and rushing about like a wolf, to successfully fight off numerous enemies. But what hampered the allies most of all was their concern for their own interests.

Russia's foreign policy goals, as well as the real conditions for conducting large-scale operations, possible only with secure communications, attracted Russian politicians and generals to a strategic region lying much north of Silesia, namely to Pomerania and Brandenburg. It was here, according to M.I. Vorontsov, that the Russian army had to “work for itself.” The divergence of interests within the anti-Prussian coalition and differences in the choice of strategic areas of action led to significant differences in the strategy and tactics of the Allied armies.

In the struggle with Frederick for Silesia, the Austrian commanders resorted to the so-called strategy of starvation, or attrition. Proponents of this tactic sought to avoid direct clashes with the enemy, but at the same time keep him in constant tension and exhaust him by all means: harass the enemy with continuous marching maneuvers, stretch his communications, cut him off from bases, etc. Daun successfully used such tactics against Frederick during the second Silesian War and continued to adhere to it. Proposing that the Russian army move to winter quarters in Silesia, Daun intended to remove the Prussian army from the Oder, weaken it with multi-day marches and sieges and thereby prevent the outbreak of war during the 1759 campaign, and next year, together with the Russian army, continue to oust the Prussians from Silesia.

However, the “strategy of attrition” was completely unsuitable for the not very maneuverable Russian army, operating far from its bases, and the Russian government wanted a speedy end to the war during the 1759 campaign by defeating Frederick’s army and occupying Berlin. It was from such positions that the victories in the battles of Palzig and Kunersdorf were perceived in St. Petersburg. The newly minted field marshal was expected to develop success and demanded: “... although we must take care of preserving our army, that frugality is bad when we have to fight a war for several years instead of ending it in one campaign, with one blow.” The government hoped that Saltykov, having superiority in forces, would make “every effort to attack the king and defeat him.”

However, the heavy burden of responsibility for the fate of the army entrusted to him, moral fatigue after two battles, distrust of his ally and his plans - all this broke the will of Pyotr Semenovich. He openly sought to withdraw the troops and end the campaign. That is why Saltykov looked indifferently as Frederick gathered forces to continue the war. From his first messages from Frankfurt after the Kunersdorf victory, one cannot conclude that he is writing from the same commander who just two weeks ago completely defeated Frederick. So, on August 15, 1759, Saltykov melancholy reported: “... the king of Prussia with a defeated army is still standing close to us (6 miles) and, according to news, by collecting garrisons from everywhere and transporting large guns from Berlin and Stetin, he is strengthening and, of course, by strengthening either he will make an effort to unite with Prince Henry, or he will intend to attack us again... and if he does not want to attack us, he can constantly harass and exhaust us on the march.”

Meanwhile, the Conference sought from the Commander-in-Chief to intensify the army's actions. Without hiding their irritation, its members wrote on October 18, 1759 to Saltykov that they had received news of his refusal to help Laudon, who intended to attack Frederick. They were especially outraged by the fact that Saltykov not only refused this, but also publicly announced that he would expect the enemy, but would never attack him. In a rescript on October 13, the Conference resorted to the last argument: “... since the Prussian king had already attacked the Russian army four times, the honor of our weapons would require attacking him at least once, and now - especially since our army was superior to the Prussian army in number, and cheerfulness, and we explained to you at length that it is always more advantageous to attack than to be attacked,” for “if he [Frederick] had been attacked even once and was defeated, then he would have retreated forward with small forces, and our army would have more peace and more convenient food.”

However, let's return to the outskirts of Berlin. All the time while negotiations were going on in Guben, the Russians demanded from the allies the agreed upon food for the army; The Austrian military leader, after Prince Henry’s raid on his stores, had nothing and offered money instead of provisions. Saltykov replied: “My soldiers don’t eat money!” and prepared to retreat. Then the Vienna cabinet, on the proposal of Daun, urgently demanded that Saltykov consolidate his gains, threatening that otherwise he would be replaced and another would reap the fruits of his victories. This infuriated the Russian field marshal, and he immediately moved towards the Polish borders. But on the way, he received the highest order (!) to continue the war and reluctantly turned again to Silesia. Saltykov, deprived of the opportunity to act independently with Russian troops alone, was forced to reach a compromise agreement with Austria and abandon offensive plans. In the meantime, according to Daun's plan, the Russian intention was to besiege Glogau.

“The indignant Saltykov decided to act independently and headed towards the Glogau fortress, but Friedrich, having foreseen his intention, moved parallel to Saltykov in order to get ahead of him.” Friedrich was ahead of Saltykov and, taking a strong position in front of Glogau, blocked the road for the Russian army. Both had 24 thousand, and Saltykov decided not to get involved in the battle this time; “He considered it inappropriate to risk these troops 500 miles from his base.” It’s so interesting: the winner at Kunersdorf “considered it expedient” to measure strength with the Prussian king only if there was a large superiority in strength, and not at all with parity.

You can go to Berlin only if you unite with the Austrians, take the fight to the enemy - only by outnumbering him by one and a half to two times, at least... I think that even 5 miles from the base Saltykov would have thought the same thing. One way or another, on September 25, the opponents dispersed: Frederick did not attack the Russians, which we usually attribute to the “memory of Kunersdorf,” although in fact the king got rid of “an enemy who does not have the custom of evading battle” this time without firing a single shot.

Having not decided to enter into battle with Frederick, not receiving reinforcements from the main Austrian army and hearing that Daun had gone to Saxony, Saltykov hastily retreated. On September 30, he led the army along the banks of the Oder, reached the town of Ternstadt, wanted to take it, but encountering resistance, turned it into ashes and then set out in early November to the banks of the Warta and further to Poland. Laudon separated from the Russians and went to Moravia. This cartoonish conclusion to the 1759 campaign is still criticized by Russian historians. Of course, Down is blamed for all the troubles. “Daun’s inaction saved Prussia,” “Daun did not prepare the provisions promised for the Russians,” and “Frederick, and his conqueror Saltykov, and guardian angel Daun - all three revealed themselves to the fullest in this campaign,” etc.

Firstly, Down prepared provisions and it was not his direct fault that the Prussians destroyed this food (remember that at the beginning of the year the same fate befell the Russians). Famine began in the Austrian army, the soldiers stripped the local population clean. Secondly, Down’s inaction is indeed sad, but quite understandable and comparable to that of Saltykov, who, having slightly fewer troops than the Austrians, sulked at them like a schoolgirl, while running from Frederick, who was “completely defeated” by him, all over the Brandenburg.